PERFORMANCE-BASED AGREEMENTS AND TEACHER BONUSES IN RIO DE JANEIRO:

Between World Bank Recommendations and Local Policies

Abstract

This article examines teacher performance-based pay policies in Rio de Janeiro (2009-2023) in light of World Bank recommendations, through documentary analysis of international reports and municipal regulations (11 decrees and resolutions). The findings reveal that while Rio adopted the educational accountability model advocated by the World Bank - with standardized assessments (Prova Rio, IDE-Rio) and collective bonuses tied to targets - the implementation overlooked crucial warnings from the Bank's own reports. The city's policy prioritized quantitative indicators in Portuguese and Mathematics, creating pedagogical distortions and ignoring school inequalities, while political turnover (2009-2023) undermined its sustainability. Though formally aligned with international recommendations, the case exposes fundamental contradictions: despite investments in assessment and bonuses, there is no evidence of improved educational quality or reduced disparities. The study concludes that the uncritical transfer of this model failed to address local complexities, demonstrating the need for accountability systems that integrate evaluation, teacher development, and educator participation, moving beyond the narrow logic of standardized testing.