childhood epistemology in alice’s adventures in wonderland

an autonomous and experience-based field of knowledge

Abstract

This article examines Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland from the perspective of childhood epistemology, arguing that childhood knowledge should not be understood as deficient in relation to adult-centered rationality, but rather as an autonomous epistemic domain constituted through experience, uncertainty, and contextual interaction. The study conceptualizes childhood not merely as a pedagogical category, but as a distinct epistemic position that exists in structural tension with dominant adult knowledge regimes. Its point of departure lies in the limited number of studies within childhood research that directly problematize the epistemic status of childhood. The theoretical framework integrates Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, John Dewey’s theory of experiential learning, and Michel Foucault’s analyses of knowledge–power relations. Metho- dologically, the study employs qualitative close reading and thematic analysis, focusing on the scenes of the Queen’s Croquet Ground, Advice from a Caterpillar, and the Mad Tea Party. The findings demonstrate that adult epistemology in the text operates through arbitrary authority, normalizing judgments, and exclusionary discourses, thereby exposing its own internal inconsistencies. In contrast, Alice’s modes of knowing are shaped through trial and error, embodied experience, and the suspension of fixed meaning. The article positions Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as a critical epistemological space in which alternative forms of knowledge associated with childhood are literarily constructed, contributing to interdisciplinary debates in childhood studies, literary theory, and philosophy of knowledge.