psychomecanics of language and philosophy for children

Abstract

In his last theoretical book published in 2003, Thinking in Education, Matthew Lipman stated that within the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program, we need a theory of thinking, because without it the work that awaits its practitioners and those who focus on the formation of thinking may have no recognized effects. To make progress in this direction, he thought it particularly appropriate to take into account research on performative sentences, since language is in a sense a mind map. In this article, I want to take a step further on the path Lipman paved by appealing to the field of linguistics known as the psychomechanics of language and to linguist Gustave Guillaume, who dedicated most of his research to understanding how thinking constructs language by constructing itself through language. First, I will outline the major points of Guillaume’s theory of language, focusing on his important distinction between “tongue” (after “langue” as proposed by Saussure in 1916) and “discourse” (which, in the reconstruction of Saussure’s theory, he substituted for the latter’s “parole”), which oppose each other in many respects. For example, while tongue is something we use, discourse designates the space in which we use tongue. Further, while tongue is the result of a construction that spans a long period of time, discourse takes a relatively short amount of time to construct. Moreover, when a talking subject enters into language she has to construct discourse whereas she already possesses a constructed tongue. Thus tongue seems like something permanent within thought, while discourse has a superficial, discontinuous character that is alternately present and absent. In short, tongue has the character of something acquired and established deep in thought, in a sustainable and durable manner. In contrast, discourse is not established—it asserts freedom in the face of an instituted tongue. Second, I will examine how these distinctions take shape within the subtle game between the two French articles “un” and “le,” demonstrating how these represent a variation of the concept rather than what logicians typically identify as the comprehension and extension of the concept. Third, I will invite readers to imagine how Lipman’s first philosophical novel, Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery, might have been different had he known about Gustave Guillaume’s linguistic theory concerning articles. By imagining how some of the book’s key chapters may have differed, I will put myself in the shoes of its main character Harry and consider how he could have been driven, with the help of his peers, to envision the ways in which his questioning endeavour ultimately entailed a complete reversal in the world of education.