Constituição e independência do Banco Central / Constitution and independency of the Central Bank
Keywords:
Marxismo e direito, Crítica marxista do constitucionalismo, Independência do Banco Central / Marxism and law, Marxist critique of constitutionalism, Independence of the Central Bank.Abstract
DOI:10.1590/2179-8966/2017/26636
Resumo
O artigo desenvolve análise interdisciplinar, entre direito e economia, indagando sobre eventual “independência” do Banco Central quanto à fixação da taxa Selic. A partir da perspectiva marxista e de conceitos do approachkeynesiano, sustenta que, à luz dos dispositivos constitucionais reguladores da ordem econômica, a autoridade monetária deve buscar o pleno emprego, adequando sua função a esse objetivo.
Palavras-chave:Marxismo e direito; Crítica marxista do constitucionalismo; Independência do Banco Central.
Abstract
The article develops an interdisciplinary analysis, between law and economics, inquiring about the "independence" of the Central Bank in relation to the Selic rate. From the Marxist perspective and the concepts of the Keynesian approach, he argues that, in the light of the constitutional provisions regulating the economic order, the monetary authority must seek full employment, adjusting its function to that objective.
Keywords:Marxism and law; Marxist critique of constitutionalism; Independence of the Central Bank.
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