O dever de apreciação de todos os argumentos feitos pelas partes à luz da doutrina de Ronald Dworkin

Abstract

The article addresses the issue of the reasoning behind judicial decisions in Brazilian law. It begins with a study of the procedural norms regulating the duty to motivate judicial decisions, explaining the functions, characteristics, and objectives of reasoning under the paradigms of the Rule of Law, the political and social legitimacy of the judicial function, and the right to adversarial proceedings in its strong sense. The method is bibliographic with a theoretical and conceptual analysis, consists of examining and interpreting the ideas and arguments of Dworkin about justice, employing an analytical approach. Further, the judicial duty of reasoning is discussed in light of Ronald Dworkin, with regard to the need for rational justification of decisions to obtain the correct answer, considered as the conjunction between the best solution that can be given by the judge and the best solution to be obtained in the specific case, always based on the arguments presented by the parties. It also discusses the dominant jurisprudential position that does not recognize the obligation of the judge to respond to all issues raised by the parties, as well as the mismatch of this understanding with Dworkin's doctrine and with the norms from which the judicial duty of reasoning derives.

Keywords: Reasoning; judicial decision; Ronald Dworkin; coherence; rule of law.