A legitimação moral dos direitos humanos: uma análise dos princípios de justiça de John Rawls / The moral legitimation of human rights: an analysis on John Rawls’ principles of justice
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12957/dep.2011.2191Abstract
DOI 10.12957/dep.2011.2191
Resumo
Este artigo analisará, em primeiro lugar, o significado kantiano de legitimação e a sua distinção em relação à legitimidade. Num segundo momento, tratará de aspectos centrais da teoria de John Rawls, o qual influenciado por Kant, Locke e Rousseau, construiu uma teoria universalista e procedimental baseada em princípios morais de justiça. Por fim, serão ainda apresentadas algumas críticas à teoria rawlsiana.
Palavras-chave: legitimação; teoria da justiça; elementos estruturadores; princípios morais de justiça; críticas à teoria rawlsiana.
Abstract
This paper will examine, first, the Kantian notion of legitimation, and the distinction between legitimation and legitimacy. Secondly, it will address some key aspects of John Rawls’ theory, who influenced by Kant, Locke and Rousseau, built a universal and proceduralist theory grounded on the moral principles of justice. Finally, some critics on Rawlsian theory will be also presented.
Keywords: legitimacy; a theory of justice; structuring elements; the moral principles of justice; critics on Rawlsian theory.
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