The art of not doing: the Composition of the Senate, the 2026 Election, and Brazilian Foreign Policy | A arte de não fazer: Composição Senatorial, Eleição de 2026 e a Política Externa Brasileira

Abstract

How can the same Brazilian Senate approve more than 97% of diplomatic nominations, leave the Washington post vacant for 16 months, and, in 2026, reject a Supreme Court nominee for the first time since the Floriano Peixoto presidency? We argue that the formal confirmation rate is an imperfect measure of legislative constraint: it captures only the outcome of a screening process that takes place before the vote, through three informal mechanisms, anticipation of preferences, beija-mão lobbying, and holds by omission, whose function varies with the Senate’s coalition composition without being reflected in confirmation rates. Using a Monte Carlo simulation of 50,000 iterations for 2026 (with 54 of the Senate’s 81 seats up for renewal), we show that institutional collapse (C4) is absent, while a contentious regime (C2) reaches a 61% probability and maintains confirmation rates (91–93%) nearly indistinguishable from those observed under the routine regime (92–93%). This divergence between high confirmation rates and the actual costs of vacancy, delay, and self-censorship is not captured by conventional metrics. The findings suggest that veto rates systematically underestimate legislative power.