Notes on the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his contribution to the truth problem: the impossibility of the existence of legal rules as definitive ‘ought’ reasons

Authors

  • Leandro Seberino da Silva UNIVALI - Universidade do Vale do Itajaí/SC
  • Douglas Roberto Martins UNIVALI - Universidade do Vale do Itajaí/SC

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12957/publicum.2016.21808

Keywords:

Philosophical Hermeneutics, Understanding, Interpretation, Truth, Legal Norm.

Abstract

This article examines the legal norm from the perspective of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in order to demonstrate the impossibility of the existence of legal rules as definitive ‘ought’ reasons. It starts by identifying the main categories of Gadamer’s theory and his operational concepts. Further, applying them to the interpretation of legal texts, it concludes that the attribution of meaning occurs only in the present, in sight of a concrete problem, and it is made possible by language and the pre-judgment of the interpreter, which is why there are no absolute truths established a priori.

Author Biographies

Leandro Seberino da Silva, UNIVALI - Universidade do Vale do Itajaí/SC

Master in Juridical Science candidate at UNIVALI. Lawyer.

Douglas Roberto Martins, UNIVALI - Universidade do Vale do Itajaí/SC

Master in Juridical Science candidate at UNIVALI. Persecutor in Santa Catarina State. Law dgree at Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina.

Published

2016-07-19

How to Cite

da Silva, L. S., & Martins, D. R. (2016). Notes on the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his contribution to the truth problem: the impossibility of the existence of legal rules as definitive ‘ought’ reasons. Revista Publicum, 2(1), 203–221. https://doi.org/10.12957/publicum.2016.21808

Issue

Section

Artigos Científicos