Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Autor/innen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2023.75437

Schlagworte:

Nonproliferation, Nuclear-Powered Submarines, Nuclear Safeguards

Abstract

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap.

Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023

Autor/innen-Biografie

Marcos Valle Machado da Silva, Brazilian Naval War College (Escola de Guerra Naval - EGN)

 

NOME: Marcos Valle Machado da Silva.

 

 

CARGO ATUAL: Professor da Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN), ministrando as disciplinas de Logística e Mobilização Militar para os cursos de Estado-Maior.

 

 

 

TITULAÇÃO:

 

  • Doutor em Ciência Política (UFF);

  • Mestre em Relações Internacionais (UERJ);

  • Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos (UFF);

  • MBA em Gerenciamento de Projetos (PUC-Rio);

  • Especialização em História Contemporânea (UFF);

  • Especialização em História das Relações internacionais (UERJ);

  • MBA em Gestão Empresarial (COPPEAD);

  • Curso de Estado-Maior para Oficiais Superiores (C-EMOS); e

  • Graduação em Ciências Navais (Escola Naval).

 

 


Literaturhinweise

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Veröffentlicht

2023-11-28

Zitationsvorschlag

Silva, M. V. M. da. (2023). Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez. Mural Internacional, 14, e75437. https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2023.75437

Ausgabe

Bd. 14 (2023): JAN~DEZ

Rubrik

DOSSIÊ | DOSSIER Ordem Nuclear Internacional em Xeque

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