Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: There is no gap; There is a First Time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2023.75437

Palavras-chave:

Não Proliferação, Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear, Salvaguardas Nucleares

Resumo

Existe uma lacuna no Regime de Não Proliferação de Armas Nucleares em relação ao material nuclear utilizado para a propulsão de submarinos desenvolvidos ou operados por Estados não nuclearmente armados? Essa questão desponta com o avanço constante do programa do submarino de propulsão nuclear brasileiro, bem como em decorrência da parceria estratégica AUKUS. O argumento proposto no artigo é o de que não existe essa lacuna, uma vez que os Acordos de Salvaguardas Abrangentes (CSA) da AIEA abordam essa questão. No entanto, ainda não foram elaborados modelos de Procedimentos Especiais para esse tipo de material nuclear. O artigo está estruturado em três etapas. A primeira tem como foco a discussão sobre a existência de tal lacuna. Em seguida é feita a análise comparativa dos CSA assinados pela Austrália e Brasil com a AIEA. As considerações finais apresentam as inferências sobre a existência − ou não − dessa lacuna.

Recebido em: 30 abr. 2023 | Aceito em: 18 nov. 2023

Biografia do Autor

Marcos Valle Machado da Silva, Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN)

 

NOME: Marcos Valle Machado da Silva.

 

 

CARGO ATUAL: Professor da Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN), ministrando as disciplinas de Logística e Mobilização Militar para os cursos de Estado-Maior.

 

 

 

TITULAÇÃO:

 

  • Doutor em Ciência Política (UFF);

  • Mestre em Relações Internacionais (UERJ);

  • Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos (UFF);

  • MBA em Gerenciamento de Projetos (PUC-Rio);

  • Especialização em História Contemporânea (UFF);

  • Especialização em História das Relações internacionais (UERJ);

  • MBA em Gestão Empresarial (COPPEAD);

  • Curso de Estado-Maior para Oficiais Superiores (C-EMOS); e

  • Graduação em Ciências Navais (Escola Naval).

 

 


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Publicado

28-11-2023

Como Citar

Silva, M. V. M. da. (2023). Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: There is no gap; There is a First Time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez. Mural Internacional, 14, e75437. https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2023.75437

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DOSSIÊ | DOSSIER Ordem Nuclear Internacional em Xeque