O sentimento de ser
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12957/ek.2023.81664Resumo
Trata-se da tradução do texto seminal de Matthew Ratcliffe The Feeling of Being (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2005, 12 (8-10):43-60), cuja importância para áreas teóricas como a Filosofia das Emoções e a Filosofia da Psiquiatria, mas também para áreas práticas e aplicadas como a própria Psiquiatria, a Psicologia e as Ciências Médicas justifica-se a partir da apresentação e tematização inaugural da noção de sentimentos existenciais (existential feelings), aqui discutida à luz de resultados da fenomenologia, neurofisiologia e psicopatologia.
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Recentemente tem havido uma série de discussões filosóficas sobre a relação entre emoção e sentimento. No entanto, em nossa fala cotidiana, “sentimento” não se restringe ao sentimento emocional, e a ênfase corrente sobre as emoções nos conduziu a uma negligência com relação a outros tipos de sentimento. Entre eles, estão os sentimentos de acolhimento, pertencimento, separação, não-familiaridade, poder, controle, ser parte de algo, estar em harmonia com a natureza e “estar presente”. Esses sentimentos talvez não sejam “emocionais”. Não obstante, sugiro aqui que eles formam um grupo distinto; todos esses sentimentos são modos nos quais “nos encontramos no mundo”. De fato, nosso senso de que existe um mundo e de que estamos “nele” é, sugiro, constituído por sentimento. Ofereço uma análise do que são esses “sentimentos existenciais”, mostrando como eles podem ser tanto “sentimentos corporais” quanto, ao mesmo tempo, parte da estrutura da intencionalidade.
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