

THE PROTESTS OF JUNE 2013 AND THE RESUMPTION OF CALLS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BRAZIL

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Abstract

The protests of June 2013 constituted a milestone in Brazilian contentious action, with the broad mobilization of people across the country. At that moment, the agendas and performances of the protesters formed a mosaic in the streets, without a predominant orientation. However, in the following years conservative actors achieved the protagonism of the mobilizations, leading the protests against Dilma Rousseff's second presidential term. Among those who confronted the government were those who defended military guardianship over power, in a notorious growth in the protests. In the research, the process of this expansion was analyzed, through the survey of journalistic articles in a systematic way, based on the methodology of the Analysis of Protest Events. The chosen vehicle was G1, besides the use of supporting materials, which enabled the observation of the participation of those who defended military intervention during the protests of 2013 and its growth process in the following years.

Keywords: Social movements, conservatism, 2013, military intervention, protests.

Os protestos de junho de 2013 e a retomada dos pedidos de intervenção militar no Brasil Resumo

Os protestos de junho de 2013 constituíram um marco na ação contenciosa brasileira, com a ampla mobilização de pessoas pelo país. Naquele momento, as pautas e performances dos manifestantes formavam um mosaico nas ruas, sem uma tônica predominante. No entanto, nos anos seguintes atores conservadores alcançaram o protagonismo das mobilizações, na liderança dos protestos contra o segundo mandato presidencial de Dilma Rousseff. Entre aqueles que enfrentavam o governo, estavam os que defendiam a tutela militar sobre o poder, em notório crescimento nas manifestações. Neste texto foi analisado o processo dessa expansão, por meio do levantamento de artigos jornalísticos de forma sistemática, baseado na metodologia da Análise de Eventos de Protesto. O veículo escolhido foi o G1, além do uso de materiais de apoio, o que possibilitou a observação da participação daqueles que defendiam a intervenção militar nos protestos de 2013 e o seu crescimento nos anos seguintes.

Palavras-chave: Movimentos sociais, conservadorismo, 2013, intervenção militar, protestos.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, Brazil has witnessed episodes of intense litigation, marked by a nationwide mobilization that gained momentum in June 2013. During that year, there was a mosaic of agendas and performances on the streets, lacking a prevailing identity (Alonso, 2017, p. 51). However, in the ensuing years, there was a notable rise in conservative participation, particularly evident in the leadership of demonstrations for the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (Workers' Party – PT), between 2015 and 2016. Concurrently, there was a discerning surge in calls for military intervention in the federal government. In 2023, approximately 3,900 people invaded and plundered key institutions, including Palácio do Planalto,¹ the Federal Supreme Court, and the National Congress. Their demands centered around the reinstatement of Jair Bolsonaro (Liberal Party – PL) to the presidency and the guardianship of the Armed Forces². Surprisingly, this intervention did not reflect a robust mobilization capacity, when compared to the 2013 protest cycle. This paper, stemming from an analysis of protests spanning from 2011 and 2019, aims to elucidate how leaders who advocated for military intervention composed the different moments of the national contentious action and fortified their positions in the face of the broader movements unfolded on the streets.

The post-2013 years were marked by the expansion of conservative groups and leaderships, as highlighted by several authors (Tatagiba; Trindade; Teixeira, 2015; Silva, 2018; Messenberg, 2017). In 2018, the retired captain Jair Bolsonaro (Social Liberal Party – PSL) emerged victorious in the elections. This marked a significant departure from the four consecutive victories of the Workers' Party, as Bolsonaro defended the celebration of the last national dictatorship and championed a “fight against the lefts” (Madeira; Quadros, 2017, p. 17). During the months that led to Bolsonaro's electoral triumph, truck drivers went on strike demanding military guardianship over the federal government from the North to the South. This underscored the intensification of the interventionist agenda which, in turn, became a remarkable element in the growth of national conservatism and revealed less-explored facets of Brazilian politics.

This paper delves into the analysis of the involvement of individuals termed “interventionists” in confrontational actions, the process unfolded since the major demonstrations of June 2013. The term “interventionists” is adopted from the self-designation used by the activists themselves. For the purpose of this research, it has been incorporated as a categorical descriptor to refer to those advocating for military intervention in Brazilian protests.

METHODOLOGY AND THE CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

This text originates from a doctoral program conducted within the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology at the University of São Paulo (PPGS-USP). The study focuses on the surge in calls for military intervention in Brazil, spanning the period from September 2011 to March 2019. The chosen timeframe spans the period just prior to the enactment of the law that established the Nacional Truth Commission and extends to the institutional commemoration of the 1964 coup d'état during Bolsonaro's (PSL) administration.

The research employed the Political Conflict Theory methodology (Tarrow; Tilly; McAdam, 2001) to scrutinize the street-level contentious actions and its interplay with state politics. In Brazil, there have been promising efforts aimed at advancing this framework for the analysis of such actions. Noteworthy contributions include works by Alonso (2017); Tatagiba, Trindade and Teixeira (2015); Bringel and Domingues (2013); Silva (2018), among others.

For the data survey, we conducted a press-focused research study employing the Protest Event Analysis methodology, grounded on the Political Conflict Theory (PCT) for the systematic collection of information on demonstrations in newspapers (Tarrow; Tilly; McAdam, 2001). Our selected source was the website G1, that belongs to Grupo Globo, chosen for its national coverage and local newsrooms, ensuring a thorough examination of protests across the country. Additionally, we utilized complementary sources by extracting surveying information from other communication channels, including pages of interventionist groups and testimonials from interventionist leaders.

According to this theoretical perspective, the protests consist of strategic interactions among the protesters themselves and between them and the authorities, operating movements of identification and differentiation, with symbols and forms of action that, when combined, shape political performances (Tarrow; Tilly; McAdam, 2001). The activists resort to forms of action available reunited in a “confrontation repertoire”, with a framework of historically accumulated references repeated throughout time, with occasional innovations depending on each context and used by the actors in protests (Tarrow, 1994, p. 18).

Thus, confrontational political action serves as the means through which citizens express their antagonism against authorities, participating in public demonstrations and drawing upon inherited forms of collective action (Tarrow; Tilly; McAdam, 2009, p. 13). Within this framework, social movements emerge as a historical phenomenon characterized by a “sequence of political confrontation rooted in supportive social networks and powerful collective action schemes which have developed to sustain provocations against powerful adversaries” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 18). While these movements may champion progressive agendas in various social contexts, they do not display a definition of their cultural or class motivations *a priori*, and can also encompass conservative activists, exemplified in cases such as of interventionism.

PCT examines collective political action within the interaction among agents, in the face of each opportunity identified – these are classified as events in the broader political context that lie beyond groups with the capacity to extend their intervention (Tarrow, 1994, p. 38). This paper is rooted in research that adheres to this agency, based on historical conditions and conjunctural events.

The unfolding sequence of protest cycles in the country since 2013, coupled with the deepening political crisis and the rise of conservatism, has illuminated the intricate dynamics shaping street actions and the scenario of the State. A protest cycle denotes the process during which litigation extends beyond the efforts of committed activists operating in the forefront of social movements (Tarrow, 1997). The events of 2013 exemplify such a cycle, characterized by the absence of a specific actor as the driving force behind the process (Bringel; Domingues, 2013; Alonso, 2017).

In the streets of Brazil, activists unified in the mobilizations for the presidential impeachment in the following years, between 2015 and 2016, particularly gaining momentum in events against the Dilma Rousseff government (Worker’s Party – PT) (Alonso; Mische, 2017, p. 157). As Alonso and Mische (2017, p. 152) analyze, the patriotic repertoire drew inspiration from symbols used in earlier demonstrations like *Fora Collor*³ and *Diretas Já*⁴, emphasizing grievances against corruption and incorporating the colors and representations of the national flag. By leveraging this repertoire, already featured in June 2013, and combining it with other performances on the streets, a strategic arena for patriotic action materialized in subsequent years during demonstrations. This field became an interactive space shaped by cooperative interactions among agents (Alonso; Mische, 2017, p. 146).

Once the strategic action field is identified, understanding its diversity becomes crucial. Within the “green-and-yellow” movement, several sectors exhibited potentials for both convergence and divergence during the unfolding events. Examples include those who advocated for neoliberalism, such as the *Movimento Brasil Livre*⁵ (Rocha, 2015; Gobbi, 2016); others dedicated to addressing corruption, with foundations laid since the *Mensalão*⁶ (Silva, 2018) and the *Marcha Contra a Corrupção*⁷, birthplace of national groups *Brasil Contra a Corrupção*⁸ and *NasRuas*⁹; additionally, there were groups with a focus on moral conservatism, particularly in gender debates, functioning as a countermovement since the early days of the Workers’ Party government (Rezende, 2016), among others. Within this landscape, the analysis centers on those who, amidst the political confrontation, prioritized the advocacy for military intervention.

In addition to delving into the concepts and methodologies of PCT, we drew on the insights of other authors who examine political processes from a relational perspective. Particularly noteworthy is the work of sociologist Michel Dobry (2014), who explains political crises as processes. According to the author, the fundamental dimension of uncertainty in fluid contexts is inherently relational, stemming from a conjunctural transformation of relationships among various sectors and the internal logics within them. This transformation corresponds to a specific status of structures and social relations, marked by moments of social dynamism and tactical

games in opposition to political routine and stability. In such moments, whether experienced by individual or collective agents, there is an awareness of structural uncertainty, leading to an amplification of their possibilities for action.

In line with the adopted methodology, conservatism has been integrated as a relational category. As stated by Hirschman (1992), this perspective emerges in opposition to progressivism in social action, contending through its rhetoric that changes lack reliability or validity. As per his insights, conservatism manifests as a resistance to the transformative forces in modern society (expansion of individual rights, secularization, and cosmopolitanism) and a reaffirmation of foundational societal pillars (family, religion, and nation). The resurgence of interventionist patriotism in the country aligns with the elements identified by the author. Engaging in a dialog with experiences from the national authoritarian past, the leadership of this movement has elevated an extreme appreciation for the military to the forefront of street-level action.

THE PROTEST CYCLE IN JUNE 2013

In her examination of the protest cycle in June 2013, Alonso (2017) underscores the tension and competition arising from the utilization of socialist, patriotic and autonomist repertoires. This interplay forms a mosaic of activist performances and agendas. Furthermore, in a publication with Ann Mische (Alonso; Mische, 2017), it was observed that, during that period, actors were stratified into two "strategic fields of action" – one aligned with the left and the other with the right of the federal government. The concept of "strategic fields of action" refers to socially constructed arenas wherein actors with varying resources compete for influence. Those with socialist and autonomist orientations typically associated with the former, while actors positioned to the right of the government have increasingly embraced the patriotic repertoire since 2013.

Meanwhile, the protests of 2013 marked a pivotal moment of profound crisis, catalyzing major changes within the national power coalition. Actors from different sectors underwent a reorganization of their political strategies, forging alliances across various arenas to challenge both local and federal governments. Amidst the multiplicity of voices echoing through during that period, the interventionists were already a notable presence.

G1's coverage did not detect any calls for intervention during the June protests. Nevertheless, records of such requests can be found, albeit in a limited manner, in other media outlets. An example is the newspaper *Gazeta do Povo*, which asserts that the initial emergence of the demand for military guardianship occurred during the June protests of that year in São Paulo¹⁰.

During the interviews conducted for the research that forms the basis of this article, the presence of interventionists in the June 2013 mobilizations was identified. An illustrative example is José Geraldo Quartim de Moraes, the leader of the *União Nacionalista Democrática*¹¹:

José: V., UND has consistently been highly engaged, particularly in the street-level activism. We actively took part in all the protests [...] We sustained our involvement with the group on the streets from 2013 until the middle of the previous year, when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged. Subsequently, we ceased our street-level activities because of health concerns. We should not and could not form large gatherings. We took part in movements on Avenida Paulista and other ones all over Brazil with very strong, sizeable actions. This includes marches, car rallies, and trucks sponsored by us for speeches by any political group that we allowed to speak. I mean, it was a very active engagement that has changed since then. It has changed because of Covid. It has changed because we perceive that the issues within the judiciary are much more pressing and much more decisive. We need a shift in the way the judiciary works in the country. The focus has shifted away from commemorations and political motivations on Avenida Paulista; I believe this phase has run its course.

V.: And did you even take part in the 2013 protests?

José: Yes.

Another leader interviewed was businessman Piero Pagni, who took part in the reedition of *Marcha da Família*¹² in São Paulo in 2014. He led a group that delivered a letter advocating for military intervention to the Command of the 2nd Military Region. When queried about his involvement in the 2013 protests, he remarked: "I've consistently participated in the various protests against the PT government, be it on Avenida Paulista, in Parque do Povo, Ibirapuera, and so forth."¹³

Hence, it becomes evident that proponents of military intervention were already active in the 2013 mobilizations. Nonetheless, during the June cycle, the patriotic repertoire was merely one among many that permeated the streets, and the interventionists did not prominently distinguish themselves amid the diverse array of demands showcased in posters, banners and through the actions of the activists.

THE DISPUTE OVER MEMORY AND THE 2013 PROTESTS

In the subsequent month, on July 10, the "March of the family with God, in defense of life, freedom, homeland and democracy, against communism" was organized in São Paulo. The event gained traction through Facebook, where a call for military intervention was issued to safeguard the nation from an alleged communist threat. The message to the participants stated: "Stand against the sickle and the hammer. Our flag bears the colors green, yellow, white, and indigo blue. We reject the color red – the red of communists, socialists, the red of blood, symbolizing the people drained by rotten, vampiric, genocidal politicians"¹⁴.

During the protest in São Paulo, approximately 50 people attended (Calil, 2016, p. 519). While this signifies a small gathering, it serves as a demonstration of the existence and willingness to mobilize this type of activism in the immediate post-June period. It is noteworthy that the event's title bears a striking resemblance to the "March of the Family with God for Freedom", an assembly organized on March 22, 1964, which served as a social force justification for the military coup.

During that period, the presence of activism was quite relevant, drawing connections between the civil-military dictatorship of 1964 and the contemporary federal administration, whose leader had faced persecution and political imprisonment by the agents of the regime. The event further accentuated the opposition against the National Truth Commission (CNV), which had been ongoing since 2012, incorporating state experiences. Notably, the Workers' Party played a leading role advocating for the Truth, aligning with the principles of Transitional Justice in Brazil (Cunha, 2020, p. 184) and building upon the initiatives by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) to acknowledge the authoritarian period. Conversely, defenders of Brazil's authoritarian past perceived the establishment of the CNV in this context as an act of "revanchism" against the Armed Forces (Castro, 2021, p. 155).

Following the March of the Family in July, a significant event occurred on November 15, 2013, marking the first protest with an intervention agenda covered by G1. This demonstration took place in Brasília and was led by the retired military officer Emílio Alarcon. He served as the primary figure in the interventionist group *O Pesadelo de Qualquer Político*¹⁵, which remained notably active throughout the studied period. The group asserted that their objective was to showcase to the population that the military governance was the most effective way to run the country. Their banner declared: "Military intervention now! Brazil demands order and progress"¹⁶. This event represents the inaugural interventionist protest documented by the research source spanning September 2011 to March 2019. Notably, the choice of the date for this event holds a great symbolic value. The Proclamation of the Republic of Brazil signifies a historical moment marked by military intervention, as it inaugurated the nation's republican history with military figures assuming leadership roles. Thus, the year ended in an interventionist mobilization in the country's capital following the significant protests of June 2013.

Following this modest event, the interventionist agenda reappeared in the G1 coverage in March 2014, marking the 50th anniversary of the civil-military dictatorship. During this time, there was a mobilization of individuals advocating for the remembrance of 1964, serving as a counterpoint to the progressing work of the CNV. These voices emerged within a context of purportedly challenging the institutional silence surrounding the dictatorial period, a silence that

persisted through the political opening and was justified by the Amnesty Law (Araújo; Dias, 2018, p. 129; Teles, Quinalha, 2020, p. 348).

Confronted with the progress of the National Truth Commission, those in opposition to the initiative rallied to defend the memory of the dictatorship and advocate for a renewed intervention. In this spirit, a reiteration of the March of the Family took place in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, drawing 500¹⁷ and 200¹⁸ participants, respectively. In Rio de Janeiro, the event was orchestrated with the involvement of retired captain and then-federal representative Jair Bolsonaro (then affiliated to the Progressive Party - PP). Both demonstrations focused on opposing the PT government, led by Dilma Rousseff, denouncing corruption, and endorsing a call for a fresh intervention in the country.

The occurrence took place in the final year of Dilma Rousseff's initial term. Rousseff embodied a perceived threat to advocates of military intervention, being associated with a "communist" party represented by the color red. Furthermore, she was previously persecuted and tortured during the civil-military dictatorship and labeled as a "terrorist". Her government's legacy was intertwined with the establishment of the CNV. The revival of the March of the Family can be therefore viewed as a direct response by interventionists to the ongoing Transitional Justice policies, serving to reassert a positive narrative surrounding the events of 1964 and their history of mobilization. This event represented both a commemoration of the occurrences that took place 50 years prior – a precursor to such activism in Brazil – and an updated interpretation of its significance. Consequently, in the days following 2013, interventionist activists had already begun leveraging the reference to the March of the Family, and on the commemoration of its half-century, a resurgence occurred, marked by a demonstration of increased strength on the streets.

It is noteworthy that the March of the Family originally comprised a series of mobilizations called by conservative factions that endorsed the intervention in 1964. The most significant among them, the March of the Family with God for Freedom, occurred in São Paulo and, collectively with the others, intensified the opposition against João Goulart's government and the ongoing fundamental reforms (Codato; Oliveira, 2004, p. 272). This organizational effort emerged in response to the pro-Reform gathering held in Rio de Janeiro on March 13, 1964, which attracted approximately 200,000 people, swelling to 500,000 people in São Paulo on March 19 (Codato; Oliveira, 2004, p. 273).


THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CRISIS AND CONSERVATIVE GROWTH

The term "crisis" originates from the Greek *krisis*, denoting decision, and *krinein*, meaning examination and decision-making (Dobry, 2014). Its etymology underscores a fundamental aspect involving the disruption of life's routine, specifically how political processes propel actors into a unique state wherein they break with *habitus* and question power structures, constituting a moment of significant decisions. In political contexts characterized by fluid, crisis-driven conjunctures, the question of legitimacy among those in power takes center stage. According to Dobry, these conjunctures "often have *short-term* effects on the stocks of legitimacy or 'diffuse support' from which authorities and political regimes draw benefit" (Dobry, 2014, p. 120), ultimately leading to a process of delegitimization.

Since 2013, the Brazilian political landscape has witnessed an onslaught of decisions involving a diverse array of actors in national politics. Citizens have taken to the streets, with many participating in contentious action for the first time, aligning themselves either with the right or the left of local and federal governments. Nevertheless, according to Tatagiba, Trindade and Teixeira (2015), the demonstrations in 2013 marked the inception of a period characterized by "the first time that organizations with no tradition of left-wing activism successfully orchestrated massive protest mobilizations after the re-establishment of democracy" (p. 197).

Concerning the escalation of discontent, Dobry (2014) cautions that a substantial portion of crises does not function as the "cause" behind major protests. Instead, social protest can be strategically employed by actors post the initiation of contentious actions to delegitimize governments and regimes. This phenomenon is exemplified by the approval ratings of the Dilma Rousseff (PT) government since 2013, as demonstrated by the Datafolha opinion polls (Graph 1).

Graph 1– Approval of the Dilma Rousseff government



Source: Chart designed by the author, based on data of Instituto Datafolha.

The president enjoyed significant popularity prior to the major protests of 2013, with Dilma Rousseff (PT) even being recognized by Forbes magazine in 2012 as one of the 100 most powerful women in the world¹⁹. However, the shift in government approval ratings following the June mobilizations is indicative. Between March and the last week of June, the government's popularity plummeted by half, and it has never since fully rebounded. The subsequent years witnessed a further decline in approval, particularly during the impeachment process, deepening public disapproval.

In this context, both interventionists and various conservative sectors responded to the political crisis that had been unfolding in the country since 2013. Their actions were calculated to advance their own growth, thereby capitalizing on the political opportunities that presented themselves on a national scale during this period. Silva (2018) notes that certain "conservative activist" groups had been operating in Brazil since the initial Lula government. Significantly, from 2007 onward, these groups initiated efforts to mobilize public opinion, specifically aiming to associate PT administrations with corruption. As outlined by the author, these groups functioned as counter-movements, resisting government policies aligned with the demands of trade unionism, feminism, land reform movements, and others. Notably, the groundwork for this action was laid well before the major mobilizations of 2013. The groups already had an organizational structure that permeated various social spaces, providing them with the capacity to discern and exploit opportunities arising from the protests (Silva, 2018, p. 102).

In the backdrop of the conservative co-optation of the public spaces (Silva, 2018), the landscape unfolds with the ascent of groups that had pre-existing organizational structures and the emergence of novel groups and leaders. Integral to the unfolding dynamics are the interventionists, deeply enmeshed in a historical continuum rooted in Brazilian authoritarianism. This historical perspective is exemplified by entities like the Democratic Nationalist Union (UND), founded in 1993, and O Pesadelo de Qualquer Político, established in 2007. Both entities emerged as prominent nationwide interventionist groups during the surveyed period (September 2011 - March 2019). Notably, the contours of this historical trajectory extended further, encompassing the incorporation of the leader of Pesadelo into Scuderie Le Cocq²⁰ in 2017. It's noteworthy that Scuderie Le Cocq, founded in 1965, holds historical significance as, according to Manso, it serves as the origin of Death Squads in Brazil (Manso, 2020, p. 130-131).

THE YEARS AFTER 2013 AND INTERVENTIONISM

Following the protest cycle in 2013, the contentious actions in the country persisted unabated. The subsequent year witnessed a heated electoral showdown resulting in the re-election of Dilma Rousseff (PT), setting the stage for heightened conflicts with her government. Various actors, spanning the media, judiciary, legislature, diverse executive roles, the business community, and

social movements collaborated in an orchestrated effort to tie her administration and the PT to allegations of corruption. The apex of this association manifested during the Operation Car Wash, despite the fact that the impeachment request was officially rooted in the so-called "pedaladas fiscais"²¹.

A year following the June cycle, between March and June 2014, another decline in the government's popularity was observed, attributed to the wave of World Cup demonstrations in Brazil²². Following the tumultuous period of the World Cup, marked by the historic 7-1 national defeat of the national football team, the latter half of the year was characterized by the electoral debate that ultimately secured Dilma Rousseff's (PT) re-election. Simultaneously, this period witnessed the heightened momentum of Operation Car Wash.

In November 2014²³, the month immediately after Dilma Rousseff's (PT) re-election, the seventh phase of Operation Car Wash unfolded. During this phase, the Federal Police executed 85 search and seizure warrants and 14 arrest warrants. Among those arrested were directors of significant contractors and the former director of services at Petrobras. As reported by Datafolha, a substantial 68% of respondents, when queried about the government during this period, expressed the belief that Dilma had some responsibility for the evident corruption scheme.

In parallel, literature analyzes the actions taken by parliamentary benches during this period, shedding light on the observed phenomenon of the right's diminishing "shame" (Madeira; Quadros, 2017). To elaborate, since the era of re-democratization, parliamentarians have typically identified themselves as "center" rather than explicitly aligning with the "right". However, a qualitative shift occurred after the 2014 elections. The Inter-Union Department of Parliamentary Advice (Diap) further corroborated this shift by characterizing this election as pivotal in generating the most conservative parliament since 1964 (Madeira; Quadros, 2017). Notably, the 2014 contest also distinguished itself through alterations in the electoral landscape of the state of Rio de Janeiro. During this election, Jair Bolsonaro (Progressive Party - PP) emerged as the most voted federal representative, quadrupling his vote count.

It is crucial to clarify that the significance of 2013 lies not in merely designating it as the "serpent's egg" of the burgeoning conservatism but in examining the unfolding dynamics post the June cycle. This period allowed actors to reassess their positions and strategies (Dobry, 2014). Moreover, irrespective of one's alignment – whether on the right or left of Dilma Rousseff's (PT) government (Alonso; Mische, 2017) – a shared element characterizes their actions: a prioritization of confrontational approaches as a mode of demonstrating dissatisfaction and clashes with the government.

Against this backdrop, the interventionist movement experienced a notable surge in strength during 2013, a momentum that persisted in the following years. Initially participating in the June 2013 cycle, they continued to assert their presence by actively engaging in street demonstrations, contributing to the nationwide protests against the Dilma Rousseff (PT) government. This period marked the zenith of the interventionists' influence within the timeframe under scrutiny. Between January 2015 and August 2016, spanning Dilma Rousseff's (PT) second term and the demonstrations advocating for her impeachment, 62 protests were identified wherein individuals explicitly called for military intervention. This presence extended across almost the entire country, with the exception of the states of Acre, Amapá, Tocantins, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte and Minas Gerais, as per G1 data – with further territorial expansion in the subsequent years.

Table 1 – Protests with calls for military intervention in Brazil (September 2011 - March 2019)

Year	N. of Protests (G1)
2011	0
2012	0
2013	1
2014	5
2015	43
2016	28
2017	4
2018	30
2019	4

Source: Table created by the author based on G1 data collection.

The Table 1 delineates the progression of interventionist activities since 2013. It is essential to highlight that the survey, spanning from September 2011 to March 2019, may not capture protests in months outside this period. Regarding the events of 2016, within the 28 protests featuring interventionists documented on G1, 19 of them occurred between January and August, when the presidential impeachment took place.

It is important to acknowledge that the data presented here has been organized by G1, and the sole protest featuring interventionists covered by the news portal in 2013 occurred in Brasília on November 15, involving only three participants. Nevertheless, it crucial to highlight that other media outlets identified calls for military intervention as early as June of that year. Additionally, through interviews conducted for this research, it was evident that leaders of interventionist groups were already active on the streets during that period. Furthermore, in July a March of the Family took place in São Paulo, drawing 50 participants. Notably, in the subsequent year, in the 50th anniversary of the 1964 event, the same march mobilized hundreds of participants.

The aforementioned illustrates the early involvement of interventionists in the June 2013 protests, leveraging the crisis within the federal government in the following years. The surge in interventionist activism unfolded concurrently with the broader trend of conservatism strengthening in Brazil. Furthermore, this phenomenon mirrored a global context marked by a rightward shift in political spectrum (Traverso, 2018; Rocha, 2015; Hochschild, 2016).

CONCLUSION

The heightened prevalence of confrontational actions in Brazil since 2013 reveals crucial facets of the country's social movements. Notably, the period witnessed a surge in activism centering around calls for military intervention. In other words, among the various actors who participated in street demonstrations in June of that year, there has been a subsequent rise in the presence of those challenging democracy and its representative mechanisms. Consequently, it becomes evident that interventionists actively engaged in the 2013 protests and, significantly, persisted on the streets in the ensuing years. Their prominence grew significantly during the protests against the Dilma Rousseff (PT) government between 2015 and 2016.

Hence, interventionists, constituting a multifaceted sector characterized by the utilization of the ascendant patriotic repertoire, experienced growth amid the unfolding crisis of the federal government. While their emergence was particularly notable in the large protests against Dilma Rousseff (PT), it is essential to recognize that this sector of social movements had pre-existing organizational structures. This is the case of the Democratic Nationalist Union, founded in 1993, and O Pesadelo de Qualquer Político, from 2007. Both groups emerged as prominent interventionist movements with activists on a national scale during the studied period (September

2011 - March 2019). Furthermore, it was possible to note the participation of one of their leaders in the Scuderie Le Cocq, founded in 1965.

The interventionists trace a historical trajectory reminiscent of the past movements associated with Brazilian authoritarian nationalism. Beyond the enduring nature of their groups and leadership, their references extend to Brazil's secular past. After all, their persistent propaganda of the 1964 intervention and their exploitation of the Proclamation of the Republic highlight their roots in historical military interventions. Within this framework, activists seized the opportunity presented by the perceived "communist threat" associated with the crisis of the government, strengthening their perspective once more. Adopting a long-term perspective becomes instrumental in recognizing the deep roots of this movement, as it continually reinvents itself and experiences a resurgence in the early years of the 21st century in Brazil.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES

- ¹ The official workplace of the president of Brazil.
- ² “Veja integra dos alertas da Abin ao GSI e ao Ministério da Justiça antes do 8/1” (“See the full text of Abin’s warnings to GSI and the Ministry of Justice before 1/8”), Folha de São Paulo. Available at: <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2023/04/veja-integra-dos-alertas-da-abin-ao-gsi-e-ao-ministerio-da-justica-antes-do-81.shtml>>. Last accessed on May 12, 2023.
- ³ T.N. Demonstrations for the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1984.
- ⁴ T.N. Political movement in favor of the return of popular elections during the military dictatorship in the 1960s.
- ⁵ T.N. Free Brazil Movement, a neoliberal conservative movement linked to the right.
- ⁶ T.N. A corruption case involving the Worker’s Party (PT) in 2005.
- ⁷ T.N. March Against Corruption.
- ⁸ “Movement Brazil Against Corruption @movimentobrasilcontracorrupcao”. Available at: <<https://web.facebook.com/pg/movimentobrasilcontracorrupcao/>>. Last accessed on: June 12, 2023.
- ⁹ “NasRuas [OnTheStreets] @nasruas”. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/nasruas/>>. Accessed on: June 12, 2023.
- ¹⁰ “Caminhoneiros pedem a intervenção dos militares. Por quê?” [“Truck drivers call for military intervention. Why?”]. Gazeta do Povo. Available at: <www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/republica/caminhoneiros-pedem-a-intervencao-dos-militares-por-que-9zrnriy73ruauxk7woowf3vy1/>. Accessed on: May 16, 2023.
- ¹¹ Interview granted by José Geraldo Quartim Barbosa, leader of UND and resident of São Paulo, on Aug. 3, 2021.
- ¹² March of the Family.
- ¹³ Testimonial by Piero Pagni, leader of the Reedition of the March of the Family in São Paulo, granted on June 25, 2021.
- ¹⁴ “SP: marcha 'em defesa da liberdade' pede volta dos militares ao poder” [“SP: march 'in defense of freedom' calls for the return of the military to power”]. Terra. Available at: <<https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/politica/sp-marcha-em-defesa-da-liberdade-pede-volta-dos-militares-ao-poder,e5d130a67cacf310VgnVCM4000009bcceb0aRCRD.html>>. Accessed on: June 13, 2023.
- ¹⁵ Any Politician's Nightmare
- ¹⁶ “Trio faz protesto na Esplanada e pede intervenção militar no Brasil” [“Trio protests at Esplanada and calls for military intervention in Brazil”], G1. Available at: <<https://g1.globo.com/distrito-federal/noticia/2013/11/trio-faz-protesto-na-esplanada-e-pede-intervencao-militar-no-brasil.html>>. Accessed on: May 17 2022.
- ¹⁷ “Marcha da Família leva cerca de 500 manifestantes em São Paulo” [March of the Family draws approximately 500 protesters in São Paulo], Globo. Available at: <<https://globoplay.globo.com/v/3232108/>>. Accessed on: May 17 2022.
- ¹⁸ “Grupo faz reedição de Marcha da Família no Centro do Rio” [Group organizes re-edition of the March of the Family in Rio de Janeiro], G1. Available at: <<https://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2014/03/grupo-faz-reedicao-de-marcha-da-familia-no-centro-do-rio.html>>. Accessed on: May 17 2022.
- ¹⁹ “Avaliação do governo Dilma bate novo recorde e sobe de 59% para 62%, aponta CNI/Ibope” [Evaluation of Dilma’s government reaches new record and improves from 59% to 62%]. UOL. Available at: <<https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2012/09/26/pesquisa-cni-ibope---dilma.htm>>. Accessed on: June 12, 2023.
- ²⁰ T.N.: Scuderie Detective Le Cocq[1][2] or Squadron Le Cocq was an unofficial organization created by police officers in Rio de Janeiro in 1965 and operated mainly in the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, being dissolved by a judicial decision in the early 2000s.[3] This organization killed at least 1,500 people in Espírito Santo and is considered the first death squad in Rio de Janeiro and the most famous in Brazil. Source: Wikipedia

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- ²¹ “Dilma: O mandato em jogo” [“Dilma: Mandate at stake”]. G1. Available at: <<http://especiais.g1.globo.com/politica/2016/dilma-o-mandato-em-jogo/>>. Accessed on: June 12, 2023.
- ²² “Popularidade de Dilma cai de 36% para 31%, aponta CNI/Ibope” [“Dilma’s popularity falls from 36% to 31%], points out CNI/Ibope”, Folha de São Paulo. Available at: <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/06/1472939-popularidade-de-dilma-cai-de-36-para-31-indica-cniibope.shtml>>. Accessed on: June 12, 2023.
- ²³ “De campeã de popularidade a 62% de rejeição: Seis momentos-chave no governo Dilma”. [“From popularity champion to 62% rejection: Six key moments in Dilma's government”]. BBC. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2015/03/150318_dilma_aprovacao_reprovacao_cc/>. Accessed on: June 12, 2023.

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