

# FROM THE OFFICES TO THE STREETS: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUNE 2013 CONFRONTATION CYCLE, 2011-2013

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## Abstract

This paper endeavors to dissect the institutional and extra-institutional political dynamics that set the stage for the issues that surfaced during the June 2013 confrontation cycle. Utilizing the political confrontation theory as a framework, the study interprets June 2013 as a series of confrontations, depicting a rapid and widespread escalation resulting from conflicts across diverse social strata. Moreover, the article scrutinizes the challenges posed by the political maneuvers of the ruling PT (Workers' Party) coalitions between 2010 and 2013, aiming to comprehend the impact of institutional politics on street activism. The inquiry extends beyond traditional urban concerns, delving into the formation of a broad spectrum of political themes that unfolded both in the streets and within institutional spheres. Drawing on a comprehensive historical analysis of newspapers and magazines and mapping pivotal protests during the period, the article endeavors to unveil the processes that contributed to the gradual erosion of the ruling coalition's influence and the crystallization of contentious issues that would later manifest on the streets.

**Keywords:** protest; June 2013; social movements; confrontation cycles.

## Dos gabinetes para as ruas: os antecedentes políticos da emergência do ciclo de confronto de junho, 2011-2013

### Resumo

O presente artigo visa rastrear os antecedentes políticos institucionais e extrainstitucionais de temas que surgiram nas ruas durante o ciclo de confronto de Junho de 2013. Seguindo como modelo teórico a teoria do confronto político, o artigo considera que Junho de 2013 pode ser entendido como um ciclo de confrontos, isto é, um conjunto de episódios de protesto cuja escalada rápida e massiva é produto da difusão de diversos conflitos entre distintos segmentos sociais. Assim sendo, o artigo também procura dar destaque às dificuldades das negociações políticas acarretadas pela coalizão governista petista no período de 2010 a 2013, buscando compreender como a política institucional impactou a política das ruas. As indagações dizem respeito à constituição de um conjunto amplo de temas políticos que não estavam exclusivamente centrados

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na “questão urbana”. Procurou-se aqui qualificar essas afirmações, argumentando que o processo político antecedente foi marcado pela eclosão de diversos temas tanto nas ruas quanto nas arenas institucionais. Com base em acervo histórico de jornais e revistas, além do mapeamento de importantes protestos no período, o artigo busca traçar os processos que levaram à progressiva fragilização da coalizão governista e à cristalização de pautas e agendas que ressurgiriam nas ruas como pontos de conflito.

**Palavras-chave:** protesto; Junho de 2013; movimentos sociais; ciclos de confronto.

## INTRODUCTION

This paper pursues a dual objective: firstly, to reconstruct the causal chain of events leading to the occurrences of June 2013, and secondly, to comprehend the phenomenon beyond expressions of discontent with urban policies. The overarching aim is to elucidate the June 2013 narrative within a framework of political conflict processes in both institutional and extra-institutional realms. The initial focus involves reconstructing the primary political events that contextualized the onset of the June 2013 cycle, with a particular emphasis on the development of conflicting political agendas during the Dilma Rousseff government (2011-2013). This entails offering a comprehensive overview of the political context that gave rise to the June cycle, portraying it as a multifaceted process encompassing various themes. Existing literature frequently characterizes the political clashes in June as manifestations of resistance against the intrusion of capitalist logic into urban governance (Harvey, 2014), and the article acknowledges the significance of this agenda among the demonstrators. However, it emphasizes the need for a more detailed analysis of the emergence of diverse political dissent in Brazil during the early part of the decade.

Alternatively, the focus here is on understanding how political disputes within the ruling coalition served as a catalyst for episodes of contestation. The inquiry delves into the manner in which political issues, including transport, corruption, moral standards, etc., surfaced on the public stage. These themes had already been evolving into intricate and contentious subjects for the ruling coalition from 2011 to 2013.

Urban space, encompassing issues like transportation, housing, public safety, etc., not only generated demands during June but was not the exclusive subject of contention. While the initial protests were centered around such matters, the entirety of the cycle cannot be reduced to just transportation. A multitude of themes emerged. If the analysis rigidly defines June as a contestation episode solely around transport, it risks overlooking other aspects, labeling them as "lack of focus," "confusion," or "hijacking." Associating June with a single theme also centralizes specific collective actors, portraying them as the primary protagonists in street actions. In such instances, the phenomenon ceases to be characterized as a cycle of confrontations, wherein multiple agendas are established, and instead becomes merely "a movement" (Tarrow, 2011). This portrayal neglects the diversity of performances, themes, and collective actors. Upholding the hypothesis of a cycle of confrontations primarily involves advocating the notion that public space in the streets was contested by various collective actors aiming to showcase different themes, employing diverse uses of space and contestation performances.

Therefore, elucidating the formation of diverse themes in agendas that challenged the government's foundations and provided platforms for various actors is crucial for comprehending a phenomenon that should not be reduced to merely a movement with a "lack of focus."<sup>1</sup> This is essential because not all the themes evident in June were directly linked to urban issues or transportation as sources of discontent.

Given the significance of the phenomenon, the literature about June is extensive. Broadly, it is divided into mapping the causes, actors, and supposed effects of June. This paper refrains from addressing the consequences, as this aligns with analyses on the new right and the rise of polarization in Brazil, topics warranting detailed consideration at another opportunity. The literature on the causes of June experienced a meteoric rise during the event itself, but the origins of June gradually faded from focus over the years. One branch of literature predominantly focuses on the urban crisis as the primary driver of manifestations, an approach prominent in research right after the phenomenon's onset. According to this literature, the protests would embody a

generation's resentment towards the neoliberal intrusion into city management (Antunes, 2013; Alfonsin, 2015; Harvey et al., 2015; Andrés, 2023). Another strand places greater emphasis on the emergence of a new political sensitivity and the clashes of these sensitivities with a political system that failed to represent them adequately. This perspective primarily centers on the novelty of the agendas, actors, and issues. This literature also supports the thesis of the representation crisis and the political system's alignment with more radical left-wing political views (Dowbor; Szwako, 2013; Gohn, 2013).

This paper adopts the political confrontation theory as an analytical model to challenge the prevailing perspective that characterizes June 2013 as a multidimensional phenomenon. While the extensive theories of social movements from the 1970s and 1980s cannot be fully detailed, it is noteworthy to briefly mention two prominent theories explaining the emergence and expansion of social movements. Until the end of the 1980s, the European traditions gathered in the New Social Movement (NSM) Theory tended to emphasize the role of culture, values, and ideas in structuring societal conflict, without making explicit references to the political process. According to the NSM theorists, social movements would be oriented towards the autonomization of their collective identities and values to the detriment of the logic of interests. In contrast, the American tradition, exemplified by the Political Confrontation Theory (PCT), underscores the strategic nature of social movements and their foundation in political disputes. PCT highlights the tactical and strategic dimensions of movements responding not only to economic or cultural factors but also to the political arena, emphasizing the processes of political negotiation between challengers and authorities, whether political or cultural. From the 1990s onwards, criticism informed by the sociology of culture paved the way for theoretical syntheses, acknowledging the intricate interplay between culture and political strategy, marked by various intersections (Alonso, 2009).

According to the Political Confrontation Theory (PCT), this paper asserts that the adoption of protest as a form of political expression is not limited to specific collective actors with particular ideological agendas. Moreover, it emphasizes that the control of physical space is a contested objective.

Generally, the literature highlights the conflict between social movements and government forces, notably the police, in the control of public space. Nevertheless, contemporary theorists have increasingly focused on the relational nature of the political confrontation process. Tilly (2010) suggests that various political entities compete for attention from the media and key stakeholders during episodes of heightened mobilization. This is due to the fact that, in instances of intense mobilization, multiple collective actors vie for advantageous positions within the political sphere.

The Political Confrontation Theory (PCT) posits that the purpose of political action in the streets is to attract public attention and influence the political agenda. The text structures these dimensions into three sections. The first section examines the political context leading to the emergence of the June confrontation cycle, highlighting challenges faced by the PT coalition during Dilma Rousseff's early administration (2011-2013) and issues that strained the government base, contributing to street demands. It also outlines the political process from the elections and aims to illustrate the time when a fragile coalition was constructed to support the government. The second section delves into the conflicts, arguing that attempting to please various factions weakened the coalition with inconsistent policies. The third section details the events preceding June, revealing signs of government weakening and the emergence of multiple agendas seen in protests. The conclusion restates the main argument.

## **1 THE PRELUDE TO CONFLICTS: THE 2010 ELECTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLARIZATION**

The protests related to transport tariffs are frequently identified as a direct precursor to the series of demonstrations in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and subsequently across Brazil. While the nature of the confrontation cycle indeed warrants detailed examination, the phenomenon itself cannot be detached from the trajectory of protests and political conflicts in Brazil following Dilma Rousseff's era. The history of protests and the expression of demands is crucial as it informs actors about the possibilities of manifestation. This is particularly relevant

because the context of political mobilizations was linked to the way the first Dilma Rousseff government began addressing fractures in its power base.

Indeed, there is a certain similarity with other conflicting historical contexts, such as the democratic crisis of 1964, the redemocratization, and the impeachment of Collor in 1992. The objective here is not to demonstrate the singularity of June 2013. Large-scale mobilizations, as the political confrontation theory postulates, are usually the product of crises in the alignment between political elites. We do not expect to present anything theoretically new here, but this point seems to have been quite neglected by the literature on the subject. Most studies apply a "pressure cooker" model, wherein the institutional impermeability and inability of the ruling coalition to process demands eventually created tensions that would explode in June 2013 (Nobre, 2013). What is presented here is the idea that June 2013 was not an explosive effect of the representation system's immutability, but the result of permanent and continuing wear on the ruling coalition. In moments of institutional stability, the conflict remains within narrow limits, and during crises in political alliances, there is an opening of political opportunities, leading to the emergence of new themes, actors, and tactics of action (Tarrow, 2022).

From 2011 to 2013, PT gradually lost its ability to negotiate with opponents and became the target of criticism from various collective actors. The ambiguities and dilemmas of the Dilma government can be traced back to the election campaign. The 2010 elections were marked by intense debates not only about the role of the State in the economy but also concerning behavioral and societal issues. The presidential election in 2010, as in previous years, witnessed polarization between PT and PSDB<sup>2,3</sup>, particularly during the second round. Dilma Rousseff had already been mentioned as a potential candidate in 2007 when she served as the Chief of Staff<sup>4</sup>, owing to her significant role in organizing and constructing the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento<sup>5</sup> (PAC).

Launched on January 28, 2007, the PAC comprised a series of policy measures designed to foster economic dynamism, playing a significant role in State intervention within Brazilian cities. With a 4-year deadline that expired in 2010, the plan projected total investments of BRL 503.9 billion in infrastructure projects, incorporating financing measures, credit stimulation, and changes in environmental regulatory frameworks. The package garnered success within the ruling wing and was extended for an additional 4 years in PAC-2, launched on March 29, 2010, just months before that year's elections, with an investment of BRL 1.59 trillion, particularly in urban infrastructure. PAC 2010 focused on key areas such as Better City, Citizen Community, Housing (Minha Casa, Minha Vida<sup>6</sup>), Water and Light for All (Expansion of the program Light for All), Transport, and Energy. Both PAC and PAC-2 faced harsh criticism for alleged electoral use of the State machine to benefit the candidate, particularly in the realm of urban policy. Opposition parties, including DEM<sup>7</sup>, PSDB, and PPS<sup>8</sup>, filed a request for representation against Dilma Rousseff and PT, alleging that the inspections of works within the PAC scope were strategically set up as part of an early election campaign<sup>9</sup>.

In any case, with the then President Lula ineligible for re-election, Dilma's candidacy was officially announced on June 13, 2010, with Michel Temer as her running mate<sup>10</sup>. The candidacy garnered robust support from political figures and prominent personalities in the arts. Social movements, unions, and civil associations affiliated with the government also rallied behind the candidacy. On April 31, 2010, an event held at the Bank Workers' Union of São Paulo, organized by the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS), called upon social movements to back the candidate. The 2<sup>nd</sup> National Assembly of Social Movements saw participation from associations like the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), Confederação Nacional de Associações de Moradores (Conam), União Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE), União Brasileira de Mulheres (UBM), União de Negros pela Igualdade (Unegro), and Marcha Mundial das Mulheres<sup>11</sup>, among others<sup>12</sup>. With a total assembly attendance of 3,000 people, the formal outcome was the development of the "Brasil 2010" Project. While the document did not explicitly endorse Dilma Rousseff's candidacy, it expressed concerns about a potential victory for the PSDB candidate<sup>13</sup>.

Despite internal tensions with parties positioned further to the left of PT, Dilma's candidacy enjoyed significant legitimacy owing to the strong economic performance of the preceding decade. From the 1980s through the 1990s, per capita GDP growth averaged a mere 0.7%.

However, after the initial years of the Lula government and the resolution of the "mensalão" crisis in 2007, the annual per capita GDP growth surged to 4.81%, with a 5.7% GDP increase propelled by rising household consumption. By the end of 2010, GDP per capita stood at BRL 19,564 per inhabitant, reflecting a substantial 6.49% increase when compared to the previous year (IBGE, 2011). These noteworthy growth rates undeniably bolstered Dilma Rousseff's position in the electoral competition, particularly following the commencement of the electoral propaganda period.

Until May 2010, polls indicated a neck-and-neck race between candidate José Serra and Dilma Rousseff. By August of the same year, Dilma had established a ten-point lead over her rival<sup>14</sup>. This comfortable lead in the polls underscored the positive impacts of the economic and social policies implemented during the Lula government. Key among these were the redistributive policies, with notable programs such as the Bolsa Família and the Universidade para Todos Program (PROUNI)<sup>15, 16</sup>. The Bolsa Família program, particularly, garnered international acclaim from organizations dedicated to combating poverty and became synonymous with the government's commitment to social welfare. Notably, the poverty rate experienced a significant 27% reduction between 2003 and 2006, contributing to poverty alleviation and boosted consumption in lower-income brackets (Castro; Modesto, 2010). On the education front, PROUNI, initiated in 2005, offered full and partial scholarships to students pursuing undergraduate courses in private institutions. Alongside the expansion of public education, including the creation of federal universities, PROUNI played a pivotal role in facilitating a substantial increase in student enrollment in higher education— from 1.7 million in 1995 to 6.3 million in 2010 (Catani et al., 2006).

The narrative of the government, framed around the reduction of inequalities in Brazil, was solidified by accelerated economic growth, a consumption-focused policy, and effective redistribution measures. The discourse surrounding the emergence of a burgeoning middle class gained prominence towards the end of the Lula government and persisted through the election period. Notably, the proportion of the population transitioning from classes D and E to class C increased by 27% from 2004 to 2008. Income inequality, as per PNAD<sup>17</sup> data, also witnessed a significant decline, with Brazil's Gini coefficient decreasing from 0.570 in 2004 to 0.515 in 2012. The reduction in extreme poverty exhibited remarkable progress, averaging a 10% yearly decrease from 2004 to 2014 (Neri, 2011).

Profound transformations provided a considerable advantage to the ruling coalition in the presidential race. Nevertheless, critiques targeting the social and economic policies of the Lula government played a significant role. The opposition consistently emphasized the electoral nature of various social programs, portraying them as instrumental tactics rather than genuine advancements in redistributive policies. The term "Bolsa Esmola"<sup>18</sup> was coined pejoratively, strategically employed to delegitimize the program during the PT government<sup>19</sup>.

The most vehement faction of the opposition labeled Bolsa Família as "vote-buying." The Millennium Institute (IMIL), a civil society organization critical of government policies, endorsed Serra's candidacy, asserting that the previous government's redistribution policies were counterproductive<sup>20</sup>. According to IMIL, the reduction in inequality was not attributable to PT policies but rather to the positive impacts of adopting the Real as a currency, decreased food prices, and the real increase in wages — measures implemented during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) or as a consequence of that administration. By enumerating factors like anti-corruption strategies as means to reduce inequality, IMIL contended that *"the advocated approach promotes the social mobility of the poorest, in contrast to welfare programs like Bolsa Família, which perpetuate their unproductive dependency. Such programs may serve in emergencies or as transitional complements to effective poverty-alleviation policies but never as instruments for social ascent, symbolizing the struggle for income redistribution."*<sup>21</sup>

The economic debate was significant, yet controversies emerged over behavioral issues like abortion, gay marriage, and drug legalization — themes that would persist during Dilma's government and echo in June 2013. These topics delineated opposing political identities during the elections and throughout Dilma Rousseff's term, creating diametrically antagonistic positions across various societal sectors. The likely election of a woman sparked discussions around "progressive" agendas, such as abortion and the legalization of gay marriage. In essence, these

themes triggered the activation of identity boundaries among collective actors and introduced new participants to the public sphere debate.

These themes surfaced prior to the election with the unveiling of the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Human Rights Plan (PNDH-3), Decree No. 7,037, at the end of December 2009<sup>22</sup>. The plan, drafted by the Special Secretariat for Human Rights (SEDH), faced considerable criticism from dissenting ministers when presented to the Executive Branch. Minister Paulo Vannuchi (PT) led the Secretariat. The initial version of PNDH-3 was extensive, comprising 521 measures that legislated on a wide range of topics with varying levels of specificity. Ambiguous definitions like the "fight against social inequality" coexisted with more concrete provisions, such as the regularization of quilombola<sup>23</sup> communities.

These measures prompted various civil society associations to either oppose or support the plan during the pre-political campaign periods. Press-related groups voiced apprehension about the potential for censorship. The Associação Brasileira de Emissoras de Rádio e Televisão (ABERT), the Associação Nacional dos Editores de Revistas (ANER), and the Associação Nacional de Jornais (ANJ) denounced the plan<sup>24</sup>. Conversely, the National Human Rights Movement, a coalition of approximately 400 civil society associations, endorsed the plan as a "progressive" measure<sup>25</sup>.

The issue of abortion elicited significant reactions, particularly from the National Confederation of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB). CNBB voiced its concerns about the matter, consistently urging then-President Lula to reassess the text and eliminate any potential for decriminalization of abortion. The ultimate version of the text removed references to abortion decriminalization, framing the issue solely as a public health concern without specifying legal parameters or the potential for legislation on the subject<sup>26</sup>. While a segment of the CNBB supported President Lula's actions, some members expressed apprehension and uncertainty regarding the potential election of Dilma Rousseff<sup>27</sup>.

Dilma won the elections with 56.05% of the valid votes, while Serra secured 43.95%. Despite the electoral contest replicating the enduring rivalry between PSDB and PT at the federal and state levels since at least 1994, this election introduced significant issues and moral considerations that would later feature prominently in the events of June 2013. Another noteworthy aspect is that, although the opposition faced defeat in the presidential election, it gained strength on other fronts.

The vote for the Lower House illustrated that even within the tightly contested context of the presidential election, a relative stability of governance mechanisms and a significant advantage for PT were established on the legislative front. Despite major defeats in important cities and municipalities for the ruling coalition, the PT government managed to secure a relatively consistent support base for the following years. However, this situation would be influenced by changes in the ruling and opposition coalitions. Conversely, the themes raised during the campaign contributed to the growth of mobilizations by social movements and other political actors in civil society. Whether within the political spectrum of the left or right, the election of the PT candidate did not fully satisfy all factions. In essence, the election played a role in shaping new political identities.

Another relevant aspect is the ambivalence observed in the levels of support and opposition across various spatial scales of governance. While the government initially achieved success, there were significant pockets of opposition to the ruling coalition at the municipal level. This duality played a crucial role in creating an environment of opposition to PT across various ideological spectra and spatial scales. In summary, the dual nature of threats and political opportunities played a key role in diversifying the landscape of political confrontation in June 2013.

## **2 THE GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMAS: MORAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE EARLY YEARS**

Upon assuming office in 2011, the government endeavored to take measures to ensure a stable coalition. A crucial element in maintaining this stability was the continuation of economic plans inherited from the Lula government, which had played a pivotal role in sustaining favorable economic indicators. PT reaped the benefits of this performance in the elections. For the leadership, maintaining the key to success was deemed imperative, and the agenda centered on

continuity. This theme also resonated on the social front, where established social policies stood as a milestone and contributed to the initial sense of stability in the early years of the Dilma government.

The PAC-2 was launched earlier that year as an aggressive measure for economic growth, without altering the presumed neo-developmental period of the Lula era. The State financed BRL 665 billion, and the private sector accounted for almost BRL 130 billion, with the majority allocated to resources for housing policies. Managed by the Ministry of Cities and in conjunction with Caixa Econômica Federal<sup>28</sup>, the program Minha Casa, Minha Vida served as both a socio-economic policy and a catalyst for the construction sector, particularly addressing the urban and housing issues<sup>29</sup>.

The program, in addition to infrastructure investments, had significant impacts on urban policy, with the housing and infrastructure sectors being the primary beneficiaries. The substantial amount invested led to numerous criticisms, including concerns about delayed works and the State's inability to effectively manage resources<sup>30</sup>. Comparisons with previous governments were commonplace. In an assessment of the first year of the Dilma government, Fiesp<sup>31</sup> President Paulo Skaf highlighted these concerns. According to Skaf:

In a year like 2011, in which the government announces 5% growth and ends up with half that, we can say that either the government made a mistake, or it overdid the measures to cool the economy. In our view, we could have had a much better result this year. The country has not moved forward, it has only marched in place.<sup>32</sup>

According to the entrepreneur, the initial and subsequent terms of the FHC government are credited with economic stabilization. In parallel, the first and second terms of the Lula administration are believed to have facilitated the ascent of a burgeoning middle class and propelled accelerated economic growth. However, this positive assessment takes a critical turn when evaluating Dilma's government, at least according to FIESP. In their estimation, none of the attributes associated with economic stability and middle-class expansion can be ascribed to Dilma's government. This blend of public expenditures and a decline in competitiveness started casting doubts on the government's efficacy in managing inflation.

The onset of the global crisis gradually eroded the foundation of governmental support from 2011 until 2013. The government implemented various measures adopted in response to this economic challenge and to ensure that the worldwide financial tsunami would not engulf Brazil in a catastrophic manner. These measures included tax reductions and exemptions for specific industry sectors. Such policies persisted throughout Rousseff's administration, prompting critics to closely examine the timing of these interventions. The reduction in interest rates, coupled with increased investments expenditures, is believed by certain analysts to have contributed to a rapid surge in inflationary pressures (Dweck; Teixeira, 2017). While it is essential to acknowledge the nuanced nature of this debate, the critical takeaway is the role that specific perspectives in the media played in shaping public opinion at that time<sup>33</sup>.

The contemporary media's apprehensions shed light on the challenges faced by the president during that period. A significant reflection on these concerns can be found in the editorial by the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo, which assessed the first 100 days of Dilma Rousseff's government. The editorial highlights the perceived hindrance to stability and economic growth attributed to the "legacy" of the Lula government. Central to this critique is the discourse on expenditure balance and the inflation, which sets the overall tone. The editorial reads: *"The correct choice is simple. Instead of resuscitating a failed model, the government must care for clearly important tasks, such as organizing accounting, investing in education and professional development, and creating favorable conditions for expanding investment, currently limited to a mere 18.4% of the GDP. It is not necessary to create an oversized, interventionist public sector to accomplish these tasks"*<sup>34</sup>.

In addition to these factors, significant shifts in economy began emerging towards the end of 2011. By 2012, the implementation of the "new economic matrix" – characterized by an expansionist fiscal policy, low interest rates, accessible credit facilitated by BNDES<sup>35</sup>, a devalued

exchange rate and an uptick in import rates – encountered challenges, particularly in crucial sectors of the Brazilian economy<sup>36</sup>. The reduced export of commodities and other primary assets exacerbated the economic impact. This economic shock prompted a series of criticisms and the first drops in economic performance became noticeable.

Interestingly, despite subtle criticisms from the media and corporate sectors, investments in the PAC played a pivotal role in bolstering Dilma's relative popularity. According to a survey carried out in March 2012 by Ibope<sup>37</sup>, at the behest of the National Confederation of the Industry (CNI), the president's approval rating witnessed an upswing. In December 2011, Dilma Rousseff held an approval rate of 72%, which experienced a rise to 77% in March 2012. This surge in popularity could be attributed to the initiation of social projects and the progress made in already implemented initiatives<sup>38</sup>. Additionally, the marked increase in job opportunities in Brazil, with four million jobs created between 2010 and 2012, likely contributed to the public's sentiment surrounding Dilma's administration.

Another probable factor influencing the increase in the president's popularity was the impending 2014 FIFA World Cup. This was particularly favored by the accelerated progress of PAC-2 projects, which "set the mood" for the sports event. In 2012, the inauguration of two new stadiums further contributed to the anticipation surrounding the World Cup. The decision to host the event in Brazil was made in 2007, with the selection of host cities occurring in 2009<sup>39</sup>. The ambivalence associated with Dilma's government was encapsulated by the World Cup becoming a focal point within the development model led by the Worker's Party (PT) at the time. The promise of economic growth during the World Cup, however, fell short of preventing the first crisis in the government coalition. This crisis was triggered by the deliberation process concerning the legal frameworks surrounding the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The establishment of legal references and the adherence to these standards by Brazilian public authorities were crucial requirements outlined in the selection process that designated Brazil as the host country<sup>40</sup>.

Without delving further into the intricacies of the decision-making and legislation processes, it is worth mentioning two episodes<sup>41</sup>. The first concerns measures implemented for the host cities. In 2011 and 2012, the 12 host cities signed contracts with the Local Organizing Committees (LOCs). These contracts primarily outlined the local governments' responsibilities for organizing the event. In accordance with FIFA's stipulations, the contracts covered street closures and other security measures required for the event. Additionally, social movements at the time criticized the inclusion of contractual clauses establishing "exception zones" within urban areas, where city governments would provide exclusive advertising spaces to FIFA-licensed companies.

The second key legal framework during this period was the General Cup Law (LGC), enacted on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2012. The law was fast-tracked through the House of Representatives, raising concerns and criticism from parliamentarians and civil society sectors. The document incorporated several recommendations established by the International Federation of Football (FIFA) for the Brazilian authorities aiming to ensure the successful execution of the 2013 Confederations Cup and the 2014 World Cup. These recommendations covered a broad range of topics, including safety, image broadcasting rights, commercial rights in event venues, technical recommendations, requests for urban improvements in areas of matches, tax exemption for companies licensed by FIFA, among other items.

Despite the project's priority, the voting on the LGC faced multiple postponements. The delays in its promulgation triggered a crisis between the Brazilian government and FIFA. These postponements were primarily attributed to controversial themes, such as the sale of alcoholic beverages in stadiums and concerns related to security. The LGC also collided with other existing laws in the country such as Estatuto do Torcedor<sup>42</sup>, and various legal provisions. These conflicts not only fractured the government's political alliances but also bolstered the opposition, led by PSDB and other smaller parties. Also, conflicts arose with municipal and state authorities regarding the implementation of changes outlined in the LGC. According to a Reuters report, the government's base of alliances experienced internal divisions over the content of the law:

*The crisis within the government's coalition took another turn this Wednesday, marked by the further postponement of the General Cup Law in the House of Representatives. Leaders of parties aligned with*

the government opted to impede the discussion of the text, aiming to avoid another defeat for the Executive. [...] Once again, revealing a lack of control over allies and succumbing to various pressures, the government reluctantly acquiesced to the delay. *Even the new leader appointed by Palácio do Planalto in the House, Arlindo Chinaglia (PT-SP), allowed the members of the alliance to vote according to their discretion on the request to the remove the matter from discussion, showcasing a lack of confidence in the government's ability to secure a victory [...]* Only three parties – PT, PSB and PCdoB – out of the 16 parties in the government's coalition in the House adhered to voting on the General Cup Law this Wednesday. However, they fell short of gathering the necessary 257 votes to keep the session open in the plenary. The government faces pressures from various fronts in the House. For instance, the rural caucus insists that the government adheres to a voting calendar for the reform of the Forest Code, making it clear that they will not vote on other matters until this commitment is fulfilled. Additionally, the evangelical parliamentarians, particularly those linked to the health sector, exerted pressured on the government not to proceed with the agreement with FIFA regarding the approval of the sale of alcoholic beverages in stadiums. Other dissatisfied representatives, unhappy with the political relationship with the government, further strengthened these connections, making the outcome of any vote unpredictable [Emphasis added] <sup>43</sup>.

The voting of the LGC exacerbated division within the government, particularly between the major ruling parties – PT and PMDB. These parties engaged in a political tug-of-war over the extension of the measures. This discussion of the LGC was intertwined with another critical issue at the time – the voting of the New Forest Code, which proposed significant changes in environmental policy<sup>44</sup>. Therefore, the government coalition found itself in a complex situation. Criticisms against the government gained traction, with growing emphasis on perceived deficiencies in dialog and heavy-handed approach in negotiations. This marked a turning point that would persist throughout the remainder of Dilma's administration.

The discontent among smaller parties with PT's "authoritarianism" reverberated loudly. The voting on both the Forest Code and the decision-making process regarding the LGC served as the catalyst for the initial signs of a ministerial crisis. Over time, the smaller parties within the government's coalition began to scrutinize the criteria employed by the Executive branch. In 2011, the Chief of Staff, Antonio Palocci (PT), was swiftly replaced amid allegations of irregularities and corruption, contributing to a broader narrative of corruption scandals that continued to erode trust within the Ministries Esplanade<sup>45</sup>. The crises involving smaller parties also had repercussions on the Executive-Legislative relationship. The administration was characterized as confrontational<sup>46</sup>.

Another source of pressure arose with the establishment of the National Commission of the Truth (CNV), in May 2012. The members of CNV were directly appointed by the president, and their primary mandate was to investigate violations and crimes committed by both civilian and military authorities during the period from 1964 to 1985. Comprising individuals from civil society and human rights movements, the CNV assumed the responsibility of collecting evidence, interrogating military officers and civilians from the era, examining complaints of human rights irregularities during that time. The culmination of those efforts was expected to result in a comprehensive report, encompassing all collected materials, to be submitted to the Presidency of the Republic in 2014. The deployment of the CNV ignited intense debates and confrontation between its proponents and critics. Critics stated that the Commission overlooked crimes committed by "terrorists" and that the military officers were in defense of the Brazilian society. The CNV was accused of revanchism and partiality in its historical reconstruction, with concerns raised about its failure to consider crimes committed by the opposing side. Moreover, the Commission was accused of contributing to the deterioration of relationships between civilians

and the military. Despite the government's investments in the military sector, driven in part by the World Cup, a segment of the Armed Forces leadership criticized the establishment of the CNV. Criticisms were also directed at the perceived lack of military representation in the commission's proceedings<sup>47</sup>.

In summary, the year of 2012 holds crucial significance in understanding the ambivalence of political opportunities for demonstrations. On one hand, Dilma Rousseff's popularity remained relatively strong, stemming from the positive impact of PT's social policies implemented in the previous government. Despite modest economic performance, which fell short of a crisis but still contributed to a sense of unease, her popularity served to maintain a certain level of political stability. On the other hand, conflicts between the Executive branch and other sectors of the State partially eroded support for the government. It is important to note that this erosion occurred on different spatial scales. At the federal level, the government faced challenges in getting measures approved, while at the municipal level, negotiations related to the PAC and the World Cup further strained alliances. This was primarily due to the significant projects and new guidelines that directly impacted municipal and state policies. The execution of mega sports events and pivotal votes, such as the Forest Code, gave rise to political divisions that transcended the traditional government/opposition or right/left dichotomies. As these sensitive issues became focal points of political negotiations, divisions transformed into opportunities for new political alignments.

The shifts in political alliances were further pronounced during the municipal elections of 2012. In that year, the winner was PMDB, elected in 1,022 of the municipalities, followed by PSDB with 701 and PT in 632 city councils. The electoral landscape presented a nuanced picture. While the base of allies for both PT and PMDB encompassed the majority of municipalities, the opposition, represented by PSDB, also commanded a substantial share of votes. PT secured victories in crucial locations, including São Paulo. The mayoral election in the capital was characterized by a certain unpredictability. In the initial stages, the candidate Celso Russomanno (PRB) led the polls, surpassing candidates from traditional parties such as Fernando Haddad (PT) and José Serra (PSDB). Russomanno's notable rise during the first-round campaign disrupted the trajectories of other candidacies. However, a series of events, blending protests and cultural production in São Paulo began to shift the narrative of Fernando Haddad's candidacy.

### **3 THE CRACKS IN THE RULING COALITION AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE 2013**

The transformation of the political landscape solidified in 2013 and the subsequent years, marked by Dilma Rousseff's escalating challenges in managing her political allies and curbing opposition criticism. The year 2013 began with tragic events in Brazilian cities, causing major commotion in the country. Notable incidents included: the fire at the nightclub Kiss, in Rio Grande do Sul and the rain induced floods in the state of Rio de Janeiro. These tragedies contributed to a climate of scrutiny regarding the effectiveness of public services and the regulatory capabilities of the State.

The government found itself compelled to negotiate with the leftist factions due to specific political choices. A notable instance was the appointment of Representative and evangelical pastor Marco Feliciano (PSC) as the chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights and Minorities of the Lower House of Representatives (CDHM). Feliciano had stirred controversy in 2011 using social media to attack LGBTTT<sup>48</sup> activism and other social movements. The decision to empower Feliciano in the CDHM was a calculated move by the PT government to appease smaller coalition parties. The session in which Feliciano was elected was marked by disturbances and confrontations between the representative's supporters and activists from social movements. Subsequent months witnessed ongoing conflicts between activists opposing the parliamentarian and his defenders, particularly after the proposal known as the "gay cure" was introduced. This proposal, drafted in 2011 by Representative João Campos (PSDB), sought to nullify a resolution by the Federal Council of Psychology (CFP) that prohibited therapies aiming to "treat" patients' sexual orientation. The Draft Decree Law (PDC 234/11) proposed establishing work standards for psychologists involved in psychotherapeutic practices related to patients' sexual orientation. Although the draft was largely forgotten, Marco Feliciano reintroduced it to the CDHM's agenda in May 2013. The inclusion of the project in the public agenda triggered the protests that had been

simmering, with various associations launching campaigns on the topic. These actions played a pivotal role in bringing the issue to the forefront during the June cycle of protests.

The “gay cure” project, as it came to be known, was not the sole sensitive matter brought into the public agenda. Other issues, unrelated to the urban agenda or identity politics, exerted pressure on the government. For instance, the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution (PEC) 478/10, dubbed the “PEC of the maids”, aimed to regulate the domestic work market in Brazil. This proposal sparked heated debates in the Lower House and the public sphere<sup>49</sup>. Another Amendment that fueled public discourse was PEC 37/2011. This proposed amendment added a new paragraph to the Constitution under the chapter on Public Security. Its primary consequence was to strip the Public Prosecution of the priority investigation responsibility for various crimes, transferring this authority to federal and civil state police forces. Proposed by Representative Lourival Mendes (PT do B), the amendment faced criticism for encroaching upon the autonomy of Investigation Parliamentary Commissions (CPI)<sup>50</sup>. It was initially viewed as a purely technical and legal matter, on the first months of analysis, but in the beginning of 2013 the landscape shifted. The PEC then became politically relevant, particularly concerning issues of corruption. Concerned about potential approval of the amendment, the movement “Brasil contra a Impunidade”<sup>51</sup> was launched. Comprising entities such as the National Association of Members of the Public Prosecution (Conamp), by the National Council General Prosecutors (CNPJ), the National Association of Prosecutors of the Republic (ANPR) and other jurists associations, the movement organized various institutional and non-institutional events in protest against the amendment’s approval. The bill eventually earned the moniker “impunity PEC,” contributing to the perception that Dilma Rousseff’s government was complicit with corruption.

While these issues were not directly related to the production of urban spaces, they played a pivotal role in the emergence of the June cycle. They facilitated several key developments, such as: 1) the slow and gradual erosion of support for Dilma’s government among its backers, creating gaps and signaling the existence of mobilization opportunities; 2) the formation of several opposition factions, spanning both the left and the right, in response to actions taken by the government, and 3) the establishment of new collective agents. Although there was progress in opening dialog channels from 2011 to 2013, controversial political proposals concurrently alienated government supporters, both from the right and the left.

However, as emphasized in the preceding section, grievances related to transportation were not the sole concerns expressed by protesters on the streets since 2011. The controversy surrounding the CDHM has also emerged as a focal point for protests. Representative Marco Feliciano became a target for both streets demonstrations and formal complaints of homophobia and prejudice. For instance, on 03/09/2013, protests against the pastor took place in several cities. In São Paulo, a demonstration on Avenida Paulista drew 1,000 participants. In Brasília, the event concurrently criticized Feliciano and Renan Calheiros (PMDB), who held the position of Speaker of the Federal Senate. Renan faced accusations of corruption related to fraudulent invoices. In Rio de Janeiro, the protest at Cinelândia gathered 1.5 thousand participants.

Protests extended to Vitória (ES) and reached London. Across all these demonstrations, protesters orchestrated theatrical and musical performances, harmonizing the colors of LGBT activism with the colors of the Brazilian flag. Notably, on March 20, the city of Goiânia coined the movement and the slogan “Fora Feliciano”<sup>52</sup>. Demonstrations in front of evangelical churches of the Assembleia de Deus denomination became frequent. The most significant protest occurred on April 24 in Brasília (DF), where the march saw the active participation of trade unions, LBGT activists, feminists, NGOs, among others, totaling 20 thousand participants<sup>53</sup>.

The “gay cure” bill significantly fueled participation in the LBGT Pride Parade under the theme “Never in the closet again.” Approximately 200 thousand people flooded Avenida Paulista and its surroundings, where costumes resembling Marco Feliciano were intermingled with rallying cries against the proposed measure. The Parade, designed by the organizing movements, particularly APOGLBT, served as an intensified protest against the measures proposed by the “infelicianos”<sup>54</sup>, a term alluding to the representative and his predominantly evangelical voter base. In essence, the discourse of these groups was crafted as a protest against what they perceived as “setbacks”<sup>55</sup>.

Massive demonstrations had already become a prevalent feature of São Paulo's landscape even before June, extending to other major cities. An illustrative instance was the teachers' strike, which drew approximately 50 thousand people to Avenida Paulista on April 19, 2013. Organized by the Official Trade Union of Teachers of the State of São Paulo (Apeoesp) and the Unified Workers' Central (CUT), the protest was marked by participants donning clown's noses and masks as they took over Avenida Paulista, rallying for salary adjustments. Simultaneously, healthcare workers organized a demonstration in the city center and subsequently joined the teachers' protests, advocating for improved working conditions<sup>56</sup>. This wave of mobilizations became a common occurrence in São Paulo, serving as channels for expressing various issues that underscored divisions within the government.

## CONCLUSION

The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the events leading up to the June cycle, aiming to comprehend how crises within the coalition of political elites contributed to the emergence of this context of turmoil. The analysis spans from the 2010 presidential elections to the first years of Dilma Rousseff's presidency, covering the period from 2011 to 2013. The focus is on the formation of a comprehensive array of political concerns that extended beyond the exclusive realm of the "urban issue." In this context, we strive to elucidate that the preceding political process was characterized by the rise of numerous issues both on the streets and within institutional arenas.

We underscored both the political processes unfolding within institutional arenas, serving as a confluence of political opportunities, and the resulting impacts on the streets driven by the action of diverse collective actors. These actors encompassed a range of groups, including legal professionals' associations, feminists organizations, movements advocating for reduced bus fares, labor unions, and more. In essence, this phenomenon cannot be solely examined through the lens of its direct connection to the urban agenda. While the urban space holds significance, its importance lies in its entirety, serving as the stage where a myriad of political conflicts become visible.

The initial section of the text delved into the political impasses faced by the government coalition due to contentious issues. Despite having a comfortable lead in voting intentions, bolstered by the popularity of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Lula governments, the 2010 elections brought about political and social conflicts. On one hand, the elections witnessed the amplification of opposition to *petism*<sup>57</sup>, particularly concerning corruption and welfare policies. Simultaneously, moral agendas such as abortion emerged as topics of debate between left-wing and right-wing associations. This atmosphere of opposition, both from the right and the left, led to tension within the ruling coalition. On one side, negotiations with the government base raised questions from left-leaning sectors seeking policies aligned with social movements. On the other side, concessions made to the left began to irk the ruling base, creating schisms within the coalition. These challenges contributed to a growing rift between the government and social movements, creating difficulties in maintaining cohesion. Compounding these issues was the political agenda of the period, which positioned the PAC and mega sports events like the FIFA Confederations Cup and the World Cup as the flagships of economic growth policies. These policies resulted in a robust intervention in urban spaces, particularly in the host cities of the World Cup. This cycle of interventions led to conflicts regarding the extent and nature of the transformations carried out in these cities. Another sensitive moment for the Dilma Rousseff government arose during the "mensalão" trial and the efforts to pass controversial bills such as PEC-37.

The research in June 2013, despite being extensive and valuable, often falls short – with some rare exceptions – of comprehending it as a cycle of confrontations involving multiple agents, demands, spaces, and political expression tactics. Recognizing the June protests as a confluence of heterogenous mobilizations allows for a historical investigation that highlights how various agendas, actors, strategies, and political conflicts coalesced. Our intention is not to comprehensively review each of these agendas or exhaust them, nor do we seek to propose any specific hypothesis. Instead, our primary aim is to emphasize how June 2013 resulted from diverse historical causes. It is crucial to note that the effects of June were also an ongoing process. In this context, the notion that June was "hijacked" or detached seems inappropriate. However, it is

important to acknowledge that the right gained increasing spaces for discussion between 2000 and 2010. Arguing that June represents a defeat for the lefts also appears overly hostile, considering the impact June had on the politicization of topics previously overlooked by the traditional left, such as feminism and antiracism.

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## EXPLANATORY NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Ver <<https://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2013/06/opinia-o-gigante-acordou-que-seja-para-melhor.html>>. [Opinion: 'The Giant has awoken; may it be for the better']
- <sup>2</sup> T.N.: Brazilian Social Democracy Party
- <sup>3</sup> The only new development during the 2010 elections was the candidacy of Marina Silva (PV). Marina Silva's candidacy, if it did not significantly alter the power game between the ruling parties and the opposition, at least temporarily shuffled the contest throughout the process.
- <sup>4</sup> Source: "Dilma evita opinar sobre fim da reeleição" [Dilma avoids giving opinion on end of re-election], Apr. 13, 2007. Available at: <<http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,MUL21509-5601,00.html>>. Accessed on: August 4, 2017.
- <sup>5</sup> T.N.: Brazilian Growth Acceleration Program (PAC)
- <sup>6</sup> T.N.: My House, My Life (in free translation) – a federal government program that subsidizes houses and apartments to low-income family.
- <sup>7</sup> T.N.: Democrats Party
- <sup>8</sup> T.N.: Socialist People's Party
- <sup>9</sup> Source: "Oposição protocola representação contra Lula e Dilma no TSE por campanha antecipada" [Opposition files suit against Lula and Dilma at TSE for early campaigning], Oct. 21, 2009. Available at: <<https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/oposicao-protocola-representacao-contra-lula-dilma-no-tse-por-campanha-antecipada-351172.html>>. Accessed on: Aug. 4, 2017. "Lula diz que ligar PAC à eleição é 'cretinice', [Lula says linking PAC to election is 'silly'], Mar. 21, 2008. Available at: <<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2103200805.htm>>. Accessed on: Aug. 15, 2017.
- <sup>10</sup> Source: "PT e PMDB fecham acordo por chapa de Dilma Rousseff em 2010" [PT and PMDB close agreement for Dilma Rousseff's slate in 2010], Oct. 20, 2009. Available at: <<https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/politica/pt-e-pmdb-fecham-acordo-por-chapa-de-dilma-rousseff-em-2010,98096f7d7fc4b310VgnCLD200000bbcecb0aRCRD.html>>. Accessed on: Feb. 28, 2018.
- <sup>11</sup> T.N.: Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST); National Confederation of Residents Associations (Conam); National Student Union (UNE); Brazilian Women's Union (UBM); Negros Union for Equality (Unegro); and the World March of Women.
- <sup>12</sup> Source: "Eleições 2010: Movimentos apoiam Dilma para aprofundar mudanças" [Elections 2010: Movements support Dilma to deepen changes], Sept. 10, 2010. Available at: <<http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia/136717-8>>. Accessed on: Feb. 28, 2018. "Movimento estudantil quer 'mais' de Dilma" [Student movement wants 'more' from Dilma], Sept 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010. Source: <[http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia.php?id\\_noticia=136152&id\\_secao=8](http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia.php?id_noticia=136152&id_secao=8)>.
- <sup>13</sup> However, the choice of the former minister Dilma Rousseff was not without its critics. The PCdoB [Communist Party of Brazil], for example, although a member of the allied base, did not express direct support for the official PT candidacy. At a party congress in early 2010, the PCdoB reiterated the need to continue "[...] the victory of the political enterprise of the progressive forces of the nation" and "prevent the neoliberal regression, deepening the changes in the construction of a new national development project". However, the document did not mention Dilma Rousseff or express euphoria at the name of the candidate. It should also be noted that the PCdoB and other parties on the left flirted with the idea of launching a candidacy for Ciro Gomes (Brazilian Socialist Party - PSB). The Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and Freedom Party - PSOL), a party linked to social movements, launched its own candidacy with representative Plínio de Arruda Sampaio Jr. (PSOL) as its candidate. The party was relatively new at the time. It had only been founded about five years earlier, during the "mensalão" crisis in the Lula government. The party was part of the opposition to Lula's government on several issues but did not vote as a bloc with the likes of PSDB and DEM, the protagonists of the opposition. Source: "Sindicatos e movimentos sociais definem plataforma eleitoral" ["Trade unions and social movements define electoral platform"] May 05, 2010. Available at: <<http://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/politica/2010/05/sindicatos-e-movimentos-sociais-definem-plataforma-eleitoral-nesta-semana/>>.
- <sup>14</sup> Source: "Datafolha: Dilma avança a 51% e venceria já no 1º turno" ["Datafolha: Dilma advances to 51% and would already win in the 1st round"], Sept 16, 2010. Available at: <<http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,datafolha-dilma-avanca-a-51-e-venceria-ja-no-1-turno,610705>>. Accessed on: Aug 25, 2017.
- <sup>15</sup> T.N.: Family Grant and University for All Program (PROUNI).
- <sup>16</sup> The Bolsa Família Program was instituted by Law 10.836/04 and regulated by Decree 5.209/04 of January 9, 2004.
- <sup>17</sup> T.N.: National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios).

- <sup>18</sup> T.N.: “Panhandling Grant,” while the real name of the program (Bolsa Família) means Family Grant.
- <sup>19</sup> *“The primary social program of PT has ultimately been reduced to a welfare project, succumbing to superficial populism. It has confined itself to mere cash distribution without the accompanying requirement of school attendance — an essential condition for marginalized populations to enhance future employment prospects and achieve a productive income increase. The absence of oversight also renders the program susceptible to deviations and hinders effective evaluation of results and course correction. An expression by Senator Cristovam Buarque (PT-DF) sums up the problem: ‘Bolsa Escola’ has transformed into ‘Bolsa Esmola.’* Source: “Bolsa Esmola - Editorial”, Sept. 3, 2004. Available at: <<http://www.psdbr.org.br/acompanhe/noticias/bolsa-esmola-editorial/>>.
- <sup>20</sup> The Millenium Institute is a civil society association that has dedicated much of the Lula administration to promoting debates, forums, and congresses around the defense of economic liberalism. The economist Patrícia Carlos de Andrade founded the institute in 2005 under the name Instituto da Realidade Nacional [Institute of National Reality], officially launched in April 2006 during the Freedom Forum in Porto Alegre.
- <sup>21</sup> Source: “BOLSA FAMÍLIA É A SOLUÇÃO?” [IS BOLSA FAMÍLIA THE SOLUTION?], Oct. 19, 2010. Available at: <<http://www.institutomillennium.org.br/artigos/bolsa-familia-e-a-solucao/>>. Accessed on: Apr. 28, 2017.
- <sup>22</sup> Source: Brazil. III Plano Nacional de Direitos Humanos [3<sup>rd</sup> National Human Rights Plan]. DECREE No. 7,037. Available at: <[http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/\\_ato2007-2010/2009/decreto/d7037.htm](http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2009/decreto/d7037.htm)>. Accessed on: Mar. 28, 2017.
- <sup>23</sup> T.N.: Historically rooted settlements formed by descendants of escaped African slaves, known as Quilombolas, which are recognized for their cultural heritage and unique social structures. Source: Wikipedia.
- <sup>24</sup> T.N.: Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Stations (ABERT), National Association of Magazine Editors (ANER), and National Association of Newspapers (ANJ).
- <sup>25</sup> Source: “Plano Nacional de Direitos Humanos racha governo” [National Human Rights Plan cracks government] Jan. 08, 2010. Available at: <<http://www.jb.com.br/pais/noticias/2010/01/08/plano-nacional-de-direitos-humanos-racha-governo/>>. Accessed on: Apr. 21, 2017.
- <sup>26</sup> Source: “Para CNBB, mudanças no Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos revelam sensibilidade do governo [For CNBB, changes to the National Human Rights Program reveal the government’s sensitivity]. Jul. 22, 2010. Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/para-cnbb-mudancas-no-programa-nacional-de-direitos-humanos-revelam-sensibilidade-do-governo-3008694#ixzz4w9bgupOTstest>>. Accessed on: Aug. 27, 2017.
- <sup>27</sup> In a text signed by Bishop Luiz Gonzaga Bergonzini, “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s”, dated July 20, 2010, the bishop called on the Catholic and non-Catholic faithful not to vote for Dilma Rousseff. *“As Diocesan Bishop, responsible for the defense of faith, morals and the fundamental principles of natural law which – because they are natural – come from God Himself and therefore affect all men, we denounce and condemn as contrary to God’s laws all forms of attack on life, a gift from God, such as suicide, homicide and abortion, by which a human being, completely incapable of defending themselves, is criminally and cowardly taken away. The liberation of abortion that is being discussed and approved by some politicians cannot be accepted by anyone who calls themselves Christian or Catholic. We have said it many times and we repeat it now: we have no political party, but we cannot fail to condemn the legalization of abortion. (See Exod. 20.13; Matt. 5.21). That said, we recommend that all true Christians and true Catholics do not vote for Mrs. Dilma Rousseff and other candidates who approve of such “liberations”, regardless of which party they belong to.* Source: “Dai a César o que é de César e a Deus o que é de Deus” [Give Caesar what is Caesar’s, and God what is God’s], Jul. 20, 2010. Available at: <<https://blog.cancaonova.com/tiba/2010/07/20/dai-a-cesar-o-que-e-de-cesar-e-a-deus-o-que-e-de-deus/>>. For a more detailed account of the pro-life movement during this period, see REZENDE, 2016; MACHADO; MACIEL, 2017.
- <sup>28</sup> T.N.: Government-owned financial institution that serves as a major public bank, providing a range of banking services and playing a key role in social programs and economic development initiatives. Source: Wikipedia.
- <sup>29</sup> Source: <http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac/>
- <sup>30</sup> The NGO Contas Abertas [Open Accounts], founded in 2005 to monitor public accounts and expose cases of corruption, revealed in 2014 that between 2011 and 2013, only 12% of the works were “completed” or “in operation,” while 53% had not progressed beyond the project phase. For instance, the Ministry of Health, which had the largest number of initiatives planned, only concluded 8%, shedding light on the challenges in the public health sector in 2013. Another common criticism revolved around the lack of transparency, extensive State presence, and excessive government spending. Business associations and the press, such as the Brazilian Association of Base Industry (Abdib), voiced concerns

about State actions impeding economic growth by undermining the competitiveness and productivity of national private companies. Source: “Após 3 anos, mais da metade do PAC 2 não saiu do papel” [After 3 years, more than half of PAC 2 has not been implemented], Apr. 4, 2014. Available at: <<http://www.contasabertas.com.br/website/arquivos/8117>>. Accessed on: Mar. 1, 2017. “Associação de empreiteiras critica governo sobre concessões” [Association of contractors criticizes government on concessions], Jul. 22, 2013. Available at: <<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013/07/1314868-assiacao-de-empreiteiras-critica-governo-sobre-concessoes.shtml>>. Accessed on: Mar. 01, 2017.

<sup>31</sup> T.N.: Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo.

<sup>32</sup> Source: “Skaf critica política econômica de Dilma” [Skaf criticizes Dilma's economic policy], Dec. 11, 2011. Available at: <<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,skaf-critica-politica-economica-de-dilma,95843e>>. Accessed on: Aug. 24, 2017.

<sup>33</sup> For a more qualified view of the macroeconomic debate than the one offered here, see Dweck; TEIXEIRA, 2017. The authors outline the debate and present important nuances regarding the characterization of the government's fiscal policy from 2011 to 2014. They present two distinct theses in academia during the period. The spending thesis, strong in the press and business associations, and the second strand which claims that there was actually a drop in the investment rate, a version very popular among heterodox economists and within left-wing currents. Lula even questioned the lack of public investment at various times in that period.

<sup>34</sup> Source: “Os primeiros cem dias” [The first hundred days], Apr. 12, 2011. Available at: <<http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,os-primeiros-cem-dias-imp-,705037>>.

<sup>35</sup> T.N.: National Development Bank.

<sup>36</sup> The so-called New Economic Matrix was the term coined by the specialized press at the time.

<sup>37</sup> T.N.: Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics.

<sup>38</sup> In the educational sector, the creation of PRONATEC was the development policy with the greatest impact. Established by Decree-Law No. 12.513/2011, it was a training measure for secondary school students. According to government data, from 2011 to 2014, there were at least 8 million enrollments. The expansion of PROUNI and Science Without Borders, another important program in education, was also improved.

<sup>39</sup> The list announced the twelve host cities, Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Paulo, leaving out the candidacies of Belém, Campo Grande, Florianópolis, Goiânia and Rio Branco. For further details on the 2014 World Cup, check (BRITO, 2015)

<sup>40</sup> These guarantees and charges did not have the same legal status as various international treaties such as those signed at the UN, for example.

<sup>41</sup> For a detailed approach of the lawsuit involving the 2014 World Cup, check BRITO, 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Football Supporter Statute

<sup>43</sup> Source: “Crise na base provoca novo adiamento de votação da Lei da Copa” [Crisis among supporters causes new postponing in voting of the Cup Law], Mar. 21, 2012. Available at: <<https://br.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idBRSPE82K0AX20120321>>. Accessed on: Aug. 25, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Sanctioned on May 25, 2012, Law 12.651, known as the Forest Code, was also the object of intensive debate in the beginning of 2012. The law addresses subjects related to the regularization of environmental policy and deeply impacted aspects of land occupation and exploration in the rural environment. The law contained observations on environmental protection areas and the rights of use of soil and established environmental obligations by rural producers. The law was object of dispute and discussions among rural producers, social movements, and parliamentarians. The movements “Veto Dilma” and “Veto all, Dilma,” supported by environmentalists, attempted to stop the promulgation of the text through social media campaigns. Rural producers, in turn, elaborated their own activities Around the approval of the text. Source: “Movimento 'Veta, Dilma!' sobre Código Florestal é sucesso nas redes sociais...” [Movement ‘Veto, Dilma!’ on Forest Code is a social media hit...], Apr. 05, 2012. Available at: <<https://noticias.uol.com.br/ciencia/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2012/05/04/movimento-veta-dilma-sobre-o-codigo-florestal-ganha-as-redes-sociais.htm?cmpid=copiaecola>>. Accessed on: April 5, 2015.

<sup>45</sup> “Retrospectiva 2012: Segundo ano de Dilma tem recorde de popularidade, apesar de avanços discretos” [2012 in Review: Second year of Dilma has popularity record, despite discreet advances]. Dec. 14, 2012. Available at: <<https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2012/12/14/segundo-ano-de-dilma-tem-recorde-de-popularidade-apesar-de-avancos-discretos.htm?cmpid=copiaecola>>. Accessed on: May 24, 2018.

<sup>46</sup> “To try and improve the relationship between the allies and the government, the leader of the Senate, Eduardo Braga (PMDB-AM) announced that he plans to take one minister to the House every week to

answer not only the allied parliamentarians, but also the mayors of the capitals and the governors. This Wednesday, the Minister of Education, Aloizio Mercadante, had already been to the Senate as part of this strategy. Mercadante listened to the demands of several allied senators and even the governor of Rio Grande do Norte, Rosalba Ciarlini, who took this chance to talk to the minister” Crisis in the Base of Allies postpones the voting of the General Cup Law, Mar. 21, 2012. Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/crise-na-base-aliada-adia-votacao-da-lei-geral-da-copa-4376267#ixz58sW httpstest>>. Accessed on: Dec. 24, 2017.

<sup>47</sup> The president of the Naval Club at the time, Ricardo Veiga, created the Parallel Commission of Truth, formed by high-ranked military officers responsible for elaborating a counter-report with the intention of rebutting the accusations of intrusion. Source: “Clube Naval cria comissão da verdade paralela à oficial” [Naval Club creates commission of truth parallel to the official one], May 14, 2012. Available at: <<http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,clube-naval-cria-comissao-da-verdade-paralela-a-oficial-imp-,872698>>. Accessed on: Aug. 27, 2017.

<sup>48</sup> In 2011, the representative gave statement against the LGBTT activism, besides being accused of racism because of his social media posts. On Twitter, the representative stated that “Africans descend from a cursed ancestor of Noah. That is a fact. The reason for the curse is controversial. Do not be irresponsible, Twitters LOL”. The representative was also a fierce opponent of the sex education project in schools. Nicknamed by its opponents as the “gay kit,” sex education in schools collaborated with the formation of a parliamentary group against agendas considered offensive to morality. Representatives like Jair Bolsonaro (PSC) and Marco Feliciano (PSC) became leaders in this process and helped eroding the support to President Dilma Rousseff even further. Source: “Deputado federal Marco Feliciano faz coro às declarações de Bolsonaro e ataca negros e homossexuais” [Federal representative Marco Feliciano echoes Bolsonaro’s statements and attacks Black people and homosexuals], Mar. 31, 2013, Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/deputado-federal-marco-feliciano-faz-coro-as-declaracoes-de-bolsonaro-ataca-negros-homossexuais-2802944#ixzz58uLanQJr>>. Accessed on: Jan. 15, 2018.

<sup>49</sup> Source: “PEC das Domésticas faz um mês sem direitos regulamentados” [PEC of the Maids’ first anniversary without regulated rights], May 03, 2013. Available at: <<http://g1.globo.com/economia/seu-dinheiro/pec-das-domesticas/noticia/2013/05/pec-das-domesticas-faz-um-mes-sem-direitos-regulamentados.html>>. Accessed on: Aug. 21, 2017.

<sup>50</sup> When the amendment was proposed, part of the Judiciary was favorable to the measure. Jurists Ives Gandra da Silva and José Afonso da Silva highlighted that the Public Prosecution did not have the necessary competence to perform criminal investigations. Yet, Ives Gandra also commented that the PEC was unnecessary. The Brazilian Institute of Criminal Sciences (IBCCrim) also stated its position in relation to the PEC, as well as unions connected to federal and civil police forces in several states. Those who took a stand against PEC 37 in mid-2011 and 2012 were the groups connected to the Public Prosecution. The Association of the Public Prosecution of Distrito Federal and Territories opposed to the measure that, according to its representatives, limited the capacity that the Public Prosecution (MP) has to investigate crimes committed by civil police officers, for example. In short, before 2013, the debate about PEC 37 was restricted to the legal sphere and mainly clashed between jurists and civil and federal police officers about the prerogatives of each of the corporations and agencies. From 2013, this scenario changes when the project is seen as a *laissez-passer* for corruption. Source: “Juristas dizem que MP não pode fazer investigação” [Jurists say that the MP cannot conduct investigations], Mar. 30, 2013. Available at: <<https://www.conjur.com.br/2013-mar-30/juristas-afirmam-investigacao-criminal-exclusividade-policia>>. Accessed on: Aug. 25, 2017. “Associação é contra proposta que limita investigação” [Association opposes proposal to limit investigation], Jun. 16, 2013. Available at: <<https://www.conjur.com.br/2012-jun-16/associacao-promotores-proposta-limita-poder-investigacao>>. Accessed on: Aug. 25, 2017.

<sup>51</sup> T.N.: Brazil Against Impunity

<sup>52</sup> T.N.: [Marcos] Feliciano Out.

<sup>53</sup> Source: “Manifestações contra o pastor Marco Feliciano” [“Demonstrations Against the Pastor Marco Feliciano”], Mar. 9, 2013. Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/manifestacoes-contra-pastor-marco-feliciano-7793255>>. Accessed on: Jan. 9, 2017. “Grupos protestam pelo país contra deputado federal Marco Feliciano” [Groups protest across the country against the federal representative Marco Feliciano], Mar. 9, 2013. Available at: <<http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/03/grupos-protestam-contra-deputado-pastor-e-renan-calheiros-em-brasiliax.html>>. “Em novo protesto contra Feliciano, marcha de 20 mil tem 4 detidos” [In a new protest against Feliciano, 4 people were detained in a march with 20 thousand], Apr. 24, 2013. Available at: <<https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/politica/em-novo-protesto-contra-feliciano-marcha-de-20-mil-tem-4-detidos,8ad0cdd88a83e310VgnCLD2000000ec6eb0aRCRD.html>>. Accessed on: Jan. 25, 2018.

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- <sup>54</sup> Play on words with Marcos Feliciano's surname meaning "unhappy" (since his surname resembles the word "happy" in Portuguese).
- <sup>55</sup> According to an interview to Brasil de Fato, one of the APOGLBT leaders reiterated the political nature of the event. "We want to convey to the [LGBT] community and to the population in general that we do not accept setbacks in our rights. We do not want to go back to ghettos or to having our relationships not acknowledged. We are never going back inside the closet. We are never going back to the underground and the margins. We want improvements and the equality of rights provided for in the Constitution. If we have equality in our obligations, we also want our rights guaranteed. The quantity of people is not one of our concerns. We want people to go to Avenida Paulista with awareness to struggle for equality of rights." Source: "Parada do Orgulho LGBT: 'Para o armário a gente não volta mais'" [LGBT Pride Parade: 'We are never going back in the closet'], May 31, 2013. Available at: <[http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia.php?id\\_noticia=215021&id\\_secao=8](http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia.php?id_noticia=215021&id_secao=8)>. Accessed on: May 25, 2018.
- <sup>56</sup> Fonte: "Protesto de professores interdita Avenida Paulista em SP" [Teachers' protest blocks Avenida Paulista in SP], Apr. 19, 2013. Available at: <<http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2013/04/protesto-de-professores-interdita-faixa-na-avenida-paulista-em-sp.html>>. Accessed on: April 15, 2017.
- <sup>57</sup> T.N.: A sentiment of defense of the Worker's Party (PT).

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