Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective

Autores

  • Octavio Amorim Neto Fundação Getulio Vargas
  • David Samuels University of Minnesota

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12660/riel.v1.n1.2010.4123

Palavras-chave:

Sistema de Governo, Ministérios, Apoio Parlamentar

Resumo

Cabinets link the executive and legislative branches, thus linking parties and government, in all democracies. Variation in cabinet appointments can help explain differences in policy-making and interest representation across different democratic regimes. We explore how variation in the separation of executive and legislative powers affects two critical questions for the study of cabinets: (1) to what extent are portfolios given to party members versus independent technocrats or political cronies of the chief executive, and (2) to what extent do executives follow “Gamson’s Law” and distribute portfolios proportionally to parties in the government coalition? We argue that executives face strong incentives to appoint partisan and proportional cabinets only when they depend on legislative confidence. In contrast, under the separation of powers, executives have stronger incentives to appoint non-partisans and to distribute portfolios non-proportionally. Our results confirm that cabinets tend to be less partisan and proportional under pure presidentialism compared to parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. These findings have substantial implications for understanding how the separation of powers affects governance.

Biografia do Autor

Octavio Amorim Neto, Fundação Getulio Vargas

Is a lecturer in political science at the Graduate School of Economics (EPGE) at the GetulioVargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego in 1998. He is the author of Presidencialismo e Governabilidade nas Américas (FGV Editora and Konrad Adenauer Foundation). His research interests are comparative political institutions and Latin American politics, with a focus on Brazil.

David Samuels, University of Minnesota

Is a Benjamin E. Lippincott Professor at the University of Minnesota. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego in 1998. His research and teaching interests include Brazilian and Latin American politics, political institutions, and democratization. His most recent book is Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers (with Matthew Shugart), from Cambridge University Press.

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Publicado

2010-07-25

Como Citar

Amorim Neto, O., & Samuels, D. (2010). Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective. Revista Ibero-Americana De Estudos Legislativos, 1(1), 10–23. https://doi.org/10.12660/riel.v1.n1.2010.4123

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