

on how society organizes and reproduces itself. This refers to the rupture with the naturalization of the phenomenon and the biologicism that has predominated in studies on human aging.

Biology/nature is part of the human being, but it is recreated, transformed, and shaped by the type of society in which the phenomenon occurs, as man is a social being whose transition from nature to human was established by labor—which constantly created and creates the conditions of existence, humanity, the social being.

The clearest example of this historical-social determination of aging and old age is mass longevity, which has also reached the working class, albeit with the reproduction of gender and race/ethnicity inequalities that are simultaneously intertwined with class status. Thus, it is possible to affirm that morbidity, mortality, health deterioration, aging with quality of life, and a long and healthy old age depend on the material and immaterial conditions of existence.

The objective of this article is to portray the results of studies and research conducted by the author on the phenomenon of aging and old age in the social relations of capital across its different cycles and models of production and social regulation, and how these affect social policies, acquired social rights, and the longevity of the working class.

Aging and old age as historical-social phenomena in symbiosis with the biological

Lukács (2013, p. 63), in his studies on the writings of Marx and Engels, points out that “only in labor, in the positing of an end and its means, with a self-directed act, with the teleological positing, does consciousness surpass simple adaptation to the environment [...] and execute modifications in nature itself” that convert the natural object into an object upon which planned labor has acted, to satisfy social needs which, upon being satisfied, also transform men and generate new social needs. For the author, this capacity to create the conditions of existence transforms man into a social being. Other animals do not have the capacity to transform nature and do not overcome instinct.

This labor process created the human being, the social being, humanity, and “founds, for the first time, the peculiarity of the social being” (Lukács, 2013, p. 61). The biological in these men is ontological, not as a fixed, immutable nature, but rather as a process that shapes and is shaped by the ways the symbiosis between the biological, the psychological, and the social/cultural occurs in each historical moment. Thus, aging is a historical phenomenon, diverse, plural, and differentiated among various types of society and even within a given society. Internally, among its strata or social classes, there are crucial antagonisms or differences.

As Lukács (2013, p. 73) highlights, “the overcoming of animality through the leap to humanization in labor and the overcoming of the epiphenomenal character of merely biological determination,” of the being and its consciousness, with the development of labor, inexorably intensify and universalize. In this process, not only is nature transformed, but also the being that transforms it.

Therefore, aging and old age are processes, not a state posited by nature. The way these are lived, experienced, socialized, and reproduced is determined by a certain type of society in which individuals are embedded. Old age is a stage of the life cycle, a historical-social construction shaped by chronology, by demography, by modern science, which tends to standardize social roles, behaviors, and ways of being in this stage of life; which attributes value or disvalue to it and which masks who actually experiences an old age intersected by the multiple expressions of the social issue.

Simone de Beauvoir (1990, p. 47) already stated that “the senile involution of a man always takes place within a society; it depends strictly on the nature of that society and the place the individual in question occupies within it.” This confronts the studies of traditional social gerontology but goes further in unveiling this phenomenon—always treated by modern science as a natural phenomenon—by highlighting that “[...] both throughout history and today, class struggle determines the manner in which a man is overtaken by old age; an abyss separates the old slave and the old eupatrid, a former worker living on a miserable pension and an Onassis” (p. 16), a bourgeois concentrator of wealth expropriated from workers.

This powerful heuristic key was not fully developed by the author due to the limitations of her theoretical-methodological and philosophical paradigm. Brazilian authors like Hadadd (2016) and Teixeira (2009), however, using historical-dialectical materialism, radicalize the analyses of this phenomenon. They seek its determinants to negate the appearance of its singularities, unveiling the origins of the naturalization, generalization, and standardization of the phenomenon based on age and physical, physiological, and biological signs, isolated from social life and the type of society in which people experience aging and old age, independent of social classes and their fractions, but also of sexist and racist domination ideologies, among others.

The dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir involves incorporating her findings but also surpassing them, hence inserting them into a different paradigm, capable of delving deeper into the determinations of social phenomena. Thus, when she states that “with regard to elderly people, this society is not only guilty but criminal. Sheltered behind the myths of expansion and abundance, it treats the old as pariahs,” (p. 8), Beauvoir provides ammunition for generic and order-reproducing standardizations. This is because, as Haddad (2016) points out, the notion of pariahs, unproductivity,

disvalue, uselessness, and being a burden to the family, the state, and society does not apply to all forms of old age.

The first determining mediation, or particularity, that links the singular to the universal, capable of unveiling this generalizing ideology, is the material conditions of existence, marked and structured by the place the individual occupies in the production relations of a given society. According to Haddad (2016), it is the working class that experiences tragic old age—marked by exclusions, poverty, rights violations, abandonment, and negligence. Teixeira (2009) calls them lives without value, invisible to industrial capital, as they no longer have use value for the market. Therefore, they are considered unproductive and a hindrance to the family and society.

Simone de Beauvoir identified that, in capitalist societies, “[...] the economy is based on profit; it is to this, in practice, that all civilization is subordinated: human material is only of interest as long as it produces. Afterwards, it is thrown away” (1990, p. 13), but the human is generic and does not distinguish between those who are indeed expurgated by age, long before reaching old age, and others who are not even included in the route of exploitation by the formal market, but who suffer the uncertainties of work, income, food, dignity; alongside others of this same class who live in a complete state of poverty, due to adverse conditions that generate stigmas, rejections, marginalities, a condition of being a non-subject—the so-called “Lazarus layer of the working class.”

For Haddad (2016, p. 60), “[...] capitalist societies, by transforming people into commodities, condemn the worker to degradation throughout their life trajectory,” and to premature, sickly, poor, and income-less aging. Therefore, the author concludes, old age as an expression of the social issue, marked by prejudices, age discrimination, and other negative attributes associated with those who age, has an ideological function, just like its opposite: old age as the best stage of life, of leisure and hedonism. Both generalizations aim to mask that the aging process is intersected by class struggle, with the working class being the one that experiences this negatively viewed old age.

Old age as a social problem, “[...] seen as a threat hanging over all men, regardless of the place they occupy in the productive process, camouflages the fact that it is the working class, formed by commodity-men, that drives the productive process. It is the historically constituted protagonist of the tragedy of the end of life” (Haddad, 2016, p. 93).

This unveiling—that class struggle intersects aging and old ages—dates precisely from the social division of labor: private property, the state, monogamous marriage, and the emergence of antagonistic classes: those who own the means of production and those who have no property—those who are subordinated, oppressed, inferiorized, and driven to work so that the ruling class continues to be the holder of wealth passed on to their children.

Industrial society and time dominated by chronology and the rhythm of production

The social and living condition of older men and women has always depended on the class to which they belong. However, with the capitalist industrial society, of “free labor,” of the sale of labor power under the yoke of the capitalist productive process, anchored in exploitation that generates profit still in production, there is a tendency to delimit life, the time of life deemed useful. For this society, the values of commodities are defined by the social time used for their production and reproduction.

Since then, all labor, now abstract, is measured by the same invariable: the time in which commodities are created, sold, and exchanged. In these social relations, “time is money”; it is the socially necessary time for the reproduction of the labor power and their family, who are also commodities.

For these new social relations, time for partying, time for living, leisure time, time to spend with family, religious time, is lost, useless, valueless time. All the time of the working class is imprisoned in work, commuting to work, reproducing children, who will be the new workers, and their women, as unpaid domestic workers, which may be called upon for so-called “productive” work; and even their children, still young, when the market needs to reduce production costs.

In these industrialized societies, workers only have “value” in the vigor of their physical strength; when they begin to age, they are discarded, deemed obsolete, unprofitable, completely losing their value. However, not all older men and women are treated the same way in this society. In the ruling class, no one is considered too old to head corporate boards, be an artist or politician, remarry younger people, form new families, travel, and live life well at any stage. This ruling class, and other dominant classes or strata, has always been long-lived thanks to the quality of life they enjoyed, while others worked and created wealth appropriated and accumulated by them.

The aging and old age of the ruling class and that of the dominated class seem to be different phenomena, given the gap between their living conditions during the aging process and old age. Old age as negative, decrepitude, limitations, illness, finitude, and dependence on the care of others was for positivist modern science a condition attributed to everyone who reached it. This generalizing scientific knowledge, whose general laws of functioning and causality of phenomena apply to everyone and everywhere, had and continues to have an ideological function: “[...] the primary purpose of concealing conflict and domination, dissimulating the existence of the particular and clothing it with a universal character” (Haddad, 2016, p. 149).

The singularities of working-class old age are attributed to everyone, hiding that it is plural and heterogeneous, depending on material and immaterial conditions of existence; structural markers (class, gender, and race/ethnicity) and domination ideologies such as sexism, racism, ageism, and ableism are structural and historical and mark the ways of aging. For this very reason, they undergo modifications that reaffirm or weaken them, depending on public policies, resistances, struggles, and diverse manifestations.

Haddad (2016) denounced this ideology of old age that hides the exploitation, the domination, the tragedy of the worker's end of life, which homogenizes the group of older people, the problems they face, their physical, psychic, and social state based on age and a common biological condition. Her studies were complemented by those of other authors, such as Teixeira, Campelo and Paiva, Benedito, etc. Teixeira (2021) advanced in studies showing that social classes are also not internally homogeneous; each class is composed of fractions and class groups, with variations in these living conditions: whether these workers are men or women, white or black, indigenous, or others. The symbioses of these social markers can unveil the multiple determinations of social inequalities and their greater or lesser incidences in a given population and within it.

As Teixeira (2021) highlights, Marx already pointed out in *Capital* that the socialization of labor was a phenomenon of the capitalist order, but that it did not include the entire mobilized labor force, leaving a portion of it outside formal labor relations. The law of accumulation, which centralizes and concentrates capital in a few hands, also throws a significant number of unemployed workers out of this market; these are composed of the occasionally unemployed, the long-term unemployed who, to survive, dedicate themselves to informal labor, those arriving from rural areas, originating from the already surplus workforce in these spaces swallowed by the rural capital fraction, and those in an absolute state of poverty, stigmatized by their social, physical, illness, and disability conditions.

In more recent studies, Neto Fernandes and Teixeira (2025) note that “tragic old age” does not affect the entire working class. With the imperialist monopoly stage, in which class struggle and compromise pacts gave rise to the recognition of fundamental labor and social rights in the 20th century, and with the expansion of state social protection systems, “tragic old age” designates the way of experiencing old age for workers who have always made up the surplus labor force, such as the unemployed, those in informal jobs, or those in absolute poverty, who did not have access to the citizenship rights of labor. Stable workers who enjoyed labor citizenship, now retired, experience the old age of the third age.

Monopoly capitalism, imperialism, class struggle, and the conquest of rights

The competitive, liberal, free-market industrial society, which expelled aging workers from the factory floor, leaving them to their own devices or dependent on family, whose only form of protection outside the family was religious or philanthropic, exhausts itself, enters successive crises, and gives rise to a new cycle of accumulation, already visible at the beginning of the 20th century.

Lenin (2021), observing the movement of concentration and centralization of capital in a few hands, concluded that it reached such a high level that it generated monopolies, and with this, imperialist politics. It was, according to the author, not just a government policy of the time, but a new accumulation model that determined that policy. “Imperialism is capitalism in the stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself” (p.114).

The large volume of accumulated capital imposed the need for its expanded reproduction, commodifying countries not yet exploited, with the purpose of exporting capital, industrialized goods, and importing raw materials at a low cost. Thus, according to Lenin (2021, p. 114), “the partition of the world by international trusts has begun, and the partition of all the territory of the earth by the greatest capitalist countries has been completed.”

According to Netto (1992), for the imperialist monopoly accumulation model to expand and become hegemonic, to achieve success and expansion, it needed the state and alterations in its functions, as well as extra-economic intervention mechanisms. The liberal state gave way to the interventionist state, with functions not only political, but also economic, social, and ideological, among others.

Marxist authors like Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Mandel pointed out these new state functions and their relations with the new accumulation model. Mandel (1982) noted that, besides the traditional state functions, such as creating the general conditions of production that cannot be ensured by the private activities of ruling class members and repressing any threat from dominated classes and ruling class fractions, through the army, politics, judicial and penitentiary systems, another was added starting from imperialist monopolism: integrating the dominated classes and disseminating the ruling class ideology, as well as maintaining cohesion and consensus around the order. What Gramsci called the expanded state, typical of the search for hegemony and expansion of capitalism, or the state with accumulation and order-legitimizing functions via political means, and not just through force and repression.

This historical moment is tensioned by class struggle. If, on one hand, the ruling class aimed at hegemony and expansion in the monopoly stage, the working class had an organizational leap in struggles, organizing into unions and political parties that pres-

sured for labor and social rights and with concrete experiences of socialism, altering the correlation of forces, especially after World War II.

The result was the mass creation, in European countries, of social protection systems for workers. The most advanced countries in social protection adopted various universalizing social policies, guaranteed in the name of working-class integration and consensus around order.

One of the first social policies was social security, which guaranteed and still guarantees income in cases of retirement, workplace accidents, maternity, dismissal, etc. Universalizing policies of public education and, in some countries, health, social assistance, work, and housing expanded as a synonym for modernity and class conciliation, marking the reformist stage in capitalism.

This reformist pact gave rise to the so-called *Trente Glorieuses*, of expansion without crises, high levels of accumulation, with the advancement of social rights and social protection via public policies. One of the resulting social phenomena of these public policies was mass longevity in many countries. This, which used to be a privilege of the ruling classes, thanks to class struggles and public policies that socialized advances in medicine, medications, piped and treated water, basic sanitation, income, protected work, housing, among others, enabled mass aging, including workers, especially in Europe and the USA.

In Spain, Italy, and Japan, life expectancy is 84 years; very close to this expectation, with 83.5, are Switzerland and Norway. The United States, with residual social protection systems, has a life expectancy of 77.5 years, according to OECD data (2025).

These working-class older people, retired, with health, disposition, and the will to continue living, began to demand diversified social services. This movement gave rise to the so-called social policies for the third age in Europe, which spread throughout the West, as well as to the so-called “ideology of old age,” to name the moment when old age is re-signified, breaking with negative and depreciative views and creating a new identity and way of living old age, driven by these services that aim to keep older people active and healthy.

Imperialist politics, which since World War II has been under US hegemony, but is also adopted by Europe, guaranteed vast social protection systems, attractive salaries for workers, available credit, and industrial production with value added by technologies at the expense of the spoliation of resources from dependent peripheral countries, since part of their surplus value is sent to commercial “partner” countries. Their trade balance is always in deficit; besides importing capital to modernize their industrial park, cities, urban infrastructure in general, and paying labor generates gigantic public debts.

External debt, a deficit trade balance, and recently internal debt press for the reservation of capital from the public fund, aiming at paying high interest rates. This reality, common to the Latin American continent and many African and Asian countries, made it impossible to create social protection systems anchored in universalist citizenship rights. In most of these countries, citizenship is for formal workers, with a signed labor card; however, these countries have a high number of surplus workers, large margins of informal labor without social protection, and a high number of poor people stigmatized by various precarious conditions.

The right to a long-lived old age is not guaranteed to the entire population of these peripheral countries; in many African countries, longevity is still a privilege of the ruling class. In Africa, regional differences are notable. According to the OECD, the North has a life expectancy above 70 years, while in the central and western parts, the average is 57 years. Countries like Nigeria and Chad have the lowest life expectancies.

Regarding Latin America, these data indicate the growth of the elderly population, but in an extremely unequal manner among countries. Haiti and Bolivia have life expectancies around 64.4 and 65.1, respectively. Even within a single country, life expectancy varies greatly among regions, states, and municipalities.

As for many years the Brazilian social protection system maintained labor citizenship, the lack of formal work and the experience of precarious, sporadic, informal, or undocumented jobs, still with high rates today in some regions, directly affect life expectancy, survival after 60, illnesses, and dependence on care in old age.

The data from IBGE (2024) indicate that from 2000 to 2023, the elderly population in Brazil jumped from 8.7% to 15.6%, and life expectancy rose from 71.7 years in 2000 to 76.4 years in 2023. The Retirement and Pension Institutes (IAPs) were unified in the 1970s, resulting in the National Institute of Social Security, which, besides income for accidents, old age, or maternity, also guaranteed access to medical assistance.

However, the biggest leap in social policies occurred with the implementation of the new format of social security policies, formed by health, social assistance, and social security, after the 1988 Federal Constitution. Health as a universal policy, social assistance for whoever needs it, with the continuous cash benefit for low-income older and disabled people, and social security with retirements by contribution, but also by age, and rural retirement for men and women in special working conditions, impacted longevity and the expansion of life expectancy.

The limitations of the Brazilian social protection system are structural due to its condition as a dependent peripheral capitalist country, and it expands from the perspective of citizenship rights belatedly, when throughout the West systems were already undergoing

restrictive access “reforms,” with the end of the reformist era of capitalism, brought about by financial, globalized, and neoliberal capitalism, which has been accentuating the expropriations of rights and public resources for the collective.

Thus, the high number of workers without formal employment and with scarce access to social policies is maintained. In regions where this type of work exceeds 50% of its economically active population, life expectancies are lower.

Table 1. Relationship between informal labor and life expectancy among Brazilian regions

Region	Informality Rate (2025)	Life Expectancy (Years)
North	52,4%	72,9
Northeast	50,8%	74,1
Center-West	35,2%	75,8
Southeast	33,1%	77,5
South	30,5%	78,9

Source: IBGE apud Google AI.

As can be observed, the correlation between informality and life expectancy indicates that the North and Northeast regions are those with the highest number of informal work and the lowest life expectancy. These regions are the ones with the largest number of poor people, scarce industrial development, and the highest number of surplus workers, excluded from the urban and rural productive process, and who, to survive, live on informal labor, without a signed work card, without protection, and with a lower life expectancy.

Internally within each Brazilian region, there is a diversity of existence conditions. There are states that accumulate greater social and economic inequalities. As the table below points out, in the Northeast, Maranhão and Piauí have informality averages higher than the national average; in the North region, there are Pará and Amapá.

Table 2. Relationship between informal labor and life expectancy among the states of the North and Northeast regions

State	Informality Rate (~2024/25)	Life Expectancy (Years)
Pará	57,6%	73,1
Maranhão	56,8%	72,1
Piauí	54,9%	72,5
Amapá	~50,0%	73,8
Tocantins	~38,5%	76,5
Bahia	~50,5%	74,4

Source: IBGE apud IA Google.

Life expectancy in Brazil, according to 2024 IBGE data, is 76.6. However, in Maranhão, Piauí, and Pará, this life expectancy is lower than the national average, just as labor informality rates are the highest in the country. These are not even lower due to access to public social security policies for the urban and rural working population. This is because social security and BPC coverage protects older people (60+). In 2023, the PNADC/IBGE (2024) with information produced by the CGEEP/SRGPS/MPS pointed out that 81.8% of older people were covered.

Social inequalities of race and sex are widely reproduced, with white men (86.3%) and white women (80.8%) being those with the highest social security coverage, considering the trajectory of greater access to formal work, higher education, etc. Black men (82.2%) and black women (78.8%) present lower percentages than whites. Besides gender inequality, racism is also a structural marker of the places people occupy, which demarcate the possibilities of access to goods, services, wealth, and public policies throughout aging and into old age.

Another indication of the reproduction of social inequalities is the value of pensions; the vast majority are equivalent to one minimum wage. Two to three minimum wages account for 30%, and above five minimum wages, only 10%, the latter concentrated among workers in better jobs, mostly white men and women.

Public policies are fundamental to provide protection in old age and must be prioritized. According to data from the Ministry of Social Security (2023), the state of Piauí has coverage higher than the national average, reaching 91.4% of older people with social security benefits.

Social security policy in Brazil began in the 1930s; the BPC started to be implemented in 1996; the Unified Health System was institutionalized in 1990; and the Unified Social Assistance System in the 2000s. Income in old age allowed the elderly to remain in their homes, as providers for their household, as well as to have access to disease diagnosis and treatment technologies, including chronic degenerative ones and assistance services. They were then able to enjoy an old age without extreme poverty and with greater survival after 60, mainly retired workers.

The workers who have always made up the labor force surplus can access the BPC from 65 years of age and with a per capita family income of up to $\frac{1}{4}$ of the minimum wage. According to data from the Ministry of Social Security, their survival is only 7.9 years, as 80% of elderly beneficiaries leave the benefit due to death.

However, with the changes in the correlation of forces globally and the long-term capitalist crisis, after thirty years without systemic obstacles, the reformist phase of capitalism runs out and initiates an era of counter-reforms in social policies, reducing access

and subtracting rights, including labor and social ones, expropriated by capital in its financialized, globalized, and neoliberal phase.

Will current capitalist societies be able to guarantee the socialization of the right to longevity? Under what conditions will future generations reach old age? Will they have a greater survival?

New cycle of capitalism and the era of attempts to dismantle state social protection

The reformist era brought about by class struggle ended with the global crisis of capitalism in the second half of the 1970s. A crisis of hyper-accumulation and reduced opportunities for the expanded reproduction of large capital, which generated production retraction, mass dismissals and unemployment, increased inflation, bank interest rates, salaries of strongly organized workers, increased production costs, and the bankruptcy of smaller businesses, which impacted and reduced capital's super-profits.

Consecutive years of recession and crisis led to the search for solutions that simultaneously involved a change in the capitalist cycle, both in the production model and in state policy. In the 1990s, Harvey (1992) called this model flexible, in opposition to the Fordist model, both with flexibility in forms of production, without stocks, on demand, with parts manufactured in other companies, and flexibility in forms of hiring the workforce, instituting flexible work, by contract, temporary, piece-rate, and demanding flexible markets for sales in allies' markets, such as zero tariffs and free movement of people. The political strategies to give concreteness, expansion, and legitimacy to this model implied a new social regulation, called neoliberal.

After three decades of neoliberal policies, it became visible that neoliberalism was a remodeling of the capitalist political, legal, ideological, and cultural superstructure, and not just an economic policy or an ideology, as it created an objectivity and subjectivity based on individualism, individual rights, "free" markets, reinforcement of private property and individual and family responsibilities for the improvement of living conditions, access to education, health, social security, housing, etc.

For Brown (2019, p. 39), emerging neoliberals and neoconservatives share a critique of the interventionist, reformist, and collectivist state. "The assault on society and social justice in the neoliberal decades is most commonly identified in the project of dismantling and deprecating the social state in the name of free and responsible individuals."

In the analyses the author conducts on Hayek's works, she points out that for him the only justice worth striving for is individual and normative, and the so-called social justice that taxes citizens and supports those who do not assume their individual and

family responsibilities is malicious. Hayek emphasizes: “[...] Social justice attacks justice, freedom, and civilizational development guaranteed by the market and morality” (Brown, 2019, p. 48).

Neoliberal counter-reforms throughout the West attacked labor and social rights, as well as environmental ones, restructuring the so-called welfare state. Harvey (2014), more recently, deepened his analyses that began in the 1990s about late capitalism. He clarified the new accumulation and social regulation model of the current capital cycle of *accumulation by dispossession*, defining its ways of being.

Fraudulent valuations of stocks, false immediate enrichment schemes, the structured destruction of assets through inflation, biopiracy, escalated destruction of global environmental resources (land, air, water), habitat degradation, privatization of public goods (universities, social policies, wave of privatizations, etc.), are new waves of expropriation of common lands, regressions of regulatory statutes designed to protect labor, loss of social rights, have been one of the most blatant policies of dispossession, implemented in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy. (Harvey, 2014, p. 123).

Brown (2019) also highlights these characteristics of expropriations of rights and social policies, which the author called dispossession: “[...] neoliberalism involves politically the dismantling of the social state; legally, it involves wielding claims of freedom to contest equality and secularism, as well as environmental, health, safety, and labor protections [...],” all dismantled to constitute an attractive space for capital, whether financial, industrial, commercial, or agrarian.

In Brazil, neoliberal counter-reforms have been, since the 1990s, in open tension against the democratic and popular constitutional project and have been limiting the advances achieved, such as social security policies with guaranteed funding through specific forms that gave rise to SUS and SUAS. Social security suffers attacks with each new government, subtracting rights, hindering and limiting access, always targeting capitalization, private pensions, and pension funds, in addition to constant attacks on rural retirement, retirement by age, the BPC, aiming to reduce them to half a minimum wage.

Access to fundamental rights like water, energy, and basic sanitation has been subtracted by concessions to capital and its unbridled commodification. The precarization of forms of hiring the workforce in Brazil—intermittent work, uberization, platformization, “pejotizado” labor (a worker with a corporate tax ID providing services)—adds to the traditional forms of precarious and informal work for the poor who have always formed the surplus workforce, thrown out by capital or unabsorbed, to reduce costs and to act as a form of pressure on those in the formal labor market.

The result of this social reality is the threat to mass longevity, especially of the working class that depends on public social policies. Survival after 60 is lower for black and peripheral people. Furthermore, there is limited access to precarized social services by reduced teams and the lack of funding to guarantee their expansion and access to the most vulnerable groups.

The attack on social justice with equity by neoliberals and neoconservatives puts at risk the commitment a society must have towards those who suffer most from the incidence of social inequalities of class, gender, and race/ethnicity.

Data from the IBGE (2024), from studies on racial inequalities, show that these, when intertwined with gender and class inequalities, are malicious to black, elderly, and peripheral women. According to Brazilian indicators, the percentage of black women is higher than white women up to 50 years of age. After 50, this percentage decreases and is overtaken by the percentage of white women. Many die before reaching 80. These data point out that among people aged 80+, 35.9% are white women, 20.7% white men, 26.3% black women, and 18.1% black men.

Access to education, health, income, and housing is also differentiated due to structural inequalities. Regarding the rates of years of study, according to IBGE data (2024), across all age groups these are higher for white people than for black people, heavily concentrated in older black people.

Black people from peripheries and the very poor, socially stigmatized, have a higher incidence of diseases like hypertension, diabetes, prostate cancer, and glaucoma; and a higher incidence of mental disorders. Black men have three times higher incidence of mental disorders than white men, and 1.9 times higher incidence of parasitic diseases.

Individualism, commodification, and the re-philanthropization of social assistance in Brazil tend to widen these social inequalities of class, gender, and race/ethnicity, and further, to blame, criminalize, and generate conditional benefits to teach them to be good parents, children, and citizens who have individual rights and civic and family duties, with resources lower than the minimum wage, so as not to discourage work and independent income generation.

Final considerations

If social policies based on social justice and equity, anchored in social rights and the state's duty to its citizens, gave rise to the phenomenon of mass longevity, ensuring that it is not merely a privilege of the ruling classes, in the current cycle capital, which expropriates acquired labor and social rights, spoliates indigenous lands and forests, environ-

mental rights, strategic territories for wars, and massacres opponents with absurd tariffs for export, directly threatens not longevity in general, but that of the working class and its fractions that make up the surplus of the labor force.

The anti-capitalist struggle is urgent and current, for reformism is becoming a thing of the past, leaving only the necessary struggle for human emancipation.

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