



[Dossier: Contemporary Reconfigurations of Latin American Political Modernity: Conflicts, Institutions, and Imaginaries]

From Protests to the Constituent Process: An Analysis of the Deadlocks of Chilean Mobilizations Through the Lens of the Hegemonic Imaginary (2011–2022)

Dos protestos à constituinte: uma análise dos impasses das mobilizações chilenas à luz do imaginário hegemônico (2011- 2022)

Daniel Henrique da Mota Ferreira^{1 2}

¹ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; ² Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. E-mail: danielhmf11917@gmail.com. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2129-6050>.

Lucas Paz dos Santos³

³ Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. E-mail: lucassantos@iesp.uerj.br. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0003-5416-6487>.

Article received on 03/31/2026 and accepted on 04/13/2026.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License



Abstract

This paper seeks to understand why the past decade in Chile witnessed successive waves of large-scale protests that ultimately encountered limits in the form of the constitutional rejection. The central hypothesis is that the protests functioned as events that reshaped the possibilities for political organization; however, their force waned due to a deficit of political organization and coordination, inherent to the dilemmas of the hegemonic imaginary in contemporary modernity. Based on a literature review and interviews with 19 members of the *Frente Amplio* party (FA), the study reconstructs the decade's political process and compares two events within the same national context — the 2011 protests and the October 2019 uprising (O-19) — focusing on their political -institutional impacts on the Chilean hegemonic imaginary. The analysis is structured around three variables: the decentering of collective subjectivities; the intensity of constituent power; and frustrations and demands directed at the existing political and constitutional system. The findings suggest that the rise in protests stems from frustrations with the partial responses provided by constitutional reforms. However, while the October 2019 uprising succeeded in opening the constituent process, it also demonstrated that the increasing strength of the protests was directly proportional to the decentering of collective actors, ultimately resulting in coordination difficulties throughout the constituent process.

Keywords: Chile; Protests; Constituent Power; Constitution; Imaginary.

Resumo

O presente *paper* busca compreender as razões pelas quais a década passada chilena apresentou ondas crescentes de massivos protestos, mas que encontraram limites na forma do rechaço constitucional. A hipótese é que os protestos serviram como acontecimentos que modificaram as possibilidades de organização política, mas cuja força arrefeceu devido a um déficit de organização e coordenação política, inerente aos dilemas do imaginário hegemônico na modernidade contemporânea. Mediante revisão bibliográfica e entrevistas com 19 membros do partido Frente Amplio (FA), buscou-se reconstituir o processo político da década e comparar dois eventos no mesmo país: os protestos de 2011 e do O-19, a partir dos impactos políticos-institucionais no imaginário hegemônico chileno. Analisa-se tendo por base três variáveis: descentramento das subjetividades coletivas; intensidade do poder constituinte e frustrações e demandas contra o sistema político e constitucional vigente. Como resultado propõem-se que o



aumento dos protestos vem das frustrações com as respostas parciais dadas nas reformas constitucionais; todavia, O-19 ao conseguir abrir o processo constituinte demonstrar que o aumento da força dos protestos estava diretamente proporcional ao descentramento das coletividades, o que culminou em dificuldades de coordenação no processo constituinte.

Palavras-chave: Chile; Protestos; Poder constituinte; Constituição; Imaginário.



1. Introduction

This study aims to discuss the last decade of protests in Chile. It seeks to understand why the major mobilizations that led to constitutional reforms ultimately resulted in the rejection of a proposed progressive Constitution. These mobilizations are understood as a response to persistent socio-political discontent stemming from the limitations of the Pinochet-era Constitution, which constrained governments within the framework of a Subsidiary State. The article is based on a case study used to construct theoretical causal mechanisms for evaluating the Chilean political process (Tilly, 1995). It examines the two key events defining this political cycle — the protests of June 2011 and those of October 19 (O-19) — focusing on the actors involved and the outcomes. The underlying hypothesis of this analysis is that differences in the decentering of subjectivities and in the intensity of constituent power, triggered by frustrations and indignation with the political system¹, account for the distinct outcomes observed in both moments.

Fieldwork and interviews with 19 members of the *Frente Amplio* party were conducted. This material was supplemented by a robust literature review to provide a historical analysis of the decade. A fundamental goal of the study is to achieve a theoretical-methodological advance; to this end, a dialogue was established between the concepts of hegemony, the imaginary, and collective subjectivities, enabling an interpretation of social mobilizations and their repercussions within institutional politics. The analysis indicates that the mobilizations, which grew and consolidated around criticism of the existing Constitution, opened a path toward constitutional reform capable of transforming the Chilean political cycle. However, as increasingly decentralized forms of mobilization emerged, political coordination became progressively more difficult, ultimately culminating in the rejection of the proposed Constitution.

The text is divided into four sections. The first section establishes the theoretical premises derived from connecting the theory of collective subjectivity, the concept of the hegemonic imaginary, and the literature on political cycles. The second presents the characteristics of the political cycle of the Chilean transition. The third discusses the

¹ By political system we understand a collective subjectivity constructed from the interactions born from the institutionalized political dispute in political modernity. Thus, the political system presents itself as divided into two sides: a state side, which in modernity concentrates most of the political power and from which the leading collective subjectivities emerge; and a societal political system, where the collective subjectivities that are outside the formal institutions are located and seek to contest them, as in the case of social movements. (Domingues, 2024)



conditions and consequences of the 2011 protests, as well as the formation of the *Frente Amplio*. The fourth addresses the O-19 protests and the resulting constitutional opening. In the final remarks, we propose a brief comparison between the two cases, emphasizing their differences regarding the type of subjectivity that achieved hegemony over the constituent power, noting that the broader the demands, the greater the decentralization and the resulting difficulties in political coordination.

2. Collective Subjectivity, Political-Hegemonic Imaginary, and Constituent Power

The conflict-ridden and contestatory production of collectivities is a significant topic in political sociology, particularly within the study of social movements (Tilly, 1978; Touraine, 2009; Polletta, 2004). Comparisons between different lineages or generations of movements have frequently highlighted organizational shifts across different periods and the factors driving them. In more recent literature, processes of decentering and decentralization have moved to the forefront of debates on identity construction, prompting extensive reflection on the differences between generations of social movements or the relationships between parties and movements (Bringel & Domingues, 2012; della Porta et al., 2017). In all these instances, the emergence of new collective actors places strain on political imaginaries, even as they simultaneously condition these actors.

To address the relationship between the imaginary and subjectivities, this study draws upon the theory of collective subjectivities and the concept of "centering" developed by José Maurício Domingues. For Domingues, social systems possess subjectivity insofar as they exhibit collective causality—that is, the capacity for intentional action and reproduction through interactive processes with other collectivities. This interaction occurs both internally (within the unfolding of the system's units) and externally (between collectivities). A social system can only possess subjectivity when it involves relationships between human beings (Domingues, 1995, p. 137; 1999, pp. 16–21, 23–25; 2004, p. 27).

Collective subjectivities are embedded in a complex web of relationships and multiple interpenetrations with other systems (Domingues, 2004, pp. 17–19). Its existence may or may not be recognized by its members, and its impact may or may not



be conscious and intentional (Domingues, 1995, pp. 114–115). Its intentionality varies according to the focus on three factors: (1) organization — ensured by decision-making centers that articulate the social system; (2) identity — ensured by the social system's self-perception and consciousness; and (3) clear boundaries — the demarcation of the social system's limits in relation to other systems (Domingues, 1995, pp. 111–112, 117; 2004, pp. 30–31). Through this theory, therefore, one can discuss organizations such as political parties and social movements by considering them as part of a continuum defined by the degree of organization and the clarity of boundary demarcation—factors viewed here as stemming from the possession of a clear identity.

Collective subjectivities reproduce themselves through the relationship among their four dimensions: (1) the material dimension; (2) the symbolically-hermeneutic dimension; (3) the spatiotemporal dimension; and (4) the power dimension (Domingues, 1995, pp. 127–132, 136–137; 2024). In the symbolically-hermeneutic dimension, Domingues (1999, pp. 32–33, 36–37, 44–46) integrates creativity and memory in order to expand Castoriadis's concept of the imaginary². By doing so, Domingues overcomes the original methodological dualism between individual and society through social interaction, employing memory³ to limit the fluidity of collective processes. Furthermore, Domingues (2024) has been working specifically on the concept of the imaginary in the political context under the notion of the political imaginary⁴. This has also been systematically pursued by several other authors (Browne & Diehl, 2019; Knöbl, 2019;

² According to Castoriadis (1982, pp. 329–362), the lives of subjects are marked by a trauma corresponding to the rupture of an originary state of pleasure, the subject's monadic core, into which the sign does not penetrate. A "gap" is created, differentiating representation, affect, and desire, which were previously united and undifferentiated. The orientation of desire toward this "lack" energizes human motivation, which is rooted in the unconscious. The unconscious, in turn, retains its non-identitarian character even when the principle of total pleasure is no longer accessible. The process of sublimation then begins: desire connects to socially instituted significations, resulting in the insertion of the new into the socio-historical world (Castoriadis, 1982, pp. 329–362).

³ According to Castoriadis (1982, pp. 329–362), the lives of individuals are marked by a trauma that corresponds to the rupture of an original state of pleasure (the subject's monadic core), where the sign does not penetrate. A "gap" is created that differentiates representation, affect, and desire, previously united and undifferentiated. The orientation of desire towards this "lack" energizes human motivation, located in the unconscious. This, in turn, retains its non-identitarian character, even when the principle of total pleasure ceases to be accessible. The process of sublimation then begins: desire connects to socially instituted meanings, the consequence of which is the insertion of the new into the socio-historical world (Castoriadis, 1982, pp. 329–362).

⁴ The political imaginary is a social form that organizes the instituting process of the political, as well as the imagination and symbolism associated with it. Within the imaginary, new political forms emerge that shape practices and understandings, enabling a shared sense of legitimacy (Browne & Diehl, 2019, pp. 394, 396–397).



Singer, 2020) and, to some extent, since Charles Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Browne & Diehl, 2019, p. 394).

Our aim here is to contribute theoretically to the topic of the political imaginary, through connecting the categories of collective subjectivity and hegemonic imaginary. It is therefore appropriate to describe the hegemonic imaginary. Heike Delitz and Stefan Maneval (2017) draw upon Simmel's concept of the "Hidden King" and the "French tradition" (Durkheim, Bergson, and Castoriadis) to argue that the imaginary constitution of society occurs through an external element—such as "God," "reason," or "nation" (ibid., pp. 33–40). Delitz and Maneval highlight, above all, Castoriadis's concept of the primary imaginary. The significations of the primary imaginary create objects and organize the world without any preceding referent (Castoriadis, 1982, pp. 406–407). They "institute the mode of being of things and individuals as relating to them" (ibid., p. 409, our translation). In contrast, the significations of the secondary imaginary are always linked to a referent, namely, the primary imaginary (ibid., pp. 406–407). If the significations of the primary imaginary serve as the "glue" binding the real, rational, and symbolic elements that constitute society, those of the secondary imaginary are derivations of the primary imaginary—such as the formation of religious subjects or the seven-day calendar resulting from the existence of a religion and its God.

Delitz and Maneval criticize Castoriadis for mentioning only one primary imaginary. According to them, this creates the impression of a harmonious unity between societies, when in reality different communities follow their own central imaginaries and fight among themselves for political and social hegemony (Delitz, Maneval, 2017, p. 40). In response to this, they mobilize Laclau and Mouffe's concept of hegemony to argue that the imaginary is fragmented into countless conflicts between different collectivities (ibid., p. 40–42). They welcome Laclau and Mouffe's reinterpretation of the concept of hegemony as an articulation between demands within the same chain of equivalence. In this sense, hegemony refers to the construction of an empty signifier, because a demand from within the chain comes to represent and articulate the totality of demands, based on an operation in which the signifier relinquishes part of its particular content in order to amalgamate the greatest possible range of heterogeneous aspirations around a precarious collective identity⁵ (Laclau, 2013; Laclau and Mouffe, 2015).

⁵ Laclau and Mouffe start from the problem of the absence of an essence for social struggles and the need to build articulations between a plurality of contemporary actors. For them, the social is permeated by



Based on these concepts, Delitz and Maneval conceive the hegemonic imaginary, which describes the process according to which a multiplicity of conflicts give rise to the consolidation of a primary imaginary in relation to competing alternatives. As a result, the central imaginaries of societies have a simultaneously antagonistic and hegemonic character (ibid., p. 41). This characterization is relevant to the discussion about the imaginary because it indicates the disputes, conflicts and partial or fragmentary articulations behind the institution of the symbolic dimension. Hegemony allows access to the dimension of power through the imaginary by accepting its partial and conflictive aspect, guaranteed by a dynamic balance of forces exercised by communities.

The understanding of the hegemonic imaginary of a political system occurs through the analysis of the reiterated and conflictive interaction between actors, agendas and institutions (Domingues, 2024; Ferreira, 2025). The changes in this imaginary resort to political cycles, which are activated in a moment of overflow of radical imaginary, of pure collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1996), where social values are placed in tension. This effervescence is interpreted here under the concept of happening or event (Ferreira, 2025). In line with Ferreira et al (2022, p. 216), it is argued that the main political event considered is the protest cycle, as they “act as an abrupt discontinuation of the historical process, providing new elements for the interpretation of reality, in terms of present, past and future” (our translation).⁶

In political modernity, effervescence occurs via popular mobilization, the strength of which is capable of modifying the institutional structures that stabilize the political imaginary. This popular force is interpreted in political thought as constituent power, which emanates from the crowd or plebs themselves (Breugh, 2013), collectivities whose actions tension and shape political and social institutions, reopening the horizon of absolute democracy (Negri, 2014; Kalyvas, 2005).

antagonisms and is anchored in a “negativity” (Marchart, 2018) that prevents the proposal of a univocal totality. This allows for the production of new identities and new subjects through the articulation of particular demands. Hegemony derives precisely from this process. In *The Populist Reason* (Laclau, [2005], 2013), the proposal of hegemony is presented from the category of people, a collective identity formed by heterogeneous demands. The fluidity and singularity of these demands mean that only in the political struggle, where the “we-they” discourse is articulated, can a collective identity be constructed by opposition (Mouffe, 2020). Opposition causes demands to become equivalent, but their stabilization and suturing into an identity occurs when one of the demands within the chain comes to represent all the others, becoming a signifier partially devoid of its original substance (Laclau, 2013).

⁶ In the original: “[...] atuam como uma descontinuação abrupta do processo histórico, fornecendo novos elementos para a interpretação da realidade, em termos de presente passado e futuro”.



It is through this popular sovereignty that the constitution of the modern regime is defended, which highlights the creative capacity of individual and collective subjectivities to redesign social arrangements (Domingues, 2024, 89-90). It is the constituent power of the same crowd that lends political force to mobilization in the modern imaginary, becoming the way to refer to the process of social creativity, or radicality of the imaginary, in which hegemony itself is reconstituted through the emergence of new political actors. As Kalivas proposes:

In normal times, these movements transgress the limits of legality in order to radicalize the utopian and radical content of a democratic government and to broaden and expand existing political freedoms. But it might be that in some rare cases they move away from illegal strategies toward more radical, extralegal activities. Such a shift signifies, in certain specific historical conjunctures, that some of the movements are able to mobilize and encompass broader strata of the population, to form wider organic alliances, to articulate new norms and rights, to formulate original collective aims that transcend the confines of the existing regime, and to propose a new hegemonic founding project. (...). In moments like these, movements and their allies become the new popular, constituent subject. In other words, they are moving toward the direction of becoming the new carriers of the constituent power (Kalyvas, 2008, p. 341).

The most significant manifestations of constituent power in modernity are found in successful revolutions, which allow for the refounding of the entire state structure. In revolutions, however, there is a sharp separation between the constituent act and the constitutional order—between the absolute exercise of popular sovereignty and the subsequent institutional exercise of democracy—leading us to distinguish a political moment from a legal one (Canotilho, 2003). Yet, this perspective hinders the study of the transitions and incremental changes that protests also help to bring about. As Andrew Arato (2017) observes, there is a divide between revolution and constitutionalism, wherein the sovereign paradigm is abandoned in favour of new strategies that enable constitutional revision within institutionalized contexts familiar with democratic tradition. In other words, Arato notes that there are modulations in constitutional processes that mirror the nuances of constituent power itself. Acting as a constituent force, therefore, should not be viewed solely as a revolutionary act, but also as involving partial attempts at constitutional change.

By accepting that there is room within existing institutional frameworks to establish a partial constituent power, we expand the possibilities for considering the relationship between mobilization and politics. The intensity of mobilization gives rise to



different strategies for redesigning the constitution. It can be said that the broader the chain of mobilized demands, the greater the constituent force; conversely, the narrower the chain, the weaker the force, and the more circumscribed the political strategies employed must be.

With this in mind, the aim here is to analyze how shifts in collective imaginaries drive transformations in political cycles, propelled by the emergence of new actors. Protests act as a catalyst for the emergence of distinct political forms of seeking social change. New actors and institutions are constructed. Pre-existing agendas are contested through their own reconfiguration. The major protests of 2011 and 2019 exemplify this constituent power inherent in large-scale protests. By analyzing their characteristics and specificities, it is possible to identify the underlying trends in the changing forms of organizing collective action, which are contemporarily marked by the decentering of these subjectivities (Bringel, 2021). Accordingly, we analyze these subjectivities based on four characteristics: (1) the degree of decentering of collective subjectivities; (2) the reasons underlying social mobilizations, understood as deriving from affective conditions of frustration and indignation; (3) the intensity of constituent power and its outcomes; and, finally, (4) returning to the issue of decentering, its implications for the coordination of collective subjectivities during the constitution-making process. These characteristics are analysed based on the theory of collective subjectivities presented here, which allows us to link the discussion of the social imaginary to the production of subjectivities characterized by varying levels of centering and coordination mechanisms; it also enables us to investigate both material changes and shifts in power relations within the formation of these collectivities.

3. The Shift in Chile's Political Cycle

The second decade of this century highlights a transition from one political cycle to another in Chilean history. The protests of the past decade — notably those of 2011 and 2019 — were directed against mechanisms that had emerged during the democratic transition but had subsequently proven insufficient. The intensity and scope of the protests had escalated over the years. While the 2011 protests were driven primarily by students, the broad social participation in 2019 amplified the power of the collective



ecstasy, ultimately leading to the opening of the constituent process. The table below considers the actors, agendas, and institutions involved, illustrating the political rupture represented by the protests and the beginning of a new political cycle in Chile:

Table 1 – Chilean Political Cycle

Political Cycle	Elements	Redemocratization	Post-Transition Political Cycle
Critical juncture	Event	Victory of the "No" campaign / First democratic election	2011 protests and O-19
Form of government	Institution	Presidentialism	Presidentialism
Party system	Institution	Binomial system (two coalitions)	Multiparty system
Government policies	Agenda	Subsidiary State	Constitutional reforms and Constitutional Conventions (rejected)
Political confrontation	Agenda	Targeted policies	Economic and post-material agendas
Movements	Actors	Labor, student, and identity movements	Student, feminist, O-19, Autonomous Left, and Indigenous movements
Parties (coalitions)	Actors	Concertación (PD, DC, PPD) and Alianza (RN, UDI)	FA, PCC, Republican Party, PS, DC, RN

Source: Ferreira, 2025.

Chile's democratic transition unfolded amid the enduring presence of authoritarian enclaves and a pro-market Pinochetist mindset throughout the transition process, despite the participation of the opposition. This can be attributed to the very conditions of the Transition, which was carried out following a state restructuring conducted during Pinochet's dictatorship in favour of consolidating a neoliberal imaginary, fostered since the influence of the Chicago School. In the view of Enzo Faletto (1998), neoliberalism first developed in Chile. Between the 1973 military coup and 1983, the government consolidated a market economy. During this period, the country experienced two economic recessions that accelerated the processes of economic and state reorganization. One of the Military Junta's objectives was to implement a new Constitution, which was promulgated in the 1980s (Cordero et al., 2022). As a result, the



social pillars of the Subsidiary State were established, namely: the further liberalization of the labour market and the large-scale liberalization of Chilean social security (through a private capitalization system), education, and healthcare (Roberts, 2017). The Constitution reinforced Pinochet's role as Head of State until 1988, when a plebiscite was held to decide whether he would remain in office until March 1997.

During this period, and particularly in moments of severe economic crisis, social movements reemerged after long periods of repression (Tarrow, 2021). Popular pressure accompanied the transformations taking place in Chilean society, which perceived a new opportunity for political opening within a democratic context. This new horizon altered the axes of political agendas and debates in Chile and, consequently, the hegemonic imaginary, which ceased to be guided by the antagonism between communism and authoritarian liberalism (Garretón, 2003) and instead came to center on the issue of the return to electoral democracy. In this shift, the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party reached an agreement in favour of an institutional transition within the framework established by the Pinochet regime, thereby accepting the limits of the political and economic model that had been instituted.

Pinochet's departure following the "No" vote victory in the 1988 plebiscite showed Chile's desire for democratization, ushering in a new political cycle. This victory was further solidified by the electoral success of the *Concertación* coalition, composed primarily of the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* [Christian Democratic Party] (PDC) and the *Partido Socialista* [Socialist Party] (PS), alongside the *Partido por la Democracia* [Party for Democracy] (PPD). According to Moulian (1997, p. 37, our translation), the "declaration of consensus discursively manifests the decision of 'absolute oblivion'" ⁷ and the glorification of this consensus became a defining feature of what he termed *Chile Actual* [Today's Chile], "a nation grounded in the construction of the "Chilean model." This model is characterized by steady economic growth and stable political representation — factors that established Chile as a model nation, despite high levels of inequality (Huneus, 2014). Consequently, another form of Progressive, or "corrected", neoliberalism emerged, as suggested by Garretón (2012), in which progressivism arose as an internal force within the coalition between the left and the center under the conditions of the Subsidiary State (Pizarro Hofer, 2020). In opposition to the *Concertación*, the right moderated its positions

⁷ In the original: "[...] la declaración del consenso manifiesta discursivamente la decisión del olvido absoluto".



and reorganized itself around the *Renovación Nacional* [National Renewal] (RN) and the *Unión Democrática Independiente* [Independent Democratic Union] (UDI).

According to Siavelis (2012), the Transition itself fostered enduring features that, over the decades, created a widening gap between political parties and civil society. The principal enclave of this transition is the binomial electoral system, which reinforced the formation of negotiated coalitions and the subsequent distribution of positions through internal bargaining and agreements among the parties within the coalition (the so-called *cuoteo*). Both coalitions secured a stable parliamentary presence due to the binomial system's tendency to concentrate votes. The model stipulated that two seats would be contested in each district. To win both seats, a coalition party needed to secure twice as many valid votes as its opponent in the district (two-thirds of the valid votes). This system allowed even a party with one-third of the vote to balance the scales, keeping the competition in a state of constant power parity between the coalitions. Consequently, this reinforced the disconnect between social demands and the political system (Huneus, 2014).

4. The 2011 Protests and The *Frente Amplio*

The 2011 movements are closely linked to the political context of the preceding decade. At the beginning of the redemocratization process, the student movement had to contend with the predominant role that the Transition agenda played for younger generations and, consequently, with the recruitment of activists into the youth wings of political parties. According to Donoso (2017), there was a clear disagreement among post-dictatorship student leaders regarding whether to push for educational reform or to accept the gradualist agenda proposed by the *Concertación*. The movement also suffered from a lack of leadership and experienced cadres, as many key leaders had moved into government positions following the dictatorship. Disappointed by the results, part of the student movement had stepped away from formal politics.

The early 2000s saw the re-emergence of the student actor, though this time with high school students taking the lead. The *Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios* [Coordinating Assembly of High School Students] (ACES) was formed to organize high school students' demands, operating under a new mindset that prioritized



decentralization. This reemergence culminated in the largest secondary student mobilization of the decade, the Penguin Revolution (*Revolución Pingüina*)⁸ of 2006. The strength of the movement and its success following the modification of the Organic Constitutional Law on Education (LOCE) by the Bachelet administration highlighted the return of educational issues to the center of public debate and served as a prelude to the 2011 protests, demonstrating that social demands could ultimately lead to constitutional reforms.

At the time, the events of 2011 were viewed as the largest demonstrations since the return to democracy. The cycle of social protest by the student movement⁹, which had begun at the turn of the century, reached its peak in 2011 and 2012. Once again, the deterioration of educational conditions was the primary driver of these mobilizations, particularly regarding the provision of scholarships for food and transportation and the demand to expand these benefits to broader sectors of the middle class (Lara, 2024). The student movement played the leading role, accounting for 36% of participants, yet the protests featured considerable diversity — particularly involving Indigenous people, miners, and "urban activists," groups that had driven a large number of protests in the preceding two years (Aguilera-Ruiz; Alvarez-Vandeputte, 2017).

On May 12, 15,000 students took the streets to express their social discontent¹⁰. At the time, Camila Vallejo, a young leader within the Partido Comunista de Chile [Communist Party of Chile] (PCCh), was at the helm of the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile [Chilean Student Confederation] (CONFECH). She outlined three core demands: increased social spending, inclusive access, and the strengthening of internal democracy within higher education (Vallejos *apud* Lara, 2024, p. 70). Giorgio Jackson — a future founding member of *Revolución Democrática* [Democratic Revolution] (RD) and a leading figure in the *Frente Amplio* — was also a key CONFECH spokesperson during this period. Movements such as *Nueva Acción Universitaria* [New University Action] (NAU) and

⁸ It stems from student dissatisfaction with the services provided by public schools and state-subsidized schools, and takes the form of large-scale student occupations of their schools to press for changes to the *Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza* (LOCE), created by the Military Junta during the Pinochet regime.

⁹ With this concept, Tarrow (1993) aimed to interpret more enduring timeframes, highlighting how seemingly new practices are produced within a broader temporality. In this sense, cycles of social contention, in their durability, contrast with cycles of protest viewed as "moments of madness."

¹⁰ This was preceded by the student occupation of the National Board of School Aid and Scholarships (JUNAEB) on April 14, 2011. Following this initial action, the *Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile* [Confederation of Chilean Student Federations] (CONFECH), the highest national body representing university students, called for a series of demonstrations throughout May.



Izquierda Autónoma [Autonomous Left] joined forces with others like *Nueva Democracia* [New Democracy] and *Izquierda Universitaria* [University Left], creating a network of small and medium-sized associations united by common interests that extended beyond the student cause itself. Despite internal disputes, a consensus prevailed regarding the lack of open institutional channels — now under a right-wing government for the first time. This, in turn, helped these more coherent discourses acquire a transversal character, enabling them to articulate actors across organizational and ideological divides during the crisis sparked by the protests.

For Manuel Garretón, this moment was "like a May '68" for the Chilean population (*apud* Alvarado, Espina, and Vargas, 2019). The reforms were notable not only for their student-led nature but also for their paradigmatic role in shifting the terms of the debate and bringing other actors to the fore. This coordination among actors expanded demands beyond the student movement, giving this break in the cycle the character of a "social overflow" (*transbordamento societário*) (Bringel; Pleyers, 2015). They were responsible for bringing over 400,000 people to the streets, in addition to university work stoppages and high school occupations (Lara, 2024). Student actors employed various methods to garner public support and mobilize the population. However, not all initiatives originated from clearly defined bodies; many calls to action were issued via anonymous groups on platforms like Facebook, advocating for novel forms of intervention ranging from art installations to flash mobs (Lara, 2024).

It is important to highlight that, contrary to the prevailing trend in the popular uprisings of that era — characterized by spontaneous mobilization without the mediation of formal organizations — the movement's key practices align with what Marisa Von Bülow (2018), drawing on Bennett and Segerberg (2014), defines as "organizationally enabled networks." In these networks, groups with more formal structures initiate more informal demonstrations—such as the "Thriller for Education" flash mob organized by members of the *Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile* [Students Federation of the Chile University] (FECh).

While appealing to a new imaginary, the possibility of hegemonizing social discontent lay in the demands for educational reform. The convergence of concerns over youth indebtedness became connected to broader aspirations for better social conditions and dignity (Pleyers, 2023). Consequently, the movement turned against the precariousness generated by the Chilean neoliberal state model, even though the country



did not experience an economic crisis comparable to those witnessed in other nations during this global cycle of protest. Its problems, however, were understood as inherent to the neoliberal model enshrined in the Constitution and, therefore, had to be confronted through the drafting of a new one. In this way, youth, as a collective actor, came to mediate the demands of diverse subjectivities, all of which shared a common questioning of the authority of political parties, their ways of conducting politics, and the need to advance reforms.

Students questioned the very foundations of the Transition and the constraints imposed by the binomial system. For a broader change to take place, these young activists understood that it was necessary to enter into the political fray by winning elections. This is why they became the leaders of the 2011 uprisings. This was the case of Camila Vallejo, the international face of the 2011 protests. It was also the case of Giorgio Jackson, a founding member of *Nueva Acción Universitaria* [New University Action] (NAU) and later of *Revolución Democrática* [Democratic Revolution] (RD). In addition, other actors, such as Gabriel Boric of *Izquierda Autónoma*, also gained prominence. In 2012, for instance, the man who would later become Chile's president defeated Vallejo to become president of the FECh. Thus, the window of political opportunity created by university protests allowed for a broader challenge to the recent Constitution.

This shift took the form of political parties because, institutionally, the movement could not force change through the existing structures of educational reform alone. Consequently, the issue also became a matter of electoral politics. As Sofía Fuentes (2024, interview), a founding member of *Frente Amplio*, observes:

When the student movement, at the end of 2011, if we stop to think about it, it failed to achieve concrete things. (...), I believe that this was the break that also allowed us to realize that, if someone was not in the institutionality, it was very difficult to make changes just through student mobilization.

This alignment was further reinforced by another shared agenda item, as highlighted by Victor Valenzuela (2024, interview), a founding member of *Revolución Democrática* [Democratic Revolution] (RD) —another party within the *Frente Amplio* coalition. As he explains: “Those in power also believed that the reasons behind the legislation replacing the LOCE were linked to a constitutional issue. Just like the LOCE—which was another organic law—the Political Parties Law was where the binominal system was enshrined (...).”



As a coalition, the Frente Amplio (FA) contested the 2017 elections, emerging as the country's third-largest political force, now competing outside the binomial electoral system. Its foundation helped advance the constitutional reform process, a cause it continued to champion after the constitutional convention was convened. Initially, the *Frente Amplio* adopted a combative stance, fiercely challenging the established parties and aligning itself closely with the grievances arising from the streets (Titelman, 2023). This connection to the anti-establishment mobilizations persisted as the coalition advocated for an institutional solution regarding the constituent process and later built a broader alliance for the election under the banner of *Apruebo Dignidad*, ultimately winning the 2021 elections (Titelman, 2023; Cortés, 2023). Through this coalition, they reaffirmed their commitment to the constituent process following the "O-19" mobilizations—an event marking a rupture and a sense of frustration directed even at the party that had itself emerged from the 2011 protests.

5. O-19 and The Constitutional Convention

In Chile, on October 4th of 2019, a decision was made to raise public transport fares in the Santiago province by 30 pesos. Outrage swept through student movements, which spearheaded the initial demonstrations. A prominent form of protest was jumping over turnstiles—an act of defiance against the fare, which was deemed abusive. The Piñera government's initial response was to attempt to neutralize the uprisings through police repression. The then-president refused to reverse the fare hikes, and in response, the Confederation of Chilean Students called for nationwide demonstrations on October 18 (Niño et al., 2019). Images of police repression against young students — symbols of previous successful protest movements—generated widespread public outrage. These images reactivated the social memory of the years of military repression (Aguilera et al., 2024), helping to transversalize feelings of indignation and injustice that fostered collective support for the protests. Fearing the escalating unrest, President Sebastián Piñera declared a State of Emergency in the early hours of October 19.

On October 19th, massive social unrest and cacerolazos (pot-banging protests) broke out in the capital's major working-class neighborhoods and some middle-class areas. In an attempt to appease the movement, Piñera announced a package of social



reforms that included a guaranteed minimum income. However, on October 25th, one million people took to the streets of Santiago. Cornered, the Chilean president asked his ministers to resign from their posts on October 26 to allow for a government reshuffle. The following day, he announced the lifting of the state of emergency.

As had occurred in other global protest movements, the spontaneous organization of the demonstrators was largely free from the mediation of political parties, which were perceived as alienating institutions (Pleyers, 2023; Castells, 2012), regardless of ideological orientation (Araújo, 2021). The upheaval in the streets and public squares was transformed into demands connected to problems that had accumulated over previous decades and that coalesced around powerful slogans. Chants such as “*It’s not about 30 pesos, but 30 years*” and “*Here neoliberalism was born, and here it will die,*” together with coffins symbolizing the “funeral” of the system, set the tone for a critique of the Chilean model maintained by the Transition (Sartorio, 2020), while simultaneously expanding the hegemonic reach of radical criticism of the political system. Once again, the constitutional question became the central axis of change, pressuring political actors to make a choice: either align themselves with the demonstrations or attempt to shield institutional politics from the pressures of the streets. This choice intensified the perception of a growing distance between the two sides of the political system and reinforced the characterization of the government as a representation of oligarchization.

In response to the virulence of the street protests, Piñera proposed the *Acuerdo Por la Paz Social y la Nueva Constitución* [Agreement for Social Peace and the New Constitution] (Chile, 2019). This agreement paved the way for a popular plebiscite in April 2020. The signatory parties also committed to restoring public order in defense of democratic institutions.

However, signing the Agreement posed a dilemma for the *Frente Amplio* (FA). By endorsing it, the coalition aligned itself with the discourse of restoring order, a stance that conflicted with the contestatory spirit that had always characterized its practices and rhetoric. Coming from the government, the agreement that was being challenged represented, in the eyes of the O-19 activists, an attempt to contain the destituent power of the streets and to reaffirm a top-down solution that excluded grassroots participation. Nevertheless, Gabriel Boric ultimately signed the Agreement, marking a shift in the Broad Front's own self-understanding (Titelman, 2023), as it increasingly adopted the



perspective of institutional pluralism and moved away from the outsider antagonistic discourse that had previously defined it.

The collective subjectivity that emerged around O-19 viewed the Peace Agreement with suspicion because it had been negotiated without popular participation. Nevertheless, it was precisely through these agreements that the plebiscite calling for the establishment of a Constitutional Convention was made possible, a process that enjoyed broad public support. In the election of the Constitutional Convention, the *Frente Amplio*, in coalition with the Chilean Communist Party under the banner of *Apruebo Dignidad*, won 28 seats, while the coalition of traditional left-wing parties, the *Lista del Apruebo*, secured 25 seats. The right-wing governing coalition obtained only 37 seats. Forty-eight seats went to independent lists, and 17 seats were reserved for Indigenous peoples. The number of seats held by independent candidates — including those elected through independent lists and those allied with political parties — reached 103 out of the 155 seats in contention (Rozas et al., 2022). In this sense, it can be argued that the Chilean constituent process experienced an "independent spring" (*primavera independiente*) (Paredes, Delamaza, & Maillet, 2023).

The independent candidates forces was the major novelty of these elections. It also resonated with the ideal that anyone could enter and participate in politics and was therefore more closely aligned with the citizenist imaginary rooted in the O-19. The power of the independent embodied a widespread distrust toward institutional politics, including the Frente Amplio itself. Beyond this distrust of traditional political representation, the independent movement underscored the importance of socio-territorial activism, "revealing to us the important role that community relations and local spaces had played in shaping national politics" (Paredes & Maillet, 2023, p. 158, our translation)¹¹. However, one of its consequences was that their agendas and demands became, in some respects, more particularistic, leading to specific difficulties in forging agreements.

Independent support was essential for reaching reform agreements. Yet, the entry of these new groups posed atypical challenges for the day-to-day functioning of the Chilean political system. Marjorie Cuello, a member of the Frente Amplio, reflected on the difficulties of building and securing agreements with independent groups due to the very

¹¹ In the original: "[...] dejando ver la importancia que las relaciones comunitarias y los espacios locales han tenido en la configuración de la vida política nacional".



design of the electoral process, which allowed these electoral lists to operate as if they were political parties. Thus, “there were coalitions of groups that did not necessarily share common political ideas but, given the widespread discredit of party politics, enjoyed high levels of electoral viability” (Cuello, 2024, authors' translation). Since assembling a majority required sustained dialogue with these electoral lists, forging effective political coordination became a major challenge.

Regarding the problem of the affiliations and coordination of independent groups, a government official who wished to remain anonymous reflected on how the differences between 2011 and 2019 led to distinct strategic perceptions within the Constitutional Convention. In this regard, our source confided to us:

I would say that the failure of the first process has a lot to do with that: with independent activists who were not politically organized and who each championed their own cause in a highly individual, sectoral, or corporatist manner. They were unable—or lacked the inclination—to view the political problem as a whole. And I would say that was one of the important steps we took as a movement in 2011 (CS member, 2024, our translation).

According to our interviewer, while in 2011 there was a group of students who were in debt and linked this political issue to the State and social rights, the independent activists represented the opposite pole. He/she further reflected:

In 2011, there was a group of students who were basically saying: ‘I am in debt!’ “‘I am in debt because of education and I want to stop being in debt because of it’—and instead of saying ‘give me money to pay the debt,’ what we said was: ‘there are bigger problems here than just education; there is a political problem regarding the State, concerning how the State relates to social rights’ and—ultimately—what the role of the market is, and how this issue transformed into a political problem in its entirety” (CS member, 2024, our translation).

Therefore, a significant portion of the differences that emerged stemmed from the difficulty of maintaining a fluid dialogue and clear decision-making processes with the independent members. Lacking internal command mechanisms to enforce the consensus reached, the solution had to be found through a slow, halting dialogue regarding each issue within the assembly itself.

The forms of legitimacy underpinning this mode of action were centred on assembly-based practices, characteristic of the imaginary of radical democracy affirmed during the constituent process. This openness to novelty reflected an aspiration to overcome what has been described as the “Chilean constitutional semantic core”, marking a deeper rupture with the country's constitutional tradition than that



represented by the 1980 Pinochet Constitution itself (Mascareño & Rozas, 2023). The members of the Convention thus sought to bring about a radical reconstitution of the hegemonic imaginary.

This explains the attempt to weave together the novelty involving groups that had previously been excluded from the constitutional process and were tasked with asserting their own distinctiveness, given the decentred nature of the coordination. For independent delegates, asserting their distinctiveness became a necessary condition for reinforcing both their identity and their claim to represent a particular constituency. Rather than seeking the transversalization of hegemony, one of the main reasons for maintaining their own political discourse lay in affirming themselves as representatives of minority voices.

Several issues can be identified when considering the decentrement of these collective subjectivities. Looking first at the matter of shifting public opinion, the fact is that while political parties were already grappling with growing distrust, independent groups suffered the same fate. In a study conducted by Mascareños et al. (2023), the researchers found that supporters of the rejection campaign counted among their principal criticisms the manner in which the constitutional process had been conducted. They identified an excessively performative character among the constitutional delegates and even questioned the competence and credibility of some of the Convention's members¹². Regarding the proposal itself, questions were raised about what appeared to be an excessive focus on specific demands that "divided" Chile (Mascareños et al., 2023). The major break from the core tenets of Chilean constitutionalism, combined with the perception that it was a "partisan constitution," fostered the feeling that the constitutional text itself was poorly drafted.

Another controversial aspect of the constituent process was that, beyond the difficulties in reaching agreements, the final text had to be accepted in its entirety. Ultimately, given a pluralistic constituent assembly conceived by diverse groups, there was a high probability that the majority of the population would disagree with the approved text. Added to this was the fact that, for the first time, voting in Chile was mandatory, compelling millions of people unaccustomed to civic participation to express

¹² In part, this is due to scandals involving certain elected representatives who were iconic figures of the protests, such as Rodrigo Rojas "Pelao" Vade. "Pelao" had won the sympathy of protesters by appearing in a mask and with other items highlighting his frailty. He became a member of the Constitutional Convention, but it was soon revealed that he had faked a cancer diagnosis.



their views at the polls. Consequently, there was no prior assessment of this segment of the electorate, which would prove decisive for the success — or failure — of the constituent process.

Therefore, if the decade began with pressure arising from a multiplicity of unmet demands that led to the manifestation of constituent power, it was precisely the decentering of these collectivities and the difficulty of building coordination that ultimately marked their limits. In this sense, a new wave of frustration emerged in response to the popular constitutional proposal itself, expressed in the rejection of the final text. Once again, the fact that Chileans were fed up (*hartos*), this time with the problems and crises displayed by the constitutional representatives, became a powerful reason for the defeat of this promise. Despite the expansion of voices represented in the constitutional text, the perception among groups that had previously not participated in electoral decision-making was that these representatives embodied only particular interests. Consequently, they were unable to transversalize their hegemony to reach these sectors and thereby foster a new hegemonic imaginary materialized in the constitution.

6. Final Considerations

This text aimed to understand why a decade of reforms and protests in Chile culminated in the total rejection of the Constitutional Convention. While the shifts in the imaginary were crucial for activating constituent power from below, they also introduced a new form of political organization that brought its own dilemmas and frustrations. It became evident that the political translation of the protests' diverse demands found its defining moment in the Constitutional Convention and various forms of assemblies. However, the difficulty of coordinating the interests of diverse actors — a characteristic of collective subjectivities with low centremment — hindered the pursuit of a clear common agenda, thereby preventing the institutionalization of the decisions reached. The strength and radicalism of the constitutional proposal, stemming from the very grievances that had fueled the protests, ultimately became its own nemesis, as no viable paths were found to resolve the tensions it generated.



This dynamic was evident in two key moments of the past decade of Chilean politics. In 2011, the prospect of forging a more centred identity led to a partial break with the prevailing hegemonic imaginary. In 2019, by contrast, the street protests were more explosive, and the challenge to the political system was far broader. In both instances, the outcomes fell short of radical aspirations, fueling collective frustration. This occurred because, in 2011, political parties came to be seen as part of the status quo and, therefore, as institutions that themselves needed to be transformed. In 2019, the Constitutional Convention came to be perceived as being composed of individuals disconnected from the country's "concrete" problems, since their internal disputes delayed the progress of the constituent process.

In 2011, the chosen path was electoral politics, driven by the hope of partially activating constituent power through that channel. Consequently, the constitutional reforms sought were more circumscribed in scope, yet they achieved success. This shift led to a *de facto* multiparty system — a profound change, given that the competing coalitions remained the same. Although the new coalitions addressed long-suppressed societal demands, they failed to make decisive progress on key social issues, such as the pension crisis. Furthermore, sectoral gains achieved by students were insufficient to dispel the sense of frustration regarding the State's limitations in ensuring social welfare, sparking a new wave of protests by the end of the decade.

In 2019, conversely, a constituent assembly was convened through the force of constituent power, as previous reforms were deemed inadequate to address the issues facing "Today's Chile." The prevailing sense of abandonment this time affected even those actors who had previously sought only partial change; as they integrated into the institutional solution for political problems, their stances gradually shifted. Consequently, the protest movement became disillusioned with the *Frente Amplio*. However, the difficulties encountered in advancing the constituent process once again highlight the core problem: the decentrement of collective subjectivities and the resulting task of political coordination. Constituent power is exercised, nowadays, by increasingly decentred collectivities, making coordination difficult once the initial event that sparked the protest cycle loses its momentum. This coordination dilemma, arising during the forging of constitutional agreements, breeds new waves of frustration, particularly among a population that feels unrepresented amid the various conflicts stemming from



disagreements on specific demands. This renewed frustration evokes a new response: the rejection at the ballot box of the hopes that had been forged in the streets.

Referências bibliográficas

AGUILERA, C. et al. **Los primo-manifestantes del “estallido social” en 2019 Espontaneidad disruptiva y politización latente**. Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesion Social, 2024. Disponível em: https://coes.cl/wp-content/uploads/COES_DT_52_LOS-PRIMOMANIFESTANTES-DEL-ESTALLIDO-SOCIAL-EN-2019_ESPONTANEIDAD-DISRUPTIVA-Y-POLITIZACION-LATENTE.pdf. Acesso 11 mar. 2025.

ALVARADO-ESPINA, *et al.* Radicalizar la democracia desde los movimientos sociales. Los casos comparados de Podemos en España y del Frente Amplio en Chile. **Revista Izquierdas**, 48, p. 87-105, 2019.

ARATO, Andrew. **The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions?** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-1-107-12679-4.

ARAUJO, K. Transformaciones sociales y desafíos para la política. In: GARRETÓN MERINO, M. A. (Org.). **Política y movimientos sociales en Chile: antecedentes y proyecciones del estallido social de octubre 2019**. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2021.

BENNETT, L.; SEGERBERG, A. Three Patterns of Power in Technology-Enabled Contention. **Mobilization**, v. 19, n. 4, p. 421-439, 2014.

BRINGEL, B.; DOMINGUES, J. M. Teoria crítica e movimentos sociais: intersecções, impasses e alternativas. In: BRINGEL, B.; GONH, M. G. (org.). **Movimentos sociais na era global**. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2012, p. 57-76.

BRINGEL, B.; MARTÍNEZ, A.; MUGGENTHALER, F. (org.). **Desbordes: estallidos, sujetos y porvenires en América Latina**. 1. ed. Quito: Fundación Rosa Luxemburg, 2021, p. 13-42.

BROWNE, Craig; DIEHL, Paula. Conceptualising the political imaginary: An introduction to the special issue. **Social Epistemology**, v. 33, n. 5, p. 393-397, 2019.

CANOTILHO, J. J. Gomes. **Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição**. 7a ed. Coimbra: Editora Almedina, 2004.

CASTELLS, M. **Redes de Indignação e Esperança: Movimentos sociais na era da internet**. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2013.

CASTORIADIS, Cornelius, **A instituição imaginária da sociedade**. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982.

CHILE, República. **Acuerdo por la Paz y la nueva constitución**. Disponível em:



https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=documentos/10221.1/76280/1/Acuerto_por_la_Paz.pdf. Acesso em: 15 out. 2024.

CORDERO, R. et al. Drawing constitutional boundaries: A digital historical analysis of the writing process of Pinochet's 1980 authoritarian constitution. **Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History**, 55:3, 145-167, DOI: 10.1080/01615440.2022.2065396. 2022.

CORTÉS, A. Del movimiento estudiantil a la Moneda: el inicio del gobierno Boric. In: HENRÍQUEZ, K.; PLEYERS, G. (orgs.). **Chile en Movimientos**. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2023.

DELITZ, H.; MANEVAL, S. The "Hidden Kings", or Hegemonic Imaginaries: Analytical Perspectives of Post-foundational Sociological Thought. **Im@go**, n.10, 2017.

DOMINGUES, J. M. **Sociological Theory and Collective Subjectivity**. Londres: Macmillan e Nova York: Saint Martin's Press, 1995.

DOMINGUES, José Maurício. **Criatividade Social, Subjetividade Coletiva e a Modernidade Brasileira Contemporânea**. Rio de Janeiro: Contra Capa, 1999.

DOMINGUES, José Maurício. **Ensaio de Sociologia**. Belo Horizonte. Editora UFMG, 2004.

DOMINGUES, J. M. Political Modernity and Social Theory: Origins, Development and Alternatives. New York: Routledge, 2024.

DONOSO, S.; VON BÜLOW, M. (Eds.). **Social Movements in Chile**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017.

DONOSO, S. El movimiento estudiantil chileno y su (re)articulación con la política institucional. In: GARRETÓN, M. (org.). **Política y movimientos sociales en Chile: Antecedentes y proyecciones del estallido social de Octubre 2019**. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2021.

DURKHEIM, Émile. **Formas Elementares da Vida Religiosa**. São Paulo. Martin Fontes, 1996.

FALLETO, E. **De la teoría de la dependencia al proyecto neoliberal: el caso chileno**. In: MONTALVA et al. (org.) Antología del pensamiento crítico chileno. 1ªed. Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2015.

FERREIRA, D. H. et al. Ciclos políticos, econômicos e de protesto no Brasil contemporâneo. In: TAVARES, F.; BALLESTRIN, L.; MENDONÇA, R. (org.). **Junho de 2013: sociedade, política e democracia no Brasil**. Eduerj, Rio de Janeiro, 2022.

FERREIRA, Daniel Henrique da Mota Ferreira. **Organizando a ilusão: Podemos, Frente Amplio e os dilemas dos partidos-movimentos em uma era descentrada**. Orientador: José Maurício Castro Domingues da Silva. 2025. 307 f. Tese (Doutorado em Sociologia) – Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2025.



FUENTES, C. **La Transición Inacabada: el proceso político chileno 1990-2020**. Santiago: Catolonia. 2021.

GARRETÓN MERINO, M. A. **Incomplete democracy: political democratization in Chile and Latin America**. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

GARRETÓN MERINO, M. A. **Neoliberalismo corregido y progresismo limitado: los gobiernos de la concertación en Chile, 1990-2010**. 1. ed. Santiago de Chile: CLACSO, 2012.

HUNEEUS, C. **La democracia semisoberana: Chile después de Pinochet**. Santiago de Chile: Taurus, 2014.

KALYVAS, Andreas. Popular sovereignty, democracy and the constituent power, **Constellation**, vol. 12: 223–244. 2005

KALYVAS, Andreas. **Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

KNÖBL, Wolfgang. Debating the Political Imaginary: A Critical Assessment. **Social Epistemology**, v. 33, n. 5, p. 452-461, 2019.

LACLAU, E. **A Razão Populista**. 1ª ed. Trad. C. E. M. de Moura. São Paulo: Três Estrelas, 2013.

LACLAU, E.; MOUFFE, C. **Hegemonia e estratégia socialista: por uma política democrática radical**. São Paulo: Intermeios, 2015.

LARA, C. P. **Desde las Calles a la Moneda: Liderazgo estudiantil y transformación política en el Chile contemporáneo**. Santiago: RIL editores, 2024.

MARCHART, O. **Thinking Antagonism: political ontology after Laclau**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.

MASCAREÑO, A; ROZAS, J. El siglo constitucional: continuidades y rupturas. Centro de Estudios Públicos. **Política y derecho**. nº660, junio. 2023.

MASCAREÑO, A. *et al.* Apruebo y rechazo en septiembre 2022 Expectativas, decepciones y horizontes comunes para el nuevo proceso constitucional. Centro de Estudios Públicos. **Política y derecho**, nº643, enero, 2023.

MOUFFE, C. **Por um populismo de esquerda**. São Paulo: Autonomia Literária, 2020.

MOULIÁN, T. **Chile Actual: Anatomía de un mito**. 16ª ed. Santiago: LOM ARCIS, 1997.

NEGRI, A. **O poder constituinte: ensaios sobre a alternativa da Modernidade**. Trad. Adriano Pilati. 2ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Lamparina, 2015.

NIÑO, A. L. *et al.* “As revoltas contra o neoliberalismo na América do Sul em 2019”. **Boletim OPSA**, 4, Rio de Janeiro, 2019, p. 26-31.



PAREDES, J. P. ; DELAMAZA, G. ; MAILLET, A. Lo que el rechazo se llevó: Activismo socioterritorial en la Convención Constitucional. In: In: HENRÍQUEZ, K.; PLEYERS, G. (orgs.). **Chile en Movimientos**. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2023.

POLLETTA, F. **Freedom Is an Endless Meeting**: Democracy in American Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

PIZARRO HOFER, Roberto. Chile: rebelión contra el Estado subsidiario. **El trimestre econ**, Ciudad de México , v. 87, n. 346, p. 333-365, jun 2020 Disponible en <http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2448-718X2020000200333&lng=es &nrm=iso>. accedido en 21 agosto 2025. Epub 20-Ene-2021. <https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v87i346.1055>

PLEYERS, G. Un estallido con características de los movimientos del siglo XXI. In: HENRÍQUEZ, K.; PLEYERS, G. (orgs.). **Chile en Movimientos**. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2023.

ROBERTS, K. M. Chilean Social Movements and Party Politics in Comparative Perspective: Conceptualizing Latin America's "Third Generation" of Anti-Neoliberal Protest. In: DONOSO, S.; VON BÜLOW, M. (Eds.). **Social Movements in Chile**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017.

ROZAS, Joaquín; OLIVARES, Alejandro, y MAILLET, Antoine. Entre la independencia y la militancia: análisis de la vinculación partidaria de los y las convencionales constituyentes de Chile. **Economía y Política**, 9, 67-100. 2022.

SARTORIO, L. Chile em chamas: a pandemia como o estopim de crises estruturais. In: Observatório de Movimentos Sociais da América Latina. **Comunica América Latina II** - julho - setembro 2020. Rio de Janeiro, 2020. Disponível em: <http://netsal.iesp.uerj.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Comunica-América-Latina-II.pdf>. Acesso 05/08/2022.

SIAVELIS, P. M. Enclaves de la transición y democracia chilena. **Rev. cienc. polít., Santiago**, v. 29, n. 1, p. 3-21, 2009. Disponível em: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2009000100001>. Acesso em 09 mar. 2025.

SINGER, Brian. Conceptualizing the Imaginary. **Social Epistemology**, v. 9, p. 1-14, 2020.

TARROW, S. **Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention**. **Social Science History**, v. 17, n. 2, p. 281-307, 1993.

TITELMAN, N. **La Nueva Izquierda Chilena**. Santiago: Editorial Planeta Chilena, 2023.

TILLY, C. **From Mobilization to Revolution**. [s.l.]: Longman Higher Education, 1978.

TILLY, C. To Explain Political Process. **The American Journal of Sociology**, v. 100, n. 6, p. 1594-1610, 1995.



TOURAINÉ, A. **Pensar Outramente: O Discurso Interpretativo Dominante**. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 2009.

VON BÜLOW, M. The Survival of Leaders and Organizations in the Digital Age: Lessons from the Chilean Student Movement. **Mobilization: An International Quarterly**, v. 23, n. 1, p. 45–64, 1 mar. 2018.

About the authors

Daniel Henrique da Mota Ferreira is a professor of Political Science at IFCS/UFRJ and a postdoctoral researcher at IESP-UERJ, with a FAPERJ grade-10 fellowship. He is an associate researcher at the Center for Studies in Social Theory and Latin America and participates in the Center for Political Theory and Institutions.

Lucas Paz dos Santos is a PhD candidate at IESP-UERJ and a member of the Center for Studies in Social Theory and Latin America (NETSAL).

Authorship credits

Daniel Ferreira: Conceptualization, methodology, Writing (especially from section 2 onward); Lucas Santos: Writing (review and editing + writing of part 1).

Conflict of interest statement

There are no possible conflicts of interest in carrying out and communicating the research.

Funding information

This research was funded by Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES), Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – Brasil (CNPq) and Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ).

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the first author, upon reasonable request.

Statement on the Use of Artificial Intelligence

ChatGPT AI was used for language review in the translation from the original article.

Editors Responsible for the Evaluation Process and Editing

Carolina Alves Vestena and Bruna Bataglia.

About the translator

Adriana Serrão, PhD student at the Postgraduate Program in Law at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Master's degree from the Postgraduate Program in Law at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, the institution from which she obtained her bachelor's degree in law.

