Between cunning and improvised justice: Hermes, Robin Hood and the distortion of virtue as an ethical ideal

Abstract

This article presents a comparative analysis of two culturally celebrated figures known for their cunning and apparent sense of justice: Hermes, from Greek mythology, and Robin Hood, from Anglo-Saxon literary tradition. Both are seen as heroic characters who transgress norms – the former through theft and persuasive speech; the latter by assuming social justice as a personal mission, bypassing the institutional role of the State. Based on moral philosophy, particularly Aristotelian virtue ethics, we argue that these characters operate under a logic of efficiency disguised as virtue: Hermes is praised for an intelligence detached from prudence and justice; Robin Hood is romanticized for enacting a form of moral revenge masked as compassion. In both cases, transgression is converted into cultural value, revealing a symbolic distortion of virtue. The discussion draws on authors such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, connecting ethical analysis with mythopoetic and narrative perspectives. We conclude that the cultural fascination with such figures may obscure ethical risks by reinforcing a worldview in which “goodness” is mistaken for cleverness, and “justice” for retaliation.