# THE FALLING OF HOSNI MUBARAK: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

*O Declive de Hosni Mubarak: uma abordagem institucional*

Facundo Guadagno[1]

Nicolás Di Paola[2]

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[1] Universidade de Buenos Aires, Ayacucho 1245 (C1111AAI), Buenos Aires, Argentina. **E-mail**: facundo.guadagno@gmail.com **ORCID** https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0892-6732

[2] Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento (UNGS), Los Polvorines, Buenos Aires, Argentiina. **E-mail:** nicolasaxeldipaola@gmail.com **ORCID:** https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1094-9327

## ABSTRACT

This article explores the Egyptian Revolution during the Arab Spring, challenging the notion that it was solely driven by social media. Instead, it posits that a combination of political, economic, and cultural factors, along with social media, spurred the revolution. Using an institutional theoretical approach, it examines the role of institutions in the genesis and development of the revolution, highlighting the concept of path dependence in the political system. The study focuses on how the political elite's failure to establish democratic capacity and diversify economic production resulted in inadequate citizen representation, ultimately leading to regime change and revolution. This comprehensive analysis seeks to provide an institutional explanation for the Egyptian Revolution.

**Keywords:** Egyptian Revolution. Arab Spring. Institutionalism.

## RESUMO

Este artigo explora a Revolução Egípcia durante a Primavera Árabe, desafiando a noção de que ela foi impulsionada exclusivamente pelas mídias sociais. Em vez disso, ele postula que uma combinação de fatores políticos, econômicos e culturais, juntamente com as mídias sociais, estimulou a revolução. Usando uma abordagem teórica institucional, ele examina o papel das instituições na gênese e no desenvolvimento da revolução, destacando o conceito de dependência do caminho no sistema político. O estudo se concentra em como o fracasso da elite política em estabelecer a capacidade democrática e diversificar a produção econômica resultou em uma representação inadequada dos cidadãos, levando, por fim, à mudança de regime e à revolução. Essa análise abrangente busca fornecer uma explicação institucional para a Revolução Egípcia.

**Palavras-chave:** Revolução Egípcia. Primavera Árabe. Institucionalismo.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

What surprised the world by 2010's end? In December, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) revolted against autocratic rulers. This sequence of revolts captivated the globe and empowered young people to participate in their nations' governments. It was a succession of pro-democracy demonstrations from Tunisia to sub-Saharan Africa without a leader. "Arab Spring," a wave of upheavals in various nations, sparked the battle for rights, especially among youth.

The Jasmine Revolution began with the Tunisian uprising. Due to the considerable income differential, many locals worked side jobs, usually illegal, to make a living (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011, p. 141). The street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, fought Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's decades-long dictatorship after surviving police torture. Tunisians revolted when Bouazizi burned himself in protest. The dictatorship's president resigned after almost a year (Müller & Hübner, 2014). The Tunisian revolt inspired nearby nations to fight for their rights and better lives.

Egypt's "Arab Spring" was different. Hosni Mubarak dominated this country for nearly three decades. Most people's poor economic situations showed displeasure since salaries were insufficient for basic needs (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011, p. 142). Nevertheless, a group was uncomfortable with the situation: young people who knew internet communication tools. They were frustrated that no educational, creative, or professional outlets existed in their nation. Deep corruption caused unhappiness and embraced income inequality (Müller & Hübner, 2014).

In contrast to Tunisia, the Egyptian revolution did not begin independently. The 25th of January is significant because it is Police Day, commemorating the forces of law and order that fought the British occupation soldiers in 1952. The police had evolved into a representation of the regime's oppression fifty-nine years later.

In this article, we delve into the phenomenon of revolutionary turning points through an institutional lens, aiming to understand the underlying mechanisms and conditions that precipitate such significant societal shifts. The structure of the article is methodically divided to facilitate a comprehensive analysis. The first section establishes our analytical foundation by presenting the theoretical framework that guides our exploration of revolutions. It details the institutional approach adopted in our study, clarifying its relevance and applicability in the context of revolutionary events. The second section delves into the specialised literature, examining the political, economic, and cultural histories that set the stage for revolutions. This part of the article synthesises various scholarly perspectives to build a nuanced understanding of the preconditions for revolutionary change. Finally, we examine the case of Egypt, a salient example where several unique properties converged to make a revolution possible. This analysis not only sheds light on the specificities of the Egyptian scenario but also offers insights into the broader dynamics of how and why revolutions occur in contemporary societies.

## 2. THE IMPORTANCE OF A PRECISE METHOD:

To effectively describe why a case study is chosen, it is necessary to justify it. In that sense, the literature on the Arab Spring is large enough to add superficial research. With that in mind, Goertz (2017) helps explain why the Mubarak government was overthrown. The text argues that choosing a case rather than a "large N" allows us to find causal mechanisms in more detail. Arab Spring refers to the events in the MENA since December 2010. The revolts against authoritarian regimes can be understood as "family resemblance" (Collier & Mahon, 1993), but Egypt will be the analysed case for this research. Exploring only what happened in a single country is not being closed to comparative analysis, but this will not be the core of the investigation strategy. In every one of the countries involved, the pattern of an authoritarian state was not resolved, but as Dinçer and Hecan (2020) point out, the process is still of developing democracies; therefore, we do not have to rush and see it as a closed transition.

This research is a case study to provide deeper explanations. This approach relates to Gerring (2006), considering that a single case study can gain intensity in opposition to extension.

Therefore, this work will provide some basis for further investigations with clear comparative objectives. The limitations of this investigation are the ones from a "single case study". On the other hand, this work is based on secondary sources as there were no opportunities to conduct ethnographic techniques, such as open interviews or extended fieldwork. Consequently, this research aims to analyse specialised literature of different disciplines, develop a historical and institutional explanation, and avoid non-specialised sources, such as websites or blogs, due to their null scientific consensus.

On the other hand, defining the theoretical approach, we will use to explain the events is crucial. Otherwise, it describes facts without any connection between them. The approach is based on the so-called "new institutionalism", although its novelty is not such. Since Meyers and Rowan wrote Institutionalized organisations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony (1977), the formal and symbolic aspects of institutional spaces have been considered, following the Weberian tradition. To clear up any confusion about the meaning of institutions, I will quote Douglass North's (1990) definition:

> Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.

On the other hand, according to Williamson (2000), institutional rules result from the formal rules of the game that individuals set up to organise society (Autore & Kovacs, 2010). I considered an approach such as Di Maggio and Powell (1991): they use supra-individual structures to explain how institutions develop - in this case, a bottom-up case -.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) discuss the slave trade's political and economic effects, which are crucial to understanding Africa's history. These studies examined the effects of colonial institutions on economic development. They found that the most significant European settlements were in colonies with fewer deadly diseases, which increased incentives to install more institutions that protect private property rights rather than institutions that take advantage of private sector rent. Thus, we can determine why many countries do poorly. Following Hall, I will mix institutional development methods. (1997). I shall use two institutional approaches: subject to ideas and interests, where an institution is the norms of a human-developed society. Knight (1992) notes that this may happen inside entities like the government, which may have institutions.

Suppose we assume that institutions have a specific behaviour depending on their history and that behind them are individuals. In that case, we must define the institutional group that reunites all the agents within a society: the state. I am not referring to it as an entity imposed on citizens or, like in the Weberian tradition, the legitimate monopoly of power. With Poulantzas (2000), the state is a dynamic social relationship. Multiple interests are always disputed, so a revolution can be possible if specific properties are given in oppressive regimes.

Unlike quantitative methods, qualitative methods allow causalities to be discovered more precisely without ontological assumptions. King, Keohane, and Verba (2021) started the debate on these techniques in 1994, which continues today. Politics, economics, and culture form a social system (Bunge, 2000). Thus, any field will explain the phenomena. Thus, is the Egyptian Revolution institutional? That lets us address additional issues: Is a revolution dependent on the economy? Can societal unrest be attributed to social media use?

## 2.1. An erroneous path

Hegel (1861) stated that history was a slaughter. He was right. What happened with the building of states after military interventions? I will briefly illustrate the case with the database used by Paris and Hisk (2009), with a work classified as neo-institutionalism. Let us suppose an example: why some African states cannot have an efficient voting system? Is there any essence, some property, that makes an exemption? Those claims are false due to their irrealism: we must analyse history.  Continuing with the voting example, election outcomes sparked a resurgence of war in Angola in 1992 since no safeguards were in place, including institutions to preserve election results or pre-election power-sharing agreements. Autocratic elites resorted to authoritarian forms of power in Cambodia throughout the 1990s and in Liberia after 1997 because there were no plans to ensure that recent political representatives would properly uphold the rule of law (Paris & Sisk, 200,9, p. 2). Even if it has some adverse outcomes, Bosnia could be considered a successful case, unlike Kosovo, Timor Leste, and Sierra Leone (óp. cit). This is related to the detailed history of every case. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) stated, there is a path dependence on how the institutions were built and the prosperity of a nation.

It is also helpful to briefly describe what the Arab Spring was: if we skip this step, we will not have certainty about what we are talking about. Following Dixon (2011), I referred to the Arab Spring  as a series of social uprisings in the MENA against authoritarianism that ended with some regimes they protested against. However, exploring what the specialised literature says about the case is mandatory if we focus on Egypt.

One of the most consistent publications regarding the Egyptian revolution is Ogbonnaya (2013), which identifies income disparity, poverty, limited economic possibilities, little freedom of political association, and food shortages as key factors. Compared to Morocco and Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia are high-income countries. (Weipert-Fenner & Wolff, 2020). Education levels follow suit. (Ritz, 2019). Plakoudas (2017) notes that the number of university students in the Arab World rose five times between 1990 and 2000. Exposure to the political ideals of a Western-style liberal democracy through the extensive Arab diaspora, the massive youth bulge, and the widespread use of new technologies are also to blame for the rise in political awareness among the younger generations in MENA countries. Education modernises democracy and economic prosperity. Education improves democracy. Over the past 30 years, Middle Eastern and North African countries' educational attainment has grown. (Aissa, 2012). However, the army and foreign

community's response to an uprising determines whether a MENA government will stay. (Plakoudas, 2017, p. 9).

1919 and 1952 revolutions transformed Egypt's government. The 2011 revolution, which rekindled those memories after a long hiatus, was the most unexpected event in modern Egyptian political history. (Sharp, 2011). The economy prospered before the revolution but only benefitted a small percentage of the populace, primarily the regime's family. Upper Egypt was economically marginalised in several regions. The 9.7% unemployment rate worst hit graduates and youth. (Saidin, 2018). Egypt's unemployment rose in 2010 while output fell. (Tucker, 2012). According to Korotayev and Zinkina (2011), pre-revolutionary Egypt's unemployment rate was low compared to other countries. It had a lower unemployment rate than the US, EU, France, Poland, Turkey, and Ireland and nearly double that of Latvia and Spain. As Echevarría and García-Enríquez showed, low unemployment does not ensure income equality or salaries above inflation. (2020).

The North African region's unemployment rate was approximately 10%, which was not significantly worsening given the conditions. One of the key factors contributing to the Arab Spring was the high rate of unemployment among young people, especially women. A quarter of Egyptians were unemployed on the eve of the Arab Spring. The North African governments' leaders have always had excellent amenities at their disposal. Examples include Mubarak in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya, and the Ben Ali family in Tunisia (Berger et al., 2012). These states' armies and religious authorities had a great deal of power. Such states' wealth and power were concentrated in a select elite: they approved of exploiting natural resources. Corruption in the market was encouraged by a lack of justice and the maintenance of cumbersome and counterproductive regulatory systems.

During the Arab Spring, governments in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia promised to dismantle the assets of the protestors but were unsuccessful in doing so. A key factor in these revolutions was the phenomenon known as 'information cascade,' where individuals mimic the actions of others, leading to a rapid spread of behaviour. According to Qadir Mushtaq & Afzal (2017), when a critical mass of opposition is reached, it can lead to the overthrow of governments. Furthermore, modern authoritarian regimes often attempt to suppress information to prevent unrest, but during the Arab Spring, platforms like Facebook and Twitter played a significant role in circumventing these barriers. Muller & Hubner (2014) describe this as an 'information cascade,' where the rapid spread of information via social media fuelled the protests.

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were successful because the military supported demonstrators' legitimate political rights. The two regimes lost support to stop the protesters when their militaries distanced themselves from the police and security services' brutal killings. The military overthrew Egypt and Tunisia's rulers quickly. (Salih, 2013). Libyan and Yemeni rulers vigorously opposed uprisings. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the government and protesters fought for a long time (Teti & Gervasio, 2011).

The research on social media and the 2011 Egyptian protests is extensive, but we view it as a variable, crucial but not causative. Successful works need examination. Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) explain that virtual ties through individuals substituted formal institutional routes restricted to the public if there was a political blockage. Sayed Ahmed's article examines social media's interpretation of defiance. (2012). Oh and Rao (2015) examine "collective sense" using Twitter hashtags and discourse analysis. Kharroub and Bas (2016) examine Twitter as a tool for activists, replacing hashtags with visuals.

According to expert research, Mubarak's collapse was multi-causal, and social media spread dissent. Social media does not explain why a ruler resigns; institutional factors do.

quest for financing and investment, particularly in infrastructure. As such, an alternative to globalization driven by the Washington Consensus has emerged. The Chinese activities in the region follow the same pattern as those in the broader BRI initiative, which includes a combination of state-owned companies, financing banks, cooperation agreements, and significant asymmetry in trade relations, with a focus on manufacturing exports and imports of raw materials.

## 2.2. History as a Variable

Egyptian subjectivity is built on colonial history. One thinks of the classical construction but must also recall the Hittites and Romans' conquests. Several Islamic kings governed it during the European Middle Ages. After decades of Ottoman control, the First World War ended. The Allies won, allowing the victorious governments, chiefly Great Britain, to rule the Middle East: Europe's relationship with Egypt in the middle of the 20th century was more touristic: the Pharaonic period's gleaming image still existed, and the only likely motivation was to acquire an archaeological artefact from the mythical, if historically ambiguous, origins of civilisation.

Egypt officially became the "star pupil" of the global trade liberalisation agenda when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the year the organisation was established. There were two main effects of this. First, the country's economic liberalisation eliminated the duty-free zones that had previously existed and were subsequently destroyed. Second, Egypt rapidly replaced its long-standing commercial partners, notably China, with counterparts in the Far East (Rutherford, 2020, p. 199).

The Nasserist regime, which began with the 1952 Free Officers' coup d'état, overthrew the monarchy, established a republic, achieved complete independence from Britain and other foreign powers (nationalising the Suez Canal in 1956), promoted and led the pan-Arabist and non-aligned movements, and, most importantly for this discussion, gradually set the nation on its current course. Nationalisation and a strong public sector gave the state a hegemonic, dominant, but not exclusive, position in the economy.  While various land reforms limited land ownership through expropriations and redistributions that did not attack private property or the agrarian bourgeoisie, they did eliminate the largest landholdings, Egypt's centuries-old political hegemony,

and semi-feudal labour relations. Most financial, industrial, and commercial sectors were state-controlled (Jakes, 2020).

Nasser's regime was conceived as revolutionary by the member of the Free Officers, but their actions were not democratic. They can be summarised in a strict ban on political parties and foreign investment for industrial development (Johnson, 1972); this strategy implies consolidating a business class entangled with governmental structures if the ruling party intended to build an egalitarian - in economic terms - and modern country that did not consider democracy as a substantive objective. As is evident in this behaviour, the government elite followed a straight pattern of non-democratic regimes, even if the revolution claimed to move the country out of middle-ages and to expulse British policy from foreign affairs (Johnson, 1972, p. 3).

The revolution removed the British military presence in Egypt, a sovereign danger, and ended King Farouk's rule, which was also successful. However, the new administration strove to attract worker support with an egalitarian share of labour participation (Bayat, 1993). Even if it succeeded, it was to maximise political capital and more efficient industrial output. (Bayat, 1993, p. 73). High 1960s inflation was reversed by 1950s growth (ibíd). The one-party rule is debatable. Still, Egypt mimicked the Soviet Union, which had become a strategic partner and Egypt's main economic friend in building the country and seizing Suez Canal riches. (Smolensky, 1956).

Egypt's Cold War history is tied to the growth of two opposing Arab groups, each supported by one of the superpowers. Ideological differences prevented reconciliation despite a desire for unity. However, various integrationist operations were done to establish blocs with other Arab countries rather than to unify. In 1958, Iraq and Jordan rejoined to preserve the regional balance between radicals and moderates. A new Arab bloc was formed, and the United Arab Republic comprising Egypt and Syria was founded. (Romero, 2015). In July, the toppling of the Hashemite dynasty in Baghdad dissolved the purported unity. In June 1967, Israel bombed Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, crushing radicalism.

Israel's 1967 Middle East victory devastated Egypt's economy and politics. In 1968, enormous protests against the regime's authoritarianism, corruption, and incompetence led to the first calls for reform. (Blanga, 2014). After Naser's loss and resignation, large-scale rallies pushed the president to stay in office and lead the transition, which they did. (Danielson, 2007). Nasser died in September 1970 after ending the fight between Jordanian troops and Palestinian fedayeen and making considerable reforms to the administration, army, and economic policy, which was now more liberal. His burial drew millions in an unusual display of sadness. After Naser's death, elites ruled the country with power-seeking, power-perpetuation, conflict, and economic corruption. (Adly, 2020, pp. 71–96). The dictatorship was in trouble, but a large institutional and human machinery controlled the country's economic and political life.

Sadat's death ended a dictatorship that had broken some of Nasser's foundations, from which it had acquired its legitimacy. It alienated purist followers by not appeasing historical

opponents. Even though he little modified the country's economic and political model. Despite a large capital influx, mainly owing to foreign policy changes, his economic liberalisation agenda was reversed only in tourism, import commerce, and construction, increasing inequality. The partial openness to global markets helped the urban and rural bourgeoisie, bureaucracy, and military and security apparatus form coalitions in a state-dominated economy. However, public sector workers and traders without administration relations or outside contacts saw their level of living decline, if not collapse.

From 1981 until 1987, Sadat's opposition cooperated or quietly contested Mubarak's flamboyant displays of détente, moderation, and political reform. (Rutherford, 2008, pp. 197-230). Mubarak reintroduced Sadat's restricted multiparty system and let the few licenced political parties into the 1984 and 1987 parliaments. The Muslim Brotherhood joined WAFD and SWP party lists. Despite election cheating and control, it was the most structured and popular political party. Party media primarily supported the Muslim Brotherhood. State media gained freedom of expression, while party media acquired new permits. Radical Islamists convicted of murdering Sadat were treated kindly (1984):

> "A social uprising could be by negotiation, violence or even a coup d'Etat. Political defiance by way of organised nationwide non-violent protests in public spaces by citizens was chosen to be the appropriate mode of action for the objective in Egypt because such a mode of action changed the distribution of power between people and a dictatorial government." (Chatterji, 2013: 99)

Finally, Pope Chenuda, imprisoned since 1981 in a Sinai monastery, was rehabilitated (1985) and became a Mubarak loyalist even after the 2011 uprisings. Mubarak's dictatorship has been criticised. This is due to citizen exclusion from political decision-making, executive power suppression, and brutal repression. The dictatorship oppressed most citizens. (Chatterji, 2013, pp.: 97-99). Torture is a governmental policy in Egypt, and more people were tortured under Mubarak than under any other president.

Regional economic blocs are easier to develop in the Arab world once the bipolar system collapsed and the ideological difference is weakened. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC: Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU: Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, and Tunisia) were founded in 1989 and 1981, respectively, and Yemen was reunified in 1990. However, the abandonment of the ideological variable as a determining factor in international politics has accelerated integrationist processes both in the Western bloc and in the Third World, especially due to the progress made by the Economic and Social in the Third World, primarily following the European Economic Community (since November 1993, the European Union) with the Single Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Agreement of December 1993.

One of the issues that elicited a positive and progressive response in the region due to the influence that globalisation has allowed is human rights: freedoms for women, sexual minorities, children, and trade and labour rights outside and against the laws imposed by some theocratic states, as Hosseinioun points out (2014, p.160).

Egypt's history includes territorial, religious, and identity issues. It cannot be solved by criticising a politician. They show how an extractive political class ruled a personalistic bureaucracy and prevented electoral competition. Natural resources made the nation a Cold War prize. The 1990s neoliberal tsunami destroyed this economic sovereignty idea.

## 3. CONDITIONS FOR REVOLUTION

Are Egypt's economic-political situations unique? Curiously, the IMF has praised the country's trade-opening changes. Even more, experts say the 2011 revolution showed middle-class entrepreneurialism. (Ayre& Macey, 2011). That technique is more accurate since it overlooks the institutional influence that started the revolution. Egypt's deregulation response was twofold. First, it implemented pro-market reforms to attract European, North American, and Chinese FDI. These changes included forging bilateral free-trade agreements with the EU and USA and privatising massively. Second, after the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks, it endorsed the Bush administration's "global war on terror" approach and used greater resources to crush rising opposition. (Dahi, 2012). For decades, corporate elites' neoliberal agenda and military elites' statist agenda clashed over privatisation. The 1991 IMF-Mubarak accord liberalised Egypt's economy. Some who sought to preserve the government's economic dominance rejected these policies. (Holmes, 2012). At least, calling a country successful because it followed the IMF's prescriptions is inaccurate. Egypt had a gender imbalance, inequality, and poverty at the start of the century. Economic growth does not mean wealth distribution. UN-Arab Annual Reports 2002 support this finding. It asserts a "social contract." (UN. 2002, p. 8). Revolution will follow that notion.

Egypt did not experience the democratic reformation wave like other Arab countries. Since they have less oil and natural gas than the region's pure "rentier-states," they are fiscally constrained. These qualities distinguish them from the rest of the Arab Middle East and North Africa, including Yemen and Algeria, which have remained low-income economies with limited production diversification despite a similar trajectory. Algeria is rich in carbon. (Dahi, 2012, p. 2). No government created a developed state. They utilise public investment and state spending to construct an economy with knowledge-based assets utilised by a highly trained workforce recruited meritocratically (Amsden, 2001).

Nevertheless, we can only disagree with Dahi (2012). Even if most of his assumptions about the Egyptian Revolution are correct, the event was not merely a political instance of poor democratic development. If the population is not experiencing an egalitarian income distribution, that is another variable to measure with the democratic quality of a government.

A government-protected elite and a weak economy led to Egyptian capitalism. Stabilisation and structural adjustment measures began Egypt's economic transformation in 1991. Since 2004, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif's ministerial economic team has vigorously promoted transformation. The government implemented several reforms. It pledged to reform the banking sector, liberalise

trade, and privatise most state-owned enterprises. Egypt has steadied its economy, increased its foreign exchange reserves, and sustained growth since 2004 through reforms. Reforms have altered the state-market-society social contract (Alissa, 2007).

Political stability drives economic prosperity. The revolution was sparked by Mubarak's thirty-year emergency legislation, the El Watany party's political and civil rights repression, and the lack of free and fair elections. All constitutional declarations and interim constitutions from the 1952 revolution until the 1971 permanent constitution, as revised, and the 25 January revolution called Egypt's political structure a hybrid system. (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013). The President's political system-based obligations are in the Constitution. The Republic's constitution also describes the president's and prime minister's powers. The constitution sets the prime minister and ministry duties, not the president. Egypt's hybrid system requires realist constitutional restraints and multiple decision-making centres between the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament to prevent one person or institution from controlling the political process. (Abdou & Zaazou, 2013, p. 96)

The rate of Egyptians who lived below the poverty threshold of $2 a day climbed considerably from 17.8% to 23% at the height of the global economic boom. Egypt experienced yearly economic growth rates of 7.2%. Contrarily, the worldwide financial and economic crisis was accompanied by a noticeable decline in the percentage of Egyptians living on less than $2 per day, from 23% to 19.5%, as well as a slowing of economic development rates (Gamal Siam and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Rady, 2010).

Social media alone cannot trigger a revolution. What about institutions? Businessmen and workers criticised Mubarak for three decades. However, the Egyptian military pressured it and outside countries as the US threatened it. (Holmes, 2012). However, political circumstances pushed a revolution. In 2005, a substantial component of the constitution was amended to enable former President Mubarak's son in the November 2011 presidential elections, precluding competition. The 2010 fall parliamentary election, which gave the NDP (National Democratic Party) a record majority, was suspected of fraud (Bakr, 2012).

The beginning, duration and end of the revolution and the "Arab Spring" movement owe their realisation to the existence of the Internet. This does not justify removing other influences. Social media utilised during the Arab Spring to organise and mobilise the masses started the revolution. Internet mobilisation was vital. (Alsayyad, 2012, p. 58). Online activists segmented, prepared, and "mobilised" the public, resulting in real protests. (Abdulla, 2014, p. 7). Poulantzas (2000) noted that this is state property. Thus, an institution. It doesn't have to be official or legal-bureaucratic, but its somewhat informal evolution has tackled the dynamic of a public problem, namely Egypt's democracy.

Al Jazeera contributed to the Internet evolution that led to the Egyptian Revolution. (Barrons, 2012, p. 59). Al Jazeera in Egypt represented a combination of traditional and modern

forms of media and means of communication in the days before the revolution. Although this medium could not be placed in the category of social internet media, it should be mentioned that there was a notable move towards digitalisation. Al Jazeera uses social media, newspapers, pamphlets, posters, and television (Abdulla, 2014, p. 6). It gradually added digital advocacy, mostly through Twitter fans. Thus, these media firms expanded into digital media. They increased their business presence, improving their lives. Digital media has strengthened the relationship with younger people, whereas conventional forms have stayed reserved for older media users. (Barrons, 2012, p.59).

Traditional media's social media presence improves customer communication. This led to citizen journalism and allowed ordinary people to provide critical information. (Tufekci, 2014, p. 12). This was crucial in organising and executing the Egyptian revolution to overthrow Hosni Mubarak. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were among the platforms civic activists used to express their unhappiness and revolutionary spirit.

## CONCLUSION

Why and did Egypt's 2011 revolution overturn a regime? What causes this? Institutionalism efficiently integrates a society's historical, political, economic, and cultural variables to address these concerns. Many writings about pro-democracy movements in Egypt based on "social networks" were naïve, creating the idea that democracy was conceivable in the next administration. This rationale is incorrect since it doesn't respond to any stage in Egyptian history or Western projections of people's demonstrations. The post-Mubarak regime was authoritarian and human rights violator. As history shows, the 2011 democratic uprisings will result in a long-term government, not an immediate one.

The revolution had several reasons, as seen above. It's naïve to imagine economic progress doesn't cause revolutions. Before the revolution, Egypt's economy grew, but it only benefited the regime's limited social base. Progress was denied to parts of Sinai and Upper Egypt, excluding large parts of the populace. (Bakr, 2012). Social unrest includes racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Nubians and Bedouins also felt isolated from Egyptian identity and development gains. Christian requests to build and refurbish churches and develop standards for Christians converting to Islam and vice versa were ignored. (Roccu, 2013).

The NDP's corrupt and conventional economic policies to modernise the country resulted in a gender-based distribution gap, a lack of representation, and government elite alienation. However, modernising Egypt led to a reliable internet connection for many individuals. This method of conveying ideas was crucial to achieving political independence. Some reviewed literature considers Egypt a successful revolution because the regime changed.

After the revolution, ensuring representation, a cornerstone of democracy, emerged as a significant challenge. Poulantzas (2000) provided insights into how citizens might evolve their understanding of the state and develop a dynamic knowledge of public affairs. However, the

establishment of democratic accountability remained uncertain. As observed, the revolution did not achieve its democratic aspirations in the first decade. Instead, a new form of dictatorship emerged, reinstating restrictive measures. The revolution had widespread impacts, altering the economy, politics, culture, and various social variables. This work aims to demonstrate these extensive effects and suggests that the methodology employed here can be instrumental for future research in tracking the progression of such revolutionary processes.

Hosni Mubarak's demise was multi-causal, but institutional development is the strongest reason. The qualitative method lets us explore the socio-historical process of the numerous Egyptian revolutions and their political growth beyond imprecise semantic criteria like "democratic quality," as Freedom House or another quantitative score would give. This journey ended with a restrictive political elite that prevented free competition between parties, arbitrary constitutional amendments, and successful economic reforms that did not reduce inequality or hunger, so vulnerable sectors did not benefit. Egypt's efficient internet network, which allowed citizens to express dissatisfaction with the regime, was an unintended consequence of modernisation. The state was built from individuals, and the germ of a new process began at their non-centralised initiative.

Social scientists risk their predictions. Patterns and recurrences are our goals. According to Egyptian history, democracy could not solidify and exist for years. This inclination allows us to think of a specific "path dependence," but other researchers with such worries can investigate that avenue. As disheartening as it seems, Egypt has never had democratic circumstances. In any event, its population will do this, and only time will show its effects.

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