Conflict resolution in West Africa: What is ECOWAS for?

This article aims at analyzing the role played by ECOWAS in the Ivorian and Malian crises. We argue that ECOWAS in many circumstances help to de-escalate violence at the first stage of conflict in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. However, the inefficiency of the ECOWAS to resolve c onflict in the region makes it seem useless for the West African.


INTRODUCTION
Since their independence in early 1960, many of West African countries are struggling for democracy, sustainable development, or stability. The West African region, already affected by the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and then the Ivorian conflict, must now face the Malian crisis. Because of the emergence of these conflicts, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rather plays a role of "regional policeman" with its army, the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
As a West African regional organization, ECOWAS has a legitimate role to play in resolving conflicts that arise in this part of Africa. However, it is increasingly criticized by its member states. Since its creation, how many conflicts has ECOWAS resolved? Is it a key player in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa? We argue that ECOWAS in many circumstances help to de-escalate violence at the first stage of conflict in Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. However, the inefficiency of the ECOWAS to resolve conflict in the region makes it seem useless for the West African.

ECOWAS CREATION
Before the creation of ECOWAS, West Africa was made up of a collection of states from different administrative and colonial systems. This area comprises fifteen states whose communities use three different official foreign languages (English, French and Portuguese). The cultural, linguistic and ecological diversity of the region generates both opportunities and challenges for the integration process. Combining forces politically and economically has always been recognized as a step towards creating common prosperity in the region (Ecowas, n.d.). In 1945, the creation of the CFA franc brought together the French-speaking countries of the region Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol.13, e69997, 2022. DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2022.69997| e-ISSN: 2177 in a single monetary union marked the beginning of an integration effort. And in 1975, the Lagos Treaty was the basis for the creation of ECOWAS At the beginning, ECOWAS started promoting the creation of a customs and economic union to facilitate the free movement of people and goods. It was therefore the integration of trade and people within the member states that was at the origin of the creation of ECOWAS. To achieve this objective, several awareness-raising campaigns have been initiated for the people and governments (Tsigbe;Kpaye, 2017). The Treaty of Lagos from 1975 was purely economical and therefore did not contain components relating to the issues of peace, security, stability, and governance. In 1993, the Treaty of ECOWAS was revised with the incorporation of regional peacekeeping, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness.
ECOWAS region was instable since the independence of its member states. And due to such instability, their adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978, enriched in 1981 with the Protocol for mutual assistance in defense against any armed threat or aggression on a member State. For that purpose, the Defense Committee and Council as well as the Allied Armed Force of the Community were both created. However, tensions in the West African region led to the establishment of a multilateral armed force in 1990 to maintain peace and security, known as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). A coalition of Anglophone member States was at the origin of the creation of ECOMOG. The Monitoring Group intervened in, among others, Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997and in Guinea-Bissau in 1999(Uneca, 2010. In December 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Related to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which is the most comprehensive protocol relating to peace and security in the region. The protocol aims to address peacekeeping, humanitarian support and peace building capabilities as well as the issue of cross border crime. Additionally, ECOWAS member States also adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 as an instrument to promote peace and security in West Africa (Uneca, 2010).
From its creation to the present days, ECOWAS evolved as a regional organization. It appears as a legitimized, economic, and political community in west Africa. What make ECOWAS a legitime organization to intervene in west African countries crises?

ECOWAS AS A LEGITIME-BASED ORGANIZATION?
In international mediation literature, the material manipulation of the bargaining environment plays a crucial role for mediation success (Beardley, 2008;Zartman, 1965). This materialist perspective points that the key to successful mediation lies in the material manipulation of the negotiating environment by third parties with significant economic and military resources. In many ways, capacity proved to be a huge argument for mediation success However, the effectiveness of capacity-based third parties mediation appear to be more due to their coercive capacity than their ability to be good mediators. Many of agreement reach by capacity-based third parties mediation showed to be useless. Malian and Ivorian cases are good examples. Even if African third parties have fewer material resources, they appear to be more legitime since capacity-based third parties' mediation is saw as a kind of imperialism and neocolonialism. Duursma (2020) demonstrated that African third parties are effective in mediating civil wars in Africa due to high degree of legitimacy flowing from the African solutions norm. The author based himself on data on international mediation in civil wars in Africa between 1960 and 2017, to show that African third parties are more effective than non-African third parties in finding a negotiated solution to the conflict (Duursma, 2020).
In my doctorate thesis, I also demonstrated that African third parties were more effective in finding negotiated solution to the Ivorian conflict than other West States capacity-based parties. The failure of capacity-based third parties to find a political solution to Ivorian or Libyan crisis prove that capacity is not always the way to mediate a conflict particularly in Africa. In many situations, regional organization such as ECOWAS proved to be more efficient than any other third parties in negotiating de-escalation in west African States. Such efficiency lies upon the legitimacy that African third parties' benefit during bargain to find negotiated solution in a conflict.
This legitimacy has roots in the colonial past of Africa and the will of African countries to free themselves from former colonizers and avoid neo-colonialism. The social structure therefore play an important role to determine the relationship between mediator and warring parties. Accordingly, the social background appears to be the key element to take into consideration when mediating for a political solution in conflict in Africa. Since ECOWAS is composed by African chief of States, the organization emerges as legitim for African warring parties. However, the legitimacy of ECOWAS as mediator is based upon norms to be study in conflict resolutions.

NORMS IN MEDIATING AFRICAN CONFLICTS
After the decolonization of Africa, security, borders, and stability became the main issues for recent independent countries. The new borders traced by former colonizers implies respect of sovereignty and respect of this borders. Earlier at their independence, several African States had to deal with internal and external threat for their borders and sovereignty. The fact is that the borders was delimited exogenously by former colonial powers, so without considering ethnicity and community (Touval, 1972).
The balkanization of the African continent was done based on interests of the colonizers', one of the consequences being the outbreak of several conflicts in post-colonial Africa. In Sudan, for example, the racial division between Arabs and Africans is reinforced by geography, religion and language, and this has resulted in conflicts out of state's control (Jackson;Roseberg, 1982). Also, the interference of former colonizers is seen as a perpetual threat. The sovereignty norm emerges as a shield to protect sovereignty and colonial border legacy. To avoid interstate conflict, the norm of Africa Unity arises and serves to keep the peace and the stability on the continent. For Clapham (1996), African unity is not a merely rhetoric, because it imposed on African leaders a moral obligation to act in harmony.
The preamble of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which became African Union (AU), remembered that African States are "determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms" (OAU, 1963). This stipulation represents the anti-imperialism norm in mediating conflict in Africa. The anti-imperialism norm is a shield again non-African third parties' interference when bargaining for a political solution during a conflict. Anti-imperialism is linked to sovereignty preventing former colonizers external pressures against newly independent countries (Clapham, 1996).
Generally, during mediation in conflict resolution in Africa, African third parties remain committed to the principle of sovereignty. Amoo and Zartman (1992) argue that the respect of sovereignty by African third parties is a ground of mediated solution. Respecting sovereignty is the preamble of peaceful resolution of conflict through mediation. Article 3 of OAU affirms and declares the adherence to the principle of "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration" by its member states. Duursma (2020, p. 300) states that "The anti-imperialism and nonalignment norms reflect how, during the Cold War, African actors had incentives for conflict-resolution efforts to be conducted by African actors." This statement describes how interlinked the different norms are when dealing with conflict in Africa. Indeed, during the negotiation for Ivorian conflict resolution, France mediation was seen as an imperialism and neo-colonialism intervention. Therefore, the Linas-Marcoussis agreement reached under France aegis was systematically reject by one of the Ahouangan, A. L.

ECOWAS' CONFLICT RESOLUTION CASES STUDIES
West Africa can be divided into three main parts. The Gulf of Guinea zone, consisting of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, and Benin. The Sahelian zone, which includes Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. The third zone consists of Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. It is also a region known for its security and political-institutional instability. Indeed, of the seventy-seven coups d'état perpetrated in Africa between 1960 and 2008, forty-one of them took place in West Africa (Thiriot, 2008). In addition to these coups, there have been recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. This staggering number of coups has its roots in political and institutional instability. To explain the political instability, one's can refer to economic and social aspects of these countries. The social and economic cannot be dissociated from the political when it comes to instability in Africa. At the institutional level, violations of constitutional texts and constant amendments are plunging ECOWAS member countries into an endless negative spiral.

ECOWAS INSTRUMENTS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
At its creation, ECOWAS treaty did not contain components relating to the issues of peace, security, stability, and governance. Since the ECOWAS region was instable, member States adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978. The Protocol was enriched and in May 1981, ECOWAS member States signed the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense for mutual assistance in defense against any armed threat or aggression on a member State (Uneca, 2010). For that purpose, ECOWAS created the Defense Committee and Council, and the Allied Armed Force of the Community. Member States undertook not to attack each other, but to furnish aid and assistance in case of armed conflict in any of member country.
Due to the growing tensions in the West African region, regional peacekeeping, stability, and security based upon good neighborliness was therefore incorporated to the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS in 1993 in article (4) as one of the fundamental principles (Uneca, 2010). Also, the protocol of 1999, focuses on peacekeeping, humanitarian support and peace building capabilities as well as the issue of cross border crime.

THE IVORIAN CASE
Often cited as a model of political stability from 1960 until the first coup d'état in 1999, Côte d'Ivoire did not escape the wave of coups in West Africa. Côte d'Ivoire experienced strong economic growth in the first two decades after independence. This period has been described as the "Ivorian miracle". The "Ivorian miracle" was based on balanced growth in which the State and the public sector played an important role even if growth was open to the world. Indeed, in terms of trade, the basis of growth was exports of agricultural products; and in terms of factors of production, regional immigration contributed to the farm labor force (Cogneau;Mesplé-Somps, 1999). But soon the deterioration of the terms of trade and the economic crisis of the 1980s led to an economic and social crisis and the Ivorian miracle quickly turned into a mirage. In 1999 the military coups, led by General Robert Gueï, marked the beginning of an unstable period in Côte d'Ivoire.  Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol.13, e69997, 2022. DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2022.69997| e-ISSN: 2177 material, logistical -to the legal authorities of Cote d'Ivoire to maintain constitutional order, peace and security, national unity and cohesion" (Ecowas, Accra I final communiqué, point 7, 2002). During the Accra I summit negotiation, ECOWAS gave precedence to the norms of the organization. The Heads of State and Government accordingly reaffirmed the position of ECOWAS for no recognition of any government overthrowing a democratically elected government or by using unconstitutional methods (ECOWAS, Accra I final communiqué, 2002).
On 17 October 2002, ECOWAS obtained from the dissident forces a declaration of cessation of hostilities and an agreement to start dialogue with the government. And from the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, a statement attesting the end of hostilities and their agreement to begin dialogue with the dissident forces (Ecowas, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, 2002). The Mediation and Security Council agreed to deploy Ecowas Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) to monitor a ceasefire. ECOMICI deployed approximately 1,400 soldiers from Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger, and Senegal (Dokken, 2008).
As long as relations between African countries are governed by the norms of sovereignty, anti-imperialism, peaceful settlement of disputes, ECOWAS has all the legitimacy to play the role of mediator in the Ivorian crisis. Being composed of African heads of state and government, ECOWAS is not perceived as an imperialist organization as Western powers might be seen. Moreover, respect for the sovereignty of states is a sine qua non for any mediation in West Africa. ECOWAS mediation makes sense for peaceful settlement of disputes. Nonetheless, the belligerents did not respect the ceasefire, and few days after they resumed the clashes. Due to the escalation of violence in Ivorian conflict, ECOWAS States leaders requested the United Nations to act on the Ivorian crisis.
ECOWAS mediation did not have the desired effect on the Ivorian crisis. This failure can be seen from two angles. Firstly, in his first proposition about his ripeness theory Zartman (2000) argues that ripeness is a necessary condition, but not sufficient, to start a negotiation, whether bilateral or mediated. This concept is based upon the perception of Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) which was completely missing during ECOWAS Accra mediation. By calling an extraordinary summit, ECOWAS wanted to avoid an escalation of violence in the Ivorian conflict. Nevertheless, the absence of MHS was not the unique factors of ECOWAS mediation failure, the lack of commitment of the warring parties explains in part the escalation of violence.
Secondly, ECOWAS, paradoxically, does not enjoy the same credit as the United Nations and even the European Union. Most of the time, sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on member states that violate the provisions of the various treaties are hardly applied. Being in solidarity with each other, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government find it difficult to use coercion against their counterparts in case of non-compliance. ECOWAS is becoming less and less credible as an organization in West Africa. At the beginning of the Ivorian crisis in 2002, the democratically elected government of Côte d'Ivoire had the full support of ECOWAS as provided in the treaty. However, this support has been eroded over time, especially with France's involvement in the Ahouangan, A. L.
Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 13, e69997, 202213, e69997, . DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2022.69997| e-ISSN: 2177-7314 mediation of the Ivorian crisis. Indeed, France's position vis-à-vis the Ivorian authorities was perceived as neo-colonialism and ECOWAS was largely aligned behind the decisions taken by the French authorities. The warring parties saw ECOWAS as France's minion in its imperialist expansion in Africa. From then on, ECOWAS lost all its legitimacy as mediator in the Ivorian crisis.
ECOWAS, having neither elements nor coercive force, has never been able to impose its authority and has never been able to enforce the agreements, despite the spectrum of a sanction. ECOWAS in the Ivorian crisis has once again shown its limits in terms of peacekeeping in West Africa. The organization has seen its goals mostly frustrated by political crises in the region and rivalries between Heads of State struggling for regional leadership. UNOCI had to take over to stabilize the country and lead it to the organization of presidential elections in 2010. The UN mission also had difficulties in enforcing peace agreements in the Ivorian crisis. But it had more success than ECOWAS.

THE MALIAN CASE
The Malian crisis has both an internal and an external dimension. An internal dimension because it affects the country's sovereignty and national cohesion. An external dimension because it endangers the Sahel zone and the countries of West Africa. Indeed, since the takeover of the north of the country by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the multiplicity of actors and groups involved, particularly elements of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the conflict has taken on a sub-regional dimension, fueling all fears of instability in West Africa (Sambe, 2012).
In the last ten years, Mali has suffered three coups, a Tuareg revolution and the spread of jihadism and intercommunal violence. In January and Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 13, e69997, 2022. DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2022.69997| e-ISSN: 2177 taking control of Kidal airport. Francois Hollande, then President of France, was welcomed as a liberator. In August 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, known as "IBK", was elected president and a year later Operation Serval was replaced by Barkhane. In May-June 2015, a peace agreement was signed in Algiers by the government camp and the separatist rebels in the north (Diallo, 2020).
Despite the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process in 2015, the security and political situation in Mali has not improved. In northern Mali, relations between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CAM) and the Platform have been punctuated by phases of rapprochement and resumption of hostilities, revealing both the limits of an agreement which obtained a minimum and the extremely precarious and volatile nature of the political and security situation (Thiam, 2017 But what is ECOWAS doing to get Mali out of the crisis? The various frameworks mobilized for the Malian crisis appear to be largely deficient. The G5/Sahel with its meagre results, the African Union as usual absent from the debates, the United Nations with a MINUSMA that is completely obsolete and unsuited in many respects to the Malian crisis, and France with its unconvincing results on the ground. As for ECOWAS, it bases its intervention in Mali on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security dating from 1999. This means that its instruments now seem far too limited or inadequate to deal with the multidimensional crisis (governance, security, military, political, institutional, social, educational, etc.) that the Sahel in general and Mali in particular, are currently experiencing (Bagayoko, 2020).
In addition, ECOWAS seems to be engaged in a power struggle with the Malian authorities. First, because of its initial intransigent stance towards the Malian junta demanding the reinstatement of President IBK. Then a set of sanctions, in response to the government's attempt to extend the transition by five years despite its commitment to hold elections in February 2022. The sanctions, which were intended to isolate Mali on the international scene, weaken its economy, and thus create the conditions for internal pressure from Malians on their leaders, have instead aroused the anger of many Malians and reawakened a patriotic feeling that benefits the transitional government. The ECOWAS decisions have raised suspicions of French interference, in a context marked for many months by escalating diplomatic tensions between Mali and France (Moderan et al., 2022).
This position of ECOWAS not only promotes Malian nationalist sentiment, but also endangers the mission of MINUSMA. Indeed, thanks to propaganda by the Malian authorities, France, the international community, and many other organizations that were trying to find a