A Heideggerian Perspective on Speculative Realism

Resumo

In spite of phenomenology’s sometimes overtly antithetical relation to realism, recent literature in speculative realism draws heavy on phenomenological sources in order to strengthen its position. This article aims to look at Martin Heidegger’s remarks on the relation between the human being and its world through the lens of Graham Harman’s proposed litmus test concerning what constitutes ‘real realism’. For a philosophical position to pass this test, a position must put object-object-relations on the same level as human-world-relations. With the help of Hans Jonas’ theory of the meaning of metabolism, I will hold that Heidegger’s own interpretation of his notion of care indeed places an all too restrictive emphasis on the human-world-relation, which unjustly excludes other living beings. However, while this means that animal-world-relations – or even amoeba-world-relations – should indeed be placed on the same level as human-world-relations, I see no evidence in Heidegger that suggests the need to broaden the scope further to include to object-object-relations.