A WALTZ, NOT A TANGO IN EAST ASIA REGIONALISM: CHINA AND JAPAN SEARCHING FOR LEADERSHIP

Abstract:

East Asia regionalism is one of the most puzzling integration processes in the world due to its particularities. Nevertheless, ASEAN has become a magnet to the process. China, Japan and South Korea have not missed the opportunity and became attached to ASEAN through APT. China and Japan are now in a fierce contest over leadership, using all the available tools. This paper aims to study this contest, with a look at the theoretical framework regarding leadership to East Asia. Then, Chinese and Japanese strategies towards the region will be analyzed, as well as the views of countries of the region regarding China’s and...
Japan’s influence and their quest for regional leadership.

**Keywords:** Regionalism, Leadership, East Asia / Regionalismo, Liderança, Leste Asiático

**Resumo:**

O regionalismo do Leste Asiático é um dos mais intrigantes processos de integração do mundo devido às suas particularidades. No entanto, a ASEAN se tornou um imã para o processo. China, Japão e Coreia do Sul não perderam a oportunidade e se ligaram a ASEAN através da ASEAN+3. China e Japão estão agora em uma disputa acirrada pela liderança, utilizando todas as ferramentas disponíveis. Este artigo busca estudar esta disputa, utilizando-se de um arcabouço teórico de liderança. As estratégias chinesas e japonesas para a região serão analisadas, assim como os pontos de vista dos países da região a respeito da influência de China e Japão e sua busca pela liderança regional.

**Palavras-Chave:** Regionalismo, Liderança, Leste Asiático.
Introduction

Regional integration in Asia has taken a different route compared to the classic European model and it still puzzles many analysts. For instance, the institutionalization has been rather slower than in Europe, and also a lack of a country (or even duo, like the German-French connection) as the clear leader steering the process puts Asia in a different league, in analytical terms.

This paper aims to cover East Asia integration and the contest between China and Japan to take a leadership role in the process. After a brief discussion about the East Asia concept and ASEAN’s historical background and the so-called “ASEAN way”, the advent of APT is analyzed. Then, a study of the theories regarding regional leadership (and if they apply to East Asian integration) is made, as well as a short analysis of some countries’ views about China and Japan. The following conclusion stresses that the leadership process is not yet clearly defined; that indefiniteness, fueled by recent events pointing to heated exchanges among some of the countries in the region due to several and conflicting national boundaries claims, could continue into the near future.

1. The concept of East Asia

Every continent is a political construction, and with Asia it is not different (McDougall, 2007). But what differ Asia from the others is the fact of being exclusively, in the geographic sense, an occidental concept, born in classic Greece, and not in the region itself. The idea of an ‘Asia’ is, therefore, European, raised by an notion of a world divided into three continents – Europe, Africa and Asia – and the last one was defined as all that is at east of Greece, and that is the idea that still persists nowadays.

“As such, Asia makes no particular ethnic or racial sense, for there is as much or as little connecting together the peoples of Japan and Asian Turkey as there is the peoples of China and France. Nor does it make any linguistic sense: Many European languages claim stronger ties to India than India with Korean or Japanese. Politically, only in the Mongols can be found a thread that has tied
the whole of Asia together, because of the success of Genghis Khan and his descendants in conquering and maintaining a thirteenth-century empire that spread from Georgia and Persia in the west to China and part of eastern Russia.” (Emmott, 2008: 34)

And maybe forced by a lack of a better definition, or only by a habit imposed by a Eurocentric world order, we keep referring to Asia in the same way the ancient Greeks did: having Europe as the reference – Near East, Middle East and Far East (Emmott, 2008). To find some ethnical, racial or political logic inside the continent, its subdivision is made joining countries groups in a way that they can have some similarities among them. However, such behavior does not hold the European logic to keep ‘constructing’ the Asian continent.

As a matter of fact, there are many different ways of classifying and dividing Asia, and on this paper, with a geopolitical sight, East Asia – and not the Asia Pacific – will be the region to be presented and analyzed. The concept of East Asia, which differs from Asia Pacific, is more geographic, and it comprises only the eastern region from the Asian Continent. By using the term ‘East Asia’, we aim to refer only to East Asian countries, excluding western powers, especially the United States.

However, East Asia concept has its limitations. To be more precise, the definition of the countries which are part of this region is not an absolute consensus among analysts.

In this article the definition of East Asia includes the following countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei and excluding East Timor, as Southeast Asia; Japan, China and South Korea – excluding North Korea, Mongolia and Russia – as Northeast Asia. This country’s selection was made to a better comprehension of the East Asian concept and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) institution, which is comprised by the 10 country members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (and since East Timor is not yet an ASEAN actual member it was excluded from our analysis) plus Japan, China and South Korea that are the “Plus Three” members and correspond to the Northeast Asian concept adopted in this paper.
APT was not the first attempt to unify East Asian geographical and political concepts seeking an identity that could actually correspond to that region. The existence of historical tensions in the region⁵, as well as the stabilizing/destabilizing presence/influence of Pacific countries, such as United States, New Zealand and Australia, made it hard to achieve a consensus towards an association which would exclude non-Asian countries. The solution came by putting together the regional powers from Northeast Asia with the countries from Southeast Asia, which were already in a regional bloc: ASEAN.

2. ASEAN Historical Background and The ASEAN-Way

By the end of 1940s and early 1950s, Southeast Asia began a setup with a higher degree of autonomy from the western (and, in some cases, imperial) powers. It was the moment of decolonization and increase of nationalisms. However, decolonization didn’t mean the immediate withdrawal of the previous powers.

Thinking of a Southeast Asian integration in the 1950s until the mid-1960s was unlikely. In fact, even to argue for it was not likely at all, although regional integration initiatives had already begun to gain strength around the world. Initially the elites of newly independent countries had a broader idea regarding Asia, which the main point was integration in terms of an Asian federation encompassing India, China and Southeast Asia as a whole or a pan-Asian unity that extended beyond the Southeast Asia (Ba, 2009). Such initiatives didn’t evolve to something concrete.

Still in its beginning, the Cold War quickly spread to Southeast Asia, a region that seemed conducive to the search for influence areas on both dispute sides, since most States were newly independent and their fragmented nationalisms were still in shaping. The ideological struggle between communism and capitalism became one way for these countries to reach development and also national cohesion (Turnbull, 1999).

⁵ As examples of historical rivalries among countries it can be mentioned Japan and China, Japan and South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, Philippines and Malaysia, and Singapore and Malaysia.
But the same Cold War that encouraged nationalism also inspired ‘regional’ arrangements as the Bandung Conference in 1955, considered “later as primus inter pares for the ASEAN” (Turnbull, 1999: 594). Bandung was not the only move that complemented the idea of rapprochement and solidarity between countries. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines proposed an anticommunist pact that would be followed by several other proposals; Thailand proposed a Buddhist Union among Mekong countries (Laos, Cambodia and Thailand), and the Malaysian Federation brought several suggestions for pan-Malaysian union, each possessing the most diverse combinations of Malaysian Federation, Indonesia, Philippines, Borneo, New Guinea and parts of Thailand. Most of these attempts to approach had ethnic or religious characteristics, which made the region definition less embracing and ended up with no progress. Those which didn’t have any ethnic or religious characteristics were weakened because of the lack of relations between two or more members, due to the fragile historical relationship in Southeast Asia. (Ba, 2009).

To keep existing, a regional organization should stick to regional and national ideas basic to ASEAN, making the bloc capable of holding international pressure, improving the relationship between the states that were part of it, facilitating dialogue between them, reducing the information asymmetry and the feeling of insecurity that was latent, and to allowing them to remain united and not strictly allied to one side or the other of the ideological conflict represented by the Cold War. (Ba, 2009).

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created on August 8th 1967 by the Declaration of Bangkok, which was signed by five countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. Despite the attempt to include other countries in the founding of ASEAN, Cambodia and Burma (Myanmar) refused to join the group (Turnbull, 1999). And although the association wasn’t theoretically anti-Communist and the Declaration emphasized the regional promotion of cultural and economic development (McDougall, 2007), the membership wasn’t extended to either North Vietnam or South Vietnam.

The ASEAN member states had, at the time of its creation, some clear similarities. They were anticommunist – although not seeking to
transmit it as a prerequisite to be ASEAN members – and one of the reason they gathered was the fear of an aggressive and imperialistic reaction from North Vietnam and Communist China to the region; they had governments with relatively open economies, but tending to authoritarianism; and they sought above all to promote and expand trade within ASEAN and outside the region as a tactic to develop individual countries and the region as a whole (Turnbull, 1999). However, it was not because they had signed the Declaration and now were together within the same association, externalizing an image of similarity to the rest of the world, that the problems concerning relations between the members would be solved.

Despite the rivalry between ASEAN member states and also countries in the region in 1971 the bloc signed the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration. The instructions that resulted from this meeting reinforced some key concepts of ASEAN as: what made those countries part of Southeast Asia, what they had in common and what was the extent of that regionalism (Ba, 2009). Albeit the efforts to sign the Declaration - which indicated the willingness to solve the region’s affairs without outside interference (McDougall, 2007) - in favor of neutrality, there weren’t any available devices which could actually control the involvement of the major powers in the region. (Turnbull, 1999). Since the 1970s, besides ZOPFAN, ASEAN also created the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Southeast Asia (TAC)

6 According to Ba (2009), the ideas that came out of this agreement were: that despite different such states had characteristics that made them part of a Southeast Asia as per all have suffered some kind of outside intervention, because they are small countries within the global system of great powers and also because they are geographically close; that such features should make them a unity through the achievement of the goals of regionalism; and finally, the Southeast Asian regionalism should extend to the mainland and the islands, to communist countries, nonaligned or not communist states, strengthening the union instead of splitting it.

7 Document that codifies the international principles and conduct appreciated by ASEAN, as the non-aggression, non-interference and peaceful resolutions. (Saunders, 2008). Initially, the TAC was a legal code that could bound some friendly inter-state conductions, after it became a document that would give access to other countries in the region to the block, and later at the end of the 1980s it had some amendments to be adapted to countries outside of Southeast Asia so they could initiate all kinds of relations with the
in the ASEAN Summit of Bali in 1976.

In late 1970 and early 1980, ASEAN began to dedicate itself to another of its goals: economic and trade cooperation. With the end of the Cold War, this line of action became even clearer. It was also in the 1980s, more precisely in 1984, that occurred the association’s first horizontal expansion with the entry of the Sultanate of Brunei, the same year it became independent from Great Britain. Henrique Oliveira (2006) argues that ASEAN went through three distinct phases:

“[...] the first corresponded to the process of maintaining the regional security [...] The second phase, with greater emphasis in 1980, covered the period when Southeast Asia was inserted in the process of Asian economic development [...] The third phase, in the post-Cold War represented a new direction for its goals.” (Oliveira,2006:92)

The end of the Cold War brought a new boost to ASEAN. “At the same time, changes associated with the end of the Cold War [...] had divided Southeast Asia, it also insulated Southeast Asia as a region in key ways.”(Ba, 2009:101). With the end of ideological struggle and the emergence of the U.S. as the only superpower, the association could focus on other objectives than on defense and sovereignty of its member states against the communist threat. The East Asia region had experienced a time of great economic growth and rapid industrialization that began about a decade after the end of World War II, but reached its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s with Japan and the Asian Tigers.

After Brunei’s entry in 1984, ASEAN opened up to new members from 1995 to 1999, with the desire to really represent the region of

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8 The original text is: “[...]a primeira correspondeu ao processo da manutenção de segurança regional [...] A segunda fase, com maior ênfase nos anos 1980, abrangeu o período em que o Sudeste Asiático se inseriu no processo de desenvolvimento econômico asiático [...] A terceira fase, já no pós-Guerra Fria, representou um novo direcionamento de seus objetivos.”

9 The Asian Tigers are: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Southeast Asia. Vietnam was, in 1995, the first country to join the ASEAN in the post Cold War. Two years later, in 1997, Laos and Myanmar also joined the bloc. In 1999 its latest member was added, Cambodia, a country equally important to the concept of Southeast Asia that the organization sought to create, but due to a Civil War lasting for more than a decade, was still recovering through most of the 1990s.

Achieving economic cooperation in ASEAN, however, was complex, mainly due to the difficulties in establishing a common market among the bloc’s economies as they were competitive and not complementary. Despite of drawbacks, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established in 1992 (McDougall, 2007). The AFTA was the reunion of previous initiatives to create a free trade area in Southeast Asia. Signed by its six members, it sought to “[...] eliminate tariff barriers among the Southeast Asian countries with a view to integrating the ASEAN economies into a single production base and creating a regional market of 500 million people “(ASEAN, 2002)\(^{10}\).

In addition to the agreements reached during this period, in 1994 the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created, a locus to discuss security issues in a more comprehensive and deeper way than within the organization. The ARF emerged from a discussion in 1993 launched by ASEAN countries along with its dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan and the U.S.) as well as the meeting observer states (China, Russia and Vietnam). Currently, ARF has 26 members\(^ {11}\) and it is the largest regional forum dedicated to security issues. (Gill & Green, 2009).

The ARF and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)\(^ {12}\)

\(^{10}\) Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/19585.htm

\(^{11}\) ARF countries are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Singapore, South Korea, North Korea, United States, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, East Timor, European Union and Vietnam. Available at: http://aseanregionalforum. asean.org/about.html

\(^{12}\) APEC began as an informal dialogue group in 1989 and can be
established in 1989 are linked to the concept of Asia Pacific. APEC mainly justifies the United States and Canada presences in East Asia area. Unlike APEC, ARF includes ASEAN as the group meetings’ core, as it passes by ASEAN principles of non-intervention, consultation and dialogue, which are important elements when it comes to security and defense. (McDougall, 2007). Moreover, the ARF is a way to keep the U.S. on the scene in East Asia in most sensitive point for the country in the region, defense, without being part of other regional concepts exclusive to Asian countries as the ASEAN itself.

The sudden growth in East Asia, however, suffered a setback in the late 1990s. A financial crisis similar to the one that reached Latin America in the 1980s, settled in the region. The first wave of the Asian crisis began with a currency crisis in Thailand and spread to several countries in Asia. As a consequence, Thai, Philippines, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies were forced to be devalued, with negative growth in all these economies, along with South Korea (Wan, 2008). The moment of fragility faced by some ASEAN states was also seen as an opportunity for the most powerful countries in the region, especially China and Japan. By realizing that western countries did little or nothing to help those countries damaged by the crisis, Japan, China and also South Korea - in a less extent, since it had been affected by the crisis as well - approached even more the Southeast Asia countries with the intent to help, but also to project themselves as capable leadership for the region hit by the crisis. (Gill & Green, 2009). One of the first Japanese and Chinese approaches to ASEAN countries was the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), launched after the third ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in 1999. It was signed in 2000 by the ten ASEAN countries Finance Ministers and also by Japan, China and South Korea which had already been part of APT since 1997. CMI was understood as an important symbol of East Asia reunited as one, (Asami, 2005) since its creation was closely linked to the emergence

considered as a meeting of regional economies that aims to develop an economic community of Asia-Pacific countries. (Gill & Green, 2009).

APEC members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Singapore, South Korea, United States, Philippines, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam. Available at: http://www.apec.org/en/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx
of APT, responsible for the idea of “East asianization” in the search of an East Asian Community. (Gill & Green, 2009).

In 2007 the ASEAN Plus One(s) was created, consisting of Free Trade Areas between ASEAN and each of the “Plus Three” countries. Each ASEAN Plus One has different characteristics such as the amount of trade liberalization among members, the member numbers that are part of the agreement and the deadline that all countries have to conform to standards. Despite different characteristics, all ASEAN Plus One(s), have basically the same goal: stimulate the economy using direct investment to strengthen regional ties between these countries, and for the main country (Japan, China or South Korea), a shot in getting more influence in the ASEAN bloc, in order to be able to play the role of regional leader in East Asia.

Even with the setbacks experienced by ASEAN in establishing itself as the association it is today, since the moments prior to its creation especially regarding the conflicts inherent in the region and the rivalry of nationalism that emerged after decolonization, today ASEAN can be considered as the most durable and organized Asian regional bloc. Unlike the European Union (EU), ASEAN has a much less institutionalized and a more flexible character with explicit respect to the state’s authority and the idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of every State. This set of rules that permits a lesser degree of institutionalization, with each member experiencing a more flexible status, came to be known as the ASEAN-Way and can be summarized in six basic informal ‘laws’: “1. sovereign equality; 2. the non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict; 3. non-interference and non-intervention; 4. the non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members; 5. quiet diplomacy; and 6. mutual respect and tolerance.” (Haacke, 2005:1)

3. The East Asian Economic Caucus and the advent of APT: the ‘asianization’ of the East

Until very recently the ASEAN was the only formal organization which pursued economic integration in Southeast and East Asia. To reach this purpose ASEAN began to encourage and getting involved in various economic integration initiatives, among them the more recent East Asian Summit (EAS) but also the 1997 APT – that was, above all, the
way found by Japan, China and South Korea to approach the region and to improve the relationship among them. But before reaching a common term in APT and EAS groups initiatives’, other ideas were launched to try to integrate East Asia.

In the early 1990s, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir launched the idea of a group to be discussed together with the others ASEAN countries. The creation of APEC as an informal dialogue, proposed by Australia in 1989, was what inspired Malaysia to also propose a group bringing together the countries that were part of East Asia. The theme was discussed in 1991 when the proposal had its name changed from East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). (Terada, 2003). The Mahathir proposal is considered a pioneer in describing a notion of East Asia that until that moment lacked a clear and distinct shape and implied a single regional group in a similar mold as it was happening in other parts of the world.

The objective of EAEG was to reunite ASEAN countries in the early 1990s (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Brunei), the countries of Indochina, which later became members of ASEAN (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) and the Northeast Asia countries (China, Japan and South Korea). (Terada, 2003). It was also part of the Malaysian Prime Minister proposal that this bloc, formed exclusively by East Asian countries, should be led by Japan. In one hand, the country has presented a decade earlier excellent economic indicators and also was the most advanced economy in the region. On the other hand it had a history of imperialist ambitions and voted against the interests of ASEAN countries in agricultural subsidies issues during the Uruguay Round. (Ba, 2009).

Despite have taken to itself the role given by the G7 as the only developed country in Asia, the EAEC proposal sounded indifferent to Japan, a fact that contributed to the proposal’s failure to materialize. The U.S sought to persuade its main allies, Japan and South Korea, to oppose the proposed East Asian bloc and at the same time emphasized a more inclusive APEC intending to avoid the risk of being left out of a regional bloc that could be created.

However, EAEC’s proposal also generated fear among ASEAN states that they would be dwarfed close to Japan and China, in this new
association. Moreover, the fact that the proposal has been placed initially as a trade bloc and not only as a consulting one, created low consensus and retaliation by ASEAN members. (Terada, 2003). From this moment on, Malaysia began to reshape the concept of EAEC in order to make it more acceptable to other countries, including those who would be part of it.

The moment of changes with the passage from the 1980’s to the 1990’s with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S. as the new undisputed hegemon, represented to ASEAN a period of uncertainties and doubts about its political and institutional constraints as well as its internal trade liberalization. In 1991, when it became increasingly latent that regional markets and trade didn’t link ASEAN countries among themselves, but with its largest and richest partners, especially those of Northeast Asia, Thailand proposed the AFTA - which was approved by the ASEAN Ministers. (Ba, 2009).

In 1994, the same year of the ARF\textsuperscript{13} creation, ASEAN and Northeast Asia began a more intense approach inside the regional arrangements where they coexisted with other countries that weren’t part of the East Asian context.

During the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting, in 1996, Malaysia proposed a meeting among the seven ASEAN countries, the three Indochina countries who were not yet members (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos), and the three Northeast Asian countries. (Ba, 2009). That

\textsuperscript{13} After many debates and challenges, ARF became a forum to bring together not only ASEAN countries, but also the major countries from East Asia and Asia Pacific. It also kept the main features of the association (toward the informal, inclusive, progressive and non-military dialogue despite dealing with security issues). The ARF was designed to function as a balance between the ASEAN countries and their powerful neighbors, especially on security issues. (Ba, 2009). However, it is worth reminding that in spite of benign for ASEAN, regarding its inclusion in a broader regional arrangements, the ARF became one of the greatest U.S. ‘cards’ in the region. Besides that, it also aided the establishment of APT years later. So, while ARF created an opportunity for a continuous the U.S. presence in the region, and guaranteed the existence of APT as an East Asian exclusively scheme, the EAEC didn’t present a way of letting the U.S. indirectly near the group and the region, and because of that was replaced and came to an end.
was basically the same proposal made by Mahathir back in EAEC. The two differences were: the inclusion of the Indochina countries, something that was already implicit in Mahathir’s proposal, and also the Japanese acceptance for the first time since the initial idea of EAEG once the channel between the U.S. and the other Southeast Asian countries was opened through APEC and the ARF. (Terada, 2003). Thus, in late 1997 an informal ASEAN Summit held the first APT informal meeting, which included exactly the same members who are now part of the group.

But it was the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that highlighted the Northeast Asian states role in its relationship with ASEAN. Some authors such as Ba (2009) do not believe that the crisis has initiated ASEAN+3, “…the crisis did not create ‘East Asia’ so much, it intensified and speeded up existing processes already in train” (Ba, 2009: 218) but others like Wignajara & Kawai (2007) think that if not for the crisis, the APT wouldn’t have started:

In spite of the crisis, ASEAN and the Northeast Asian powers kept on the informal meetings they had begun, and in a regular basis. With the formalization of the APT term in 1999 - which originally was a more consultative process it is today - new meetings emerged and also new cooperation themes as the CMI, signed in 2001.

During the 2000’s, with the crisis effects under control, APT countries increased even more their relationship and started a series of bilateral agreements. Presently they keep researching and deepening the APT Cooperation Plan launched in 2007. (MOFA)\textsuperscript{14}. In the same way, China and Japan increase their movements toward ASEAN, seeking to play a role of regional leadership, which would give them a comparative advantage inside the region and also in the international scenario.

4. Theoretical Approach for Leadership in Regional Integration

This article discusses the role of China and Japan in East Asia and
the dispute for leadership in the region inside multilateral regional institutions and groups. To do so, we use theories of regional integration, leadership and a concept not yet very explored, in the theoretical field of regional leadership, to build a theoretical approach which would allow the analysis to embrace several features in the research.

**Regional Integration in Theoretical Perspective**

Starting with Andrew Hurrel’s article (1995) on regionalism theoretical perspectives, it is essential to subdivide the subject main theories in three different levels of analysis: systemic, regional and domestic, assigning different theories to each levels, as shown in the diagram below. Despite creating several divisions to explain the regionalism theoretically, the author states that as well as the categories of regionalism, the three levels communicate among them.

**Table 1: Hurrel System of Theories of Regional Integration in Different Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sistemic Level</th>
<th>Neorealism: Regionalism is the answer fro threats, mainly to small and able countries. Problems to explain the future of integration.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Level</td>
<td>Structural Independency and Globalization: Global Integration could bring problem that could be solved collectively, but treated on a regional and not global level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Level</td>
<td>Neofunctionalism: Integration presuppose high interdependency level. State role in integration is decreased. Neoliberal institutionalism: Neoliberalism assumptions but with trust in cooperation. Main role to the State in cooperation. Construtivism: Cognitive regionalism based on regional identities. Emphasis on internal State’s historical and cultural processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Elaborated on data from Hurrel (1995)</td>
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</table>

According to Hurrel (1995), systemic level theories could not explain more than the initial step of integration and internal level theories are
only able to look into each state. Thus, the regional level theories have the best scope to explain the integration in East and Southeast Asia. The regional level theories enable us to study the object from the regional level to the international level, which makes it possible to analyze regional issues more than at the systemic level, and international issues, more than at the domestic level.

Despite some notions of constructivism often applied to ASEAN and APT studies by specialists in this field (Ba, 2009; Narine, 2009; Acharya, 2008 and others) due to identity, recognition and mutual sympathy, it is the neoliberal institutionalism that continues explaining successful integration in ASEAN based on trade and strong state’s role as the essential proponent to alliances and friendly integration. In spite of enmities, diverse identities, and sometimes lack of mutual sympathy, the bloc was one of the most active and that has most evolved on the last decade. The trade inside the bloc and the state’s role in ASEAN culture seems to be superior to ‘identity’ keeping the association and its growth, despite several cases of past enmity and troubled history.

Leadership in Theoretical Perspective

Nabers (2008) and Young (1991) study not only the leadership issue but also when it is applied to disputes within regional institutions, regimes and institutions creation in the international area. To Nabers (2008) for a group of countries to act collectively it is indispensable a strong and international prominence state’s leadership. ASEAN as an institution doesn’t have a country that can be considered a leader, although Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have greater emphasis in the association. On the other hand, in APT China and Japan are countries with large international prominence, ability to guide the institution to collective action and willingness to do so.

Nabers (2008) deals with the leadership issue from theoretical concepts by dividing it in two basic types as shown in the summarized following diagram.
Table 2: Nabers Summarized idea of Leadership in Theoretical Perspective. Source: Elaborated on data from Nabers (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership in Theoretical Perspective</th>
<th>Hegemonic Stability Theory: To Nabers (2008)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemony providing public goods can work in the short term, maintaining stability, but in the long term, the instability in the international system is inevitable due to a tendency of monopolistic behavior of the hegemon itself.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership based on Material Capabilities</th>
<th>Racionalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership based on the intersubjective</th>
<th>Construtivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focused on less tangible issues such as the power conception based on speech and the reformulation of interests and identities.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nabers (2008) concludes that the rationalist theories that deal with leadership, unlike the intersubjective theories, analyze the power issue linked to leadership without taking into account all aspects and dimensions of power, in accordance with the approach of Steven Lukes (1974) (apud Nabers (2008))\textsuperscript{15} which presents three power specific elements. For Nabers, based on Lukes’ findings, rationalist theories cover only the first two aspects of power. According to the author, the third aspect of power would not be discussed by rationalist theories, only by intersubjective theories that take into account the speech and its interpretation.

Table 3: Dimensions of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Power (Lukes, 1974)</th>
<th>How the Power is exerted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Dimension</td>
<td>The Power A exert on B so as B would do something it is not willing to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Dimension</td>
<td>Power exerted through coercion, influence, authority, strength and manipulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Dimension</td>
<td>Discursive hegemony: The Power A exert on B influencing it, shaping it or determining its wills and beliefs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The leadership theories based on intersubjectivity are closer to the constructivist theory in the field of international relations, despite the statement not being made by the author in his article. Such characteristics can be noticed since Nabers (2008) highlights the social interaction issue and the modification it causes on interests and identities. But the intersubjective approach the author proposes, differently from rationalist theories, doesn’t show collective interest as something exogenous and given previously, but as something intrinsic

to social interactions.

Although Nabers (2008) states that the rationalist theories ignore the third dimension of power, Nye’s Soft Power (2004) addresses several of the issues presented as Lukes’ third dimension of power. Though the Soft Power is not considered a theory, but a concept, it can be managed into the rationalist and the intersubjective theories, mainly because it analyzes power issues and also because it has sufficient conditions to be applied on leadership issues. In this way, it is possible to see some similarity between Lukes’s third aspect of power, Nabers’ (2008) intersubjective power and leadership theories and Nye’s (2004) Soft Power\textsuperscript{16}.

Even though quite diverse and divergent, both theoretical assumptions made by Nabers (2008), should be seen as complementary and interrelated. Though the author seems to prefer the theory that involves intersubjectivity, it is remarkable, even by the author himself, that if rationalist theories fail for not dealing with power related to speech, intersubjective theories give little attention to material capabilities that also matter in the International scene.

Young (1991), in turn, deals with issues such as international negotiation and the nature of leadership related to it; international regimes formation and international arrangements; he also classifies the leadership in three different types: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership.

The author is emphatic when he affirms that although working in individual level and not in states or international institutions level, individuals who in most cases assume the role of leader are acting on a State or institution behalf. However, to Young (1991), it is these individuals’ behavior that should be explored to evaluate leaders’ role

\textsuperscript{16} More recently, Nye (2011) has dealt with Lukes’ third dimension of power issue relating it to his concept of Soft Power. The author believes that it is possible to have soft and hard power in all the three dimensions of power, and in the third dimension, the intersubjective dimension, the soft power can be seen when a State uses its attraction or its institutions to shape another State’s initial preferences, but the hard power also exists when a State uses its strength or financial resources to shape another State’s preferences.
in shaping institutional negotiations. Thus, it is possible to theorize that while the individual is the means by which leadership is exercised, the state is the end, since it is the state’s orders’ that the individual will accept and put into action. Therefore, to treat all three types of leadership proposed by the author, we will leave the micro level, the individual, and we’ll use the macro level, the state, without ignoring the importance of the individual in the process of international leadership, but emphasizing the fact that the State or the institution the individual represent is what is behind his choices and actions.

Table 4: Types of Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Leadership</th>
<th>How does it work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Leadership</td>
<td>The individual necessarily acts on a state behalf, that is part of an institutional negotiation in the international level, and brings the country’s material capacities (or its structural power) as a way to show its relevance in the international arena, and thus boost their bargaining power within the negotiation face to other individuals representing other States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial Leadership</td>
<td>Individual who may or may not, but most times represents a large stakeholder interests- the state may also be a stakeholder to companies - in an institutional negotiation that seeks to lead and, using his negotiation skills, to influence the way issues are placed inside the group he is taking part. He seeks to create agreements that can reunite stakeholders and bring benefits to all participants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intellectual Leadership

Exercised by an individual who also may or may not be affiliated with an actor on the international scene (State or multilateral institutions). He uses the power of ideas to shape not only how the other participants of a negotiation understand an issues discussed, but also to guide their thoughts about the options available to solve such issues.

Source: Elaborated on data from Young (1991)

From Young’s (1991) work it is possible to extract some analysis based on the author’s three leadership typologies, adapting it to the state’s role. In this article we’ll use all three forms of leadership found not only in Japan’s but also in China’s action toward East Asian region and more specifically the institutions of ASEAN and APT, to measure how each actor seeks to exercise the different types of leadership in the region. Thus, the intention is to establish a direct comparison between the two states and measuring which one has higher and denser structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership inside the institutions that increasingly represent East Asia.

Regional Leadership in Theoretical Perspective

Dent (2008), writes about the regional leadership issue contrary to mainstream theories of International Relations, which deal only with international leadership, which, according to the author, are basically American concerned about the country’s super power position. For Dent (2008), you must open the state’s black box to understand
leadership not only in a national level. You should also look inside each state to try to find the actors, pressure and interests groups that guide the state’s actions and make it seeks for leadership in the region the way it does. Dent (2008) also presents some emerging theories, which he also criticizes since much of its literature is based on the mainstream international leadership theories on regional leadership. According to Dent (2008), the term ‘regional power’ turns out to mean that the state is hegemonic or dominant in a given region (as it would be the case of China and Japan in East Asia). This is a correct assumption according to regional leadership theories derived from international leadership theories. Accepting that, Flemes (2007) lists a number of determinants that characterize a regional power: claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and acceptance of leadership. After characterized according to the emerging theories, the regional leader has two main actions to perform: stabilize the region in security matters, and create rules for the regional economy. Those two attributions approximate Flemes (2007) assumptions to the theory of Hegemonic Stability approach.

Since he’s unsatisfied with emerging theories, Dent (2008) seeks to develop a new research agenda to study, more specifically, regional leadership and its exponents in East Asia. The author believes that to fully analyze regional leadership, the approaches should combine positivist and normative analysis, with emphasis on explanation and not on prevision.

Besides detailing various concepts focused on Regional Leadership, Dent (2008) presents the key concepts of Regional Multilateralism and Global Multilateralism, which are placed as a starting point to the emergence of new approaches to regional leadership specific to East Asia.
Table 5: Key Concepts of Regional Multilateralism and Global Multilateralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Multilateralism</th>
<th>Global Multilateralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong relation between multilateralism and regionalism in East Asia</td>
<td>Strongly related to regional leadership concept. Defined by two aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive concept wit States engagement co-administrating a region or organization to achieve collective objectives.</td>
<td>Aspect one is about how the actors that are regional leaders represent the regional community’s interest overall community forums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of the most important ways for China and Japan to exert leadership and show responsibility once regionalism has strength in the region with Southeast Asian countries increasingly engaged to regional schemes.</td>
<td>Aspect two is focused on how regional leadership assignment affects global governance main mechanisms’ nature and behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan and China interested in promoting multilateral regionalism to reach the region in the best way.</td>
<td>When a regional leader stands out globally, it can be able to call attention to itself and also to the region it leads when inside of a global multilateral organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happen in the East Asia is an Inter-constitutive and a co-determinant relation which creates, due to the regional multilateralism deepening, opportunities to a regional leadership.</td>
<td>It is up to each regional leader state to seek to represent its interests more and less the community’s it represents or vice versa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated on data from Dent (2008)

From what was presented by Dent (2008), it is reasonable to think that both theories mentioned by the author – “mainstream” and “emergent” – as well as the key concepts he introduces can be useful tools to form this research theoretical perspective. More specifically, Flemes (2007) emerging regional leadership theory can be of great help since it describes a regional leader main characteristics and role. About the key concepts introduced by the author, regional multilateralism appears to be able to help analyzing Japan and China’s quest for leadership in the East Asian region; both countries’ strategies aim to achieve it through ASEAN and APT institutional framework. (Dent 2008)
About the Theoretical Approach

This research does not present the choice of a single theory to guide the final analysis but a compound or a theoretical perspective formed by some theories and / or important concepts in the field of International Relations. To build this theoretical perspective it was required to submit three different themes, but all closely related, some of which can be a basis for the coming discussion and others will be directly used as a measure of comparison or pre-requirements in the identification of regional leaders.

The neoliberal institutionalism fits better on ASEAN and APT issue, first because it studies regionalism in a regional level and not in systemic or internal, and also because it gives great importance to the state figure which despite being the main actor is not configured as selfish, but cooperative and acts seeking a collaborative management where institutions have the role of making the international system more predictable, especially regarding cooperation.

From leadership perspective, although only the three leadership types by Young (1991) will be used in our approach, Nabers (2008) helped to clarify some issues about the rational and intersubjective theories of international leadership. It is possible to make a parallel between the two texts matching the first two Young’s (1991) leadership forms - the structural and entrepreneurial - in rationalist division made by Nabers (2008) and intellectual leadership in the intersubjective division.

What will be done with the three Young (1991) leadership forms is to measure, making direct comparisons: which of the two more prominent actors in the region of East Asia - Japan and China - have greater structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. This comparison will enable to indicate one as the most likely regional leader in East Asia and distinguish the type of leadership that prevails more in each of these two actors.

The Regional Leadership can be initially seen as a sum of the first and second themes, but in this case the sum of the parts does not mean the whole. The regional leadership theory is still very new, does not have a theory established yet and therefore ends up getting support on international leadership theories. The two theories or concepts
that will be used are an emerging theory of regional leadership that lists the characteristics and roles of a regional leader by Flemes (2007) and the concept of Regional Multilateralism proposed by Dent (2008) that describes pretty well China, Japan, ASEAN and APT relations and attempts to be a regional leader. Flemes’ (2007) emerging theory will be used to designate which of the two actors has more leadership features and develops larger and/or better regional leadership role, while the concept of Regional Multilateralism will help explain the reasons why and how Japan and China seek to exercise leadership through institutional means.

5. The struggle for Regional Leadership in East Asia

East Asian has become an even more important region in economic terms after the end of the Cold War, not only because the existing regional integration mechanism, which so far involved only Southeast Asia, was redirected from a structure that was designed basically to security purposes to another, that valued regional development through trade, but also because Japan and China left aside their ideological dispute heading toward a new path that highlighted economy, finance and trade. The amazing Japanese growth in the 1980s and the Chinese economic reforms that also have strengthened from the 1980s turned up both countries important actors in the region.

Even with such individual growth of the East Asian two giants, the region around it seems to increase its importance to Japan and China, which despite maintaining trade and relationship with the rest of the world, consider the geographic space around them indispensable in the search for business, economic, financial and political partners. It becomes increasingly important to have ASEAN members or the association as a whole, as regional allies for several matters, including representation and legitimacy in international institutions and bodies. Currently there is a visible competition between China and Japan in the East Asian region through the regional integration mechanisms. The race for the establishment of FTAs in similar molds, as well as the need of meetings as summits, which happen with the almost mandatory presence of Japan and China when there are group discussions or talks involving ASEAN, and the impetus to increase and strengthen their relationship with several ASEAN members are some facts that permeate this competition. An example, beyond the of FTAs issue, is
the dispute for leadership in the Mekong Valley region where some
ASEAN members are placed: Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia
and Vietnam. Both Japan and China have projects in the region in
order to develop these countries’ economies that suffered for several
years from civil and regional wars. (Nabers, 2008).

The contest for leadership in East Asia seems to be evident in recent
years in view of the increasingly ‘competitive’ movements Japan and
China present toward the ASEAN members and the association as
a whole. Although Japan was the first powerful country to become
interested in the regional integration and also the first to agree with
idea of a gathered East Asia back on the 1970s, since China opened up
to regional and global institutions and associations by the end of the
1990’s, a race between Japanese and Chinese to increase and improve
relations with ASEAN countries is obvious.

There are many issues involved when it comes to regional leadership
by China or Japan in the East Asian region. The Japanese colonial
and imperialist past, the rapid pace of growth and an increasingly
competitive and military China are just two facets that can be
discussed. However, many other questions can be asked when we
realize that Japanese and Chinese may be disputing the preference of
its neighboring states which, though small, have direct importance
for trade, finance and political decisions taken under ASEAN rules
or even beyond it nevertheless still highly influenced by invisible and
historical alliances, as well as old rivalries among members.

The leadership of East Asia is disputed even stealthily between Japan
and China. This type of contend is not only in bilateral contexts. The
establishment of regional integration mechanisms and bases for the
creation of an East Asian community is approaching the region and
increasingly arousing the interest of the powerful Northeast Asian
countries. The Chinese and Japanese race to increase their ties with
such mechanisms, particularly through ASEAN, ASEAN Plus One(s)
and APT, reflect their importance for both actors and represent one
of the most recurrent forms of dispute between the two countries.

The real objective in the quest for regional leadership is not to achieve
power and economic growth in the short term, but stabilizing the
region in order to start thinking about growth and relative power
accumulation within an increasingly integrated framework. Both China and Japan understand the need for a stable East Asia, but neither of them relies on the other to allow a gradual gain of stability with the constant threat of the ‘rival’ becoming the region leader or isolated hegemon, which would decrease its global and regional power. What exists is the duality of a contest for regional leadership fought under low profile, where none of the two actors affirm to be disputing a leadership position, even if it is to prevent the other of becoming the leader.

This leadership contest between the major countries in Northeast Asia that pervades the region integration mechanisms as ASEAN Plus One(s) and APT - that represent the largest part of the relationships that happen in East Asia - gives ASEAN a high bargaining power. The association can benefit from the dispute, since it triggers a competition among aspiring leaders for seeking bigger and better ties with ASEAN. This competition between China and Japan can enable ASEAN to have the power to influence the terms of the agreements that are signed between the two actors and the association, making them minimally more favorable to it, even if it is the less powerful in these relationships. Moreover, the central role of ASEAN in both APT, where the Plus Three countries have status of ‘visitors’ like EAS, where ASEAN usually have the final word during the meetings, gives the association a growing international and regional prominence toward outside powers.

6. ASEAN Countries’ Views on China and Japan

As it has been mentioned before, China and Japan have been courting ASEAN in order to achieve leadership in the process of regional integration. How have ASEAN’s countries reacted? Unfortunately, there are few updated regular opinion polls which bring up the subject. One of the most widely accepted is Pew Research Global Attitudes Project\(^\text{18}\) which has, among other topics, assessed many countries’ views of China over the years. But, in the case of ASEAN, only Indonesia has been included continuously. Countries’ views of Japan were also shown, but only up to 2008.

\(^{18}\) Pew Research Center (2013)
Table 6 Views of China by Indonesian population - Percentage of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net result</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated on data from Pew Research Center (2013)

Table 7 Views of Japan by Indonesian population – Percentage of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Result</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated on data from Pew Research Center (2013)

Another renowned poll is BBC’s World Service Country Rating Poll19. As in the case of Pew’s, the problem is the small number of countries polled, only two: Indonesia and Philippines.

Table 8 Views of China - Percentage of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Result</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19  BBC (2013)
Table 9 Views of Japan - Percentage of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Result</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Result</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obs: n.a. (non-available)

Although the sample is clearly too small (two countries in a group of 10, as is the case of ASEAN), some results can be drawn from the four Tables. First, China and Japan are viewed positively by populations of Indonesia and Philippines. Nevertheless, Japan’s net result (favorable minus unfavorable) is definitely much higher in both countries (and in the case of Philippines this number would be even higher, given that the number related do 2012 wasn’t available, and that was the year when there were serious problems with China, due to border disputes in South China Sea).

As to Indonesia, Japanese are viewed in a favorable way since World War II, when their presence was seen as a prelude to Independence from Netherlands and its brutal colonial rule. After gaining independence, Indonesia (along with USA, Brazil and Saudi Arabia) were the four main objectives for Japanese foreign investments.

Indonesian relations with China were interrupted due to Chinese
support of PKI’s failed attempt in overthrowing the government and military influence, in 1965, and were reinstated only in the 1990’s. Since then, especially after 2005 (when China named Indonesia one of its “strategic partners”) (Parameswaran, 2012), Indonesia started a “pendulum strategy”, aiming to “carefully balancing its relationships with the United States and China. While its neighbors ratchet up anti-Chinese rhetoric over miniscule islands, Jakarta has chosen to follow a path of moderation.”(Bodirsky, 2012).

According to both polls, but especially to BBC’s (since Pew showed only two results regarding views of Japan), either Japan or China are positively viewed by the population of Indonesia and Philippines, but views of Japan are more impressive, in terms of net results. At least regarding both countries, Japanese influence has a deeper and better resonance.

7. Conclusion – The waltz, the tango and the future scenarios for East Asian leadership

Although Chinese conditions to become a regional leader are higher, due to its size and political status (for example, being a permanent UNSC member) it should be stressed that there isn´t only one type of leadership, and that despite being a minor (in comparison with China) political and military power in the region, Japan remains a powerful country, even more in commercial and technological fields, an important differential when compared to China. This research also sought to analyze some types of leadership based on a theoretical approach formed by the contributions of theoretical concepts from Dent (2008), Flemes (2007) and Young (1991). Combining different concepts focused on leadership issues created by each one of the authors and applying them to Japan and China cases makes it possible to build a hypothetical static image of the two actors in relation to their leadership in the region and reach a consensus on what kind of leadership they would exert.

Dent’s (2008) Regional Multilateralism concept has four key requisites a regional leader must have: a) reduce as most as it can the other regional countries’ fear for its leadership, b) act as a responsible power, c) have the ability to represent the region in multilateral global forums d) affect somehow the global multilateral mechanisms. Flemes
(2007) argues that for an actor to be considered a regional leader it should: e) claim power f) possess power resources; g) to have foreign policy instruments aimed to the region and working to reach regional leadership h) and to be accepted as regional leadership by the region. Young (1991) divides leadership in three distinct types: i) based on structural power, j) with structural leadership characteristics; and l) focused on intellectual aspects.

Regarding what Dent (2008) considers essential for leadership within his concept of Regional Multilateralism, we have that: a) although Japan has more old relations to ASEAN than China, both actors exert fear on other regional actors, Japan because of its imperialist historic and China by the huge current growth, b) both countries seek to act as a responsible power, Japan since it started its relationship with the association in 1970. But for both countries, it was from the Asian Crisis on that this responsibility has grown, yet it is possible to notice that by the amount of FDI and development and emergency aid the Japanese state transfers to the entire region since 1970, Japan can be considered a more responsible power, c) since China is a country that has, in addition to some developed countries characteristics, many other developing countries features, it is largely possible that it could better represent East Asia in global multilateral organizations precisely because most of the demands of the ASEAN countries are compatible with its demands d) due to the enormous importance the Chinese state currently has on the international scene, mainly because it is characterized as the second largest global GDP and one of the largest exporters and importers on the planet, it is highly possible that China has a much greater power to affect or influence the global multilateral agreements than Japan.

According to a regional leader’s characteristic appointed by Flemes (2007), e) both countries claim power covertly, using indirect ways to do it throughout the regional integration mechanisms, f) both Japan and China have power capabilities features, however, while China has an emphasis on economic and military power, Japan has emphasis on the economic and the soft power (which demonstrates clear differences between the way the two lead States act); g) although Japan and China show foreign policy instruments towards the region and more specifically it integration mechanisms, due to the longer Japan and ASEAN - and also other regional schemes - historic, its foreign
policy tools are best adjusted to it than to the China’s; h) neither of the two countries are completely accepted as leader in the region since the association and countries with whom it maintain relations, understand Japan and China’s posture in the quest for leadership with apprehension due to the results it can generate.

Young’s (1991) three types of leadership may all be present in one actor or different actors. Thus, according to the author’s ideas and the points made by this research, i) even though Japan has wide structure power based largely on its technological development, its structured economy, and high trade volumes, currently, China has more structural power due to its extensive developing economy combined with its military power which is also going through a expansion and modernization process; j) the skills of an entrepreneurial leader can be seen both in Japan and China, but the constant Chinese search to include all ASEAN members in their free trade agreements, contrary to what Japan did in the beginning - agreements only with the richest ASEAN countries, and also because of the idea that China can be a superior representative to the region when in global multilateral organizations, it is more likely that Chinese characteristics can fit better this type of leadership; l) Japan seems to be more apt to possess the prerequisites of an intellectual leader since it has the habit, especially with the regional integration mechanisms, to establish agreements and attend meetings and also meetings that deal with paradiplomatic issues; Japan also has a tradition in academics and researchers training including the exact, economics and politics areas, a tradition that China is recently recovering.

Through direct comparisons established by this hypothetical and static framework, it is possible to identify that the two countries have different ways of expressing their willingness to lead and do so through various means despite going through the same channel, the integration mechanisms in the region. Looking again to this framework and to the research done, China would have an advantage over Japan to exert regional leadership as it has extensive material capabilities and it is more likely to represent the region as a whole. However, the constant Japanese statements to act as a responsible power in the region - even with the history of wars and expansionism - may set a precedent for Japan to be seen as an option for states that keep perceiving China as a threat.
Nevertheless, nothing prevents the two countries to act as regional leaders, each in different areas. But it is almost an obvious fact that they will continue trying to reduce or nullify the other’s leadership or leading possibility until they understand and trust that cooperation based on economic, political, commercial and cultural spheres is what will bring the balance to the region.

Although the Chinese leadership can stand out when compared to the Japanese leadership, it is impossible to determine one of the two countries as the most prominent in East Asia. Despite having distinct importance in distinct regional areas (such as economy, high politics, security etc), China today wouldn’t be the same without Japanese FDI and foreign aid and the present Japan, that tries to abandon historical issues to start a new wave of relationships with the regional countries, wouldn’t exist the way it is today, without Chinese pressure on the war guilt. The contest for regional leadership is therefore another form of Sino-Japanese interaction that even outworn, must find a way to overcome the past and use its incredible power to boost economic and commercial growing in the region, on the basis of cooperation and healthy competition, and not conflict.

As shown in the present work, ASEAN became a fulcrum for East Asian integration, a magnet to which even the three biggest economic powers (China, Japan and South Korea) became attached. But the struggle for leadership in such a process is not easy to discern, since even ASEAN itself has not a clear leader (contrary to EU, in which Germany and France are easily highlighted as to that role).

Instead of choosing a clear and fixed partner, as in the rigid choreography of tango, ASEAN as a whole has opted for many different waltzes, each time giving its partner (China or Japan) the taste of the role. Nevertheless, recent developments regarding border disputes in South China Sea between some of ASEAN countries (especially Philippines and Vietnam) and China and the American initiative of considering Asia its main strategic “pivot” (turning to some ASEAN countries in order to increase military alliances) seem to threaten ASEAN’s strategy of many waltzes.

If we establish those two factors (border disputes involving Chinese claims/American participation/interference) as axis, ranging
respectively from peaceful resolution to armed solution and low profile to active interference, it is possible to draw four scenarios:

1) Blues Skies and Seas (Peaceful resolution/American low profile) – ASEAN can keep its strategy of many waltzes, playing with China and Japan in order to obtain advantages in each round. Leadership is somewhat fuzzy, depending on specific issues. Deepening economic ties, in a multipolar system;

2) Asian Discomfort (Peaceful resolution/American interference) – ASEAN feels uncomfortable with American behavior and tends to view China as a “benign” leader. Although economic ties are also deepened, China as the biggest pole in the system starts prevailing;

3) Cozy (rising) Sun - (Armed solution/American low profile) – Japan’s silent leadership is viewed as the solution for ASEAN countries, in stark contrast to Chinese stance on some issues. Japan, almost by default, turns into the main pole in the system;

4) Cold War II – (Armed Solution/American Interference) – De facto breakup of ASEAN (at least in practical terms), with some countries aligning to each pole (China/Japan-US) and echoing Waltz’s proposition that a bipolar system tends to be more stable in the long run than a multipolar one.

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