



article

the negativity of the child

articulating the existential foundations of inclusive pedagogy

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
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abstract

This article examines inclusive pedagogy in the context of contemporary debates about what is specifically “educational” in education studies. The argument is made in two stages. First, it traces the evolution of inclusion from a sociological to a pedagogical concept, and its subsequent shift from individual concerns to broader questions of social justice. This evolution differentiates inclusion from integration and highlights challenges in addressing social inequalities while maintaining a focus on the unique individual. Second, the article posits that an existential approach in educational theory may enable us to ask educational questions about inclusive education. In particular, Jean-Paul Sartre’s view of the self is introduced, insofar as it underpins inclusive pedagogy’s emphasis on the non-comparable, irreplaceable individual and allows us to address her/him as a subject. This understanding of the individual as a subject supports inclusive education’s rejection of both intra- and inter-individual differentiation, and advocates instead for empowering children to transcend facticities—barriers and adversities—through imaginative projection into their future. On the basis of this existential approach, the article



argues that, when focusing predominantly on categories of needs to be addressed (and, thus, by “categorizing” children according to these needs), we risk missing the specifically pedagogical dimension of these needs. Instead, inclusive pedagogy must view each child as a subject striving to overcome their unique challenges, emphasizing individuality and freedom, without disregarding structural inequalities. This approach aligns with a rejection of external forces—economic, political, or psychological—that threaten pedagogical autonomy and redefine education’s purpose. Critics of inclusive pedagogy highlight the risks of overemphasizing individual autonomy, which potentially leads to neglect of systemic barriers faced by marginalized groups. This article contends, however, that an existential approach reconciles these tensions by acknowledging differences in facticities while maintaining a focus on individual self-actualization. Inclusive pedagogy thus envisions children not as defined by their limitations but as beings capable of becoming “what they are not”, in Sartre’s parlance. This perspective safeguards the core pedagogical principles, framing education as a process that nurtures freedom, responsibility, and imagination, affirming its role as a distinct and autonomous practice.

keywords: existential approach; inclusion; integration; sartre; negativity.

la negatividad del niño
articulando los fundamentos
existenciales de la pedagogía inclusiva

Este artículo examina la pedagogía inclusiva en el contexto de los debates contemporáneos sobre lo que es específicamente «educativo» en los estudios sobre educación. El argumento se desarrolla en dos fases. En primer lugar, se traza la evolución de la inclusión de un concepto sociológico a uno pedagógico, y su posterior desplazamiento de las preocupaciones

individuales a cuestiones más amplias de justicia social. Esta evolución diferencia la inclusión de la integración y pone de relieve los retos que plantea abordar las desigualdades sociales sin dejar de centrarse en el individuo único. En segundo lugar, el artículo postula que un enfoque existencial de la teoría educativa puede permitirnos plantear cuestiones educativas sobre la educación inclusiva. En particular, se presenta la visión del yo de Jean-Paul Sartre, en la medida en que sustenta el énfasis de la pedagogía inclusiva en el individuo no comparable e irremplazable y nos permite abordarlo como sujeto. Esta comprensión del individuo como sujeto apoya el rechazo de la educación inclusiva a la diferenciación intra e interindividual, y aboga en cambio por capacitar a los niños para trascender las barreras y adversidades mediante la proyección imaginativa de su futuro.

Sobre la base de este enfoque existencial, el artículo sostiene que, al centrarnos predominantemente en las categorías de necesidades que deben abordarse (y, por tanto, al «categorizar» a los niños en función de estas necesidades), corremos el riesgo de pasar por alto la dimensión específicamente pedagógica de estas necesidades. En su lugar, la pedagogía inclusiva debe considerar a cada niño como un sujeto que se esfuerza por superar sus desafíos únicos, haciendo hincapié en la individualidad y la libertad, sin dejar de lado las desigualdades estructurales. Este enfoque se alinea con el rechazo de las fuerzas externas -económicas, políticas o psicológicas- que amenazan la autonomía pedagógica y redefinen el propósito de la educación.

Críticos de la pedagogía inclusiva destacan los riesgos de sobreenfatizar la autonomía individual, lo que potencialmente lleva a descuidar las barreras sistémicas que enfrentan los grupos marginados. Este artículo sostiene, sin embargo, que un enfoque existencial reconcilia estas tensiones al reconocer diferencias en las facticidades, a la vez que mantiene el enfoque en la

autorrealización individual. Por lo tanto, la pedagogía inclusiva concibe a niñas y niños no como definidos por sus limitaciones, sino como seres capaces de convertirse en «lo que no son», en la jerga de Sartre. Esta perspectiva salvaguarda los principios pedagógicos fundamentales, enmarcando la educación como un proceso que nutre la libertad, la responsabilidad y la imaginación, afirmando su rol como una práctica singular y autónoma.

palabras clave: enfoque existencial; inclusión; integración; sartre; negatividad.

a negatividade da criança articulando os fundamentos existenciais da pedagogia inclusiva

resumo

Este artigo examina a pedagogia inclusiva no contexto dos debates contemporâneos sobre o que, exatamente, significa “educacional” nos estudos em educação. O argumento é feito em duas partes. Primeiro, é traçada a evolução da inclusão, de um conceito sociológico a um conceito pedagógico e a sua mudança subsequente de uma preocupação individual a questões mais amplas de justiça social. Essa evolução diferencia a inclusão da integração e destaca os desafios de lidar com as desigualdades sociais e, ao mesmo tempo, manter o foco no indivíduo. Em segundo lugar, o artigo postula que uma abordagem existencial da teoria educativa pode nos permitir levantar questões educacionais sobre a educação inclusiva. Em particular, é apresentado o conceito do “eu” de Jean Paul Sartre, na medida em que sustenta a ênfase da pedagogia inclusiva em um indivíduo incomparável e insubstituível, nos permitindo abordá-lo como sujeito. Essa compreensão do indivíduo como sujeito apoia a rejeição da educação inclusiva à diferenciação intra e interindividual e advoga, em vez disso, por capacitar as crianças para transcender as barreiras e adversidades através da projeção

imaginativa de seus futuros. Na base dessa abordagem existencialista, o artigo argumenta que, ao focar predominantemente as necessidades a serem supridas (e, portanto, ao “categorizar” as crianças de acordo com essas necessidades), corremos o risco de perder a dimensão especificamente pedagógica dessas necessidades. Em vez disso, a pedagogia inclusiva deve ver cada criança como um sujeito se esforçando para vencer seus próprios desafios, enfatizando a individualidade e a liberdade sem desconsiderar as desigualdades estruturais. Essa abordagem se alinha à rejeição de forças externas — econômica, política ou psicológica — que ameaçam a autonomia pedagógica e redefinem o objetivo da educação. Críticas à pedagogia inclusiva destacam os riscos de enfatizar demais na autonomia individual, o que pode levar à negligência/negação de barreiras sistêmicas enfrentadas por grupos marginalizados. Este artigo sustenta, no entanto, que uma abordagem existencial reconcilia essas tensões ao reconhecer as diferenças nas facticidades, enquanto mantém o foco na autorrealização individual. A pedagogia inclusiva, então, imagina a criança não definida pelas suas limitações, mas como um ser capaz de se tornar “o que não é”, como diz Sartre. Essa perspectiva resguarda os principais princípios pedagógicos, definindo a educação como um processo que cultiva a liberdade, a responsabilidade e a imaginação, afirmando seu papel como uma prática distinta e autônoma.

palavras-chave: abordagem existencial; inclusão; integração; sartre; negatividade.

the negativity of the child

articulating the existential foundations of inclusive pedagogy

introduction

If one looks up UNICEF's webpage, one finds, next to the organization's logo, the phrase "for every child"; accordingly, inclusive education is spelled out in terms of the motto: "Every child has the right to quality education and learning." In this paper, we are not going to discuss UNICEF's stance, but we will focus on an apparently simpler question: what does "every child" mean, in particular when what is at stake is their inclusion in education? And, more specifically, how should the "every-ness" of the child be engaged with in inclusive education, if this concept should be genuinely educational?

Our answer will be that — in genuinely educational terms — this "every-ness" is actually (and perhaps paradoxically at first sight) a "negativity" and that children whom we wish to include in education should not be considered starting from what they are, viz. in reference to their limitations, but rather as "what they are not," in Jean-Paul Sartre's parlance, that is, as what they are capable of becoming. The risk of starting from their limitations is that our actions — valuable and significant as they are in many other respects — ultimately amount to a "politics of inclusion" (Korsgaard, 2018), even when they are presented as educational.

It is appropriate to specify the kind of inquiry developed here: we are not going to present a reflection in, but rather a reflection about, inclusive education and, more specifically, on how we should understand "inclusion" if we want to think of it in relation to inclusive *education* (viz. through an educational lens). Within this framework, we will suggest that the existential approach (Biesta, 2017a, 2017b, 2021) could represent the most promising framework and, in our reflection, we are going, as aforementioned, to appropriate some tenets of Sartre. This does not imply that our argumentation aims to frame a Sartrean outlook on inclusive education: there are many aspects of Sartre's philosophy that we will not consider, but we think that some of his insights — especially concerning the question of facticity — are particularly relevant for an understanding of inclusive

education situated within the contemporary “existential turn” in educational theory (Oliverio, 2022).

Against this backdrop, our argumentation will be structured in four steps: first, in §1, we will situate our endeavor within the debates about the risk of the “instrumental fallacy” (Korsgaard, 2018) or what is defined in German “pedagogy”¹ as “affirmative theorizing in education”; secondly, in §2, drawing once again in particular upon the German tradition, we will turn to an educational conceptualization of inclusion by distinguishing it from the sociological understanding of the notion; thirdly, in §3, we will intimate that the most promising “foundation” for inclusive education as educational is predicated upon an existential approach and, more specifically, one that emphasizes the negativity of the child; and, finally, in the last two sections, we will rehearse the reasons for selecting an existential approach in educational theory and we will insinuate that the negativity of the child is not specific exclusively to inclusive education but to any genuinely educational reflection. The fact that, however, this character comes to the fore most prominently in inclusive education might be one more confirmation of the “chiastic nature” (Maltese, 2014) of the connection between inclusion and education.

the risk of affirmative theorizing in education

In recent debate in educational theory, an influential strand is represented by the vindication of its autonomous status and of what would be called *Pädagogik* in the German tradition against the risk of its subjugation to “allogeneic” agendas and epistemic devices. This stance is characterized by at least two inter-related argumentative trajectories. One insists on the need to “ask educational questions about education” (Biesta, 2011) as distinct from philosophical, psychological, sociological etc. questions, important as an interdisciplinary dialogue obviously is. The other states the importance of educators and educationalists not ceding to the *instrumental fallacy* (Korsgaard, 2018), that is, to the proclivity to deploy education merely as a tool to address social issues that are framed according to theoretical vocabularies that are not educational. This is by no means an appeal to a

¹ We will put the word “pedagogy” in inverted commas whenever we refer to the Continental meaning of the term, viz. to an autonomous discipline focused on the study of education.

disengaged attitude when doing education(al theory) but rather it draws our attention to the danger of its subordination to other agendas.

These latter concerns about instrumentalization of education and the vindication of education's autonomy are not new. We find them stated clearly, to mention only one illustrative instance, at the end of John Dewey's *The Sources of a Science of Education*:

Education is autonomous and should be free to determine its own ends, its own objectives. To go outside the educational function and to borrow objectives from an external source is to surrender the educational cause. [...] For education is itself a process of discovering what values are worth while and are to be pursued as objectives. (Dewey, 1984, p. 38)

The implicit polemic target of Dewey's statements were the sociologists of social efficiency who vindicated as their own task that of identifying aims and values that education was expected to pursue. As a consequence, educators were relegated to a subordinate position and their role was that of devising the appropriated pedagogical strategies to put those values and aims to effect.

In the German tradition of *Pädagogik*, instrumental fallacy is connected with "affirmative theories of education" that are:

based on an instrumental concept of educational practice and view it as an important means for either the transmission or the alteration of given actualities. Not as producers of the respective actuality are the educational interactants viewed, but rather as actual or potential bearers of desirable qualities. [...] [Affirmative theories] recognize the "educational" aspect, [...], only as the "execution" of non-educational demands on educational practice. (Benner, 2015, p. 147)

A genuinely educational theory of education entails, therefore:

[t]he suspension of any affirmative education, that is, the fundamental renunciation of placing education as a directly affirming or negating instance in the service of non-educational actualities. [...] A non-affirmative theory of education differs from affirmative educational conceptions in that it does not conceptualize pedagogical influences as either intentional or functional interventions. Instead, it problematizes the intentionality of educational action on the basis of the principle of the summoning to self-activity [*Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit*] and it challenges the functionality of societal influences under the idea of their pedagogical transformation. (Benner, 2015, pp. 147–147)

Gert Biesta (2021, pp. 33, 46) has appropriated precisely this notion of the *Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit* in order to define the specificity of an educational inquiry into education, and has construed it in terms of an existential approach, distinct from the typical paradigm of cultivation (see also Biesta, 2017a, 2017b). As we understand his position (see Oliverio, 2022, 2025), to overlook the existential

approach risks ultimately dissolving educational questions into those of other sciences (psychology, sociology etc.) or discourses (e.g. politics). In Italian contributions to this debate, this danger has been termed the “negative identity of pedagogy” (Spadafora, 1992): once we build the disciplinary field of “pedagogy” (= *Pädagogik*) merely through concepts of psychology, sociology or politics – without any further work of re-elaboration and transformation – we end up with a discipline that has a simply residual, if not utterly negative, epistemic and methodological identity.

Against this backdrop, in the present paper we want to offer an existential view of inclusive education in particular. Inclusion is not only one of the key notions of the contemporary educational debate but also it provides a litmus test to explore whether and to what extent an existential understanding can help us to avoid the traps of affirmative theorizing and of the colonization (Habermas, 1985, p. 522) of the educational-pedagogical discourse by other vocabularies.²

It should be stated that the very notion of inclusion belongs originally to sociology and, thus, the question arises of what transformation it must undergo in order for it to become a genuinely educational-pedagogical concept. Moreover, the issue of inclusion has become more and more intimately connected with that of social justice, such that education may be subordinated to political discourse. Hence, inclusive education risks ending up as a “politics of inclusion” (Korsgaard, 2018). Here, we investigate the role that an existential approach might add to understanding inclusive education in genuinely educational terms.

Our argument will unfold in two stages. First, we will examine the evolution of inclusion, from a sociological concept to a pedagogical one, which initially distinguishes itself from integration and gradually transitions from individual concerns to broader questions of social justice. Second, we will argue that existentialist philosophy of the self provides the foundation both for inclusive pedagogy’s emphasis on the unique, non-comparable, and irreplaceable individual subject and for its ability to address the challenges within the concept of inclusion, particularly regarding the acknowledgment of social justice issues. This includes the reality of facticities – barriers and adversities – and their limiting

² While Habermas uses the concept of colonization to critique the encroachment of systemic imperatives into the lifeworld, we apply this notion to their intrusion into the educational discourse.

impact on individual self-actualization. Based on this, we propose that this philosophically grounded understanding of inclusive pedagogy serves as a model that exemplifies the core pedagogical principles, thereby safeguarding pedagogical autonomy from external forces—particularly economic, political, and psychological forces—that seek to redefine its telos.

In this endeavor, we suggest that a non-affirmative stance in educational theorizing goes hand in hand with a vindication of the “negativity” of a child. Disturbing as this notion may sound, it should not be taken in a derogatory meaning. The negativity here invoked is not that of adultist views, which consider childhood at most as an early, preparatory stage in a developmental trajectory or as a condition of (temporary) inferiority to be gone through and abandoned or, even, as pure materiality to be shaped (materiality in the Aristotelian acceptance of a negative potentiality which must get in-formed). Instead, according to the philosophical-existential perspective here proposed, negativity is a manifestation of the freedom to be(come) a subject and, in line with the key idea of the *Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit*, its recognition is the real core of any educational encounter. In this respect, the concept of “negativity” aims also at disengaging the reflection on inclusion from the “politics of identities,” which all too often encumber the discourse of inclusion. Indeed, valuable as this may be from other viewpoints, it is moot that it results in a genuinely, viz. non-affirmative, educational theorizing about inclusion³.

towards an educational conceptualization of inclusion

In his entry on *Inklusion/Exklusion* as a fundamental concept of science of education, Markus Emmerich (2022) highlights that

[t]he vocabulary of the science of education is known to include numerous borrowed terms drawn from the reference theories of adjacent disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, or sociology. However, this does not mean that the original meaning of the imported conceptual constructs is preserved. (p. 219)⁴

³ One could even wonder whether and to what extent an educational-affirmative stance, when referred to the child, might be ultimately a manifestation of adultism, in that it addresses the child from perspectives drawn from adult concerns and disrespectful of the potentiality of an encounter with the child as the freedom to be(come) a subject or, with a slightly different vocabulary, to be a beginner and a beginning. We will not be able to explore this more radical interpretation in this contribution.

⁴ It is appropriate to mention that the term “science of education” is a translation of the original German *Erziehungswissenschaft*, which could also be rendered as “education studies.” Indeed, it is worth specifying that while “science” is the most commonly used translation for *Wissenschaft*, the

As is often highlighted in the German debate, to which we are referring, inclusion is originally a sociological notion⁵ that “refers to the question of the ‘access’ of individuals to social systems [...] as well as the process and mechanisms involved in creating such access” (Kastl, 2012, p. 7). In the sociological conceptualization, inclusion and integration are two distinct, but not opposing, notions, insofar as integration:

presupposes access to a social context, i.e., inclusion. However, integration fundamentally concerns something different: the “holistic character” of social systems, encompassing cohesion [...] and the interplay of various parts or subsystems within a social system. It also involves the question of embedding and the interaction of individuals within and with the social system. (p. 10)

In inclusive education, by contrast, inclusion and integration represent two different approaches and bear different values (see below § 2.1) connected with a major difference between sociology and “pedagogy” in their respective takes on inclusion: in “pedagogy,” the notion indicates a *Wertpräferenz* (Emmerich, 2022), a preference in terms of value. Accordingly, in educational theory inclusion is not merely an analytical tool to describe a state of affairs but points to something more desirable than integration. In this context, the question of inclusion is often tackled in reference to the challenges of social justice according to a critical pedagogical approach. This value aspect is tendentially alien to sociological research, however (Kastl, 2012). In the following sub-sections, we will engage in more detail with these two sides of inclusive education, the difference from sociology and the link with the issue of social justice.

latter encompasses a broader domain than the English “science” and does not necessarily imply reference to empirical research. In addition to this specification, let a contextualization of the quotation be allowed. The critique that educational science tends to import concepts from neighboring disciplines without incorporating their associated conceptual complexity has been reiterated repeatedly in metatheoretical discussions (especially in the German debate to which we are predominantly drawing upon). Brezinka (1978) famously applied Kuhn’s distinction between paradigmatic (or “normal”) and pre-paradigmatic sciences (Kuhn, 1962) to educational science, ultimately rejecting its status as a true science—an argument echoed in the English-speaking discourse (Labaree, 1998; Neoparast, 2016; Ranis & Walters, 2004). This critique is further supported by the fact that educational science is only marginally recognized by other, more paradigmatic disciplines in Kuhn’s terms—and when it is, it is almost exclusively in the form of quantitative research (Li et al., 2024). With our attempt to provide the concept of inclusion in educational science with a philosophical framework, we hope to contribute constructively to addressing this issue.

⁵ As Stichweh (2013) analyzes, the inclusion/exclusion distinction has been developed and refined in the social sciences over the past 30–40 years. Building on the initial theoretical groundwork laid by Talcott Parsons in the 1960s, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann further elaborated this distinction to move beyond traditional sociological integration models, which he argued were insufficient for explaining the role of individuals in a functionally differentiated society (Luhmann 1987/1995).

inclusion does not distinguish itself from exclusion but from integration

From the outset⁶ in the 1980s, inclusive pedagogy has defined itself in contrast⁷ to integration (cf. Sebba & Ainscow, 1996). Whereas the sociological concept of inclusion can be defined as the unity of the difference between inclusion and exclusion,⁸ pedagogical inclusion – as paradoxical as it may seem – does not address the problem of exclusion but rather the issues arising from the integration model (cf. Krönig, 2016). This is because exclusion, in the sociological sense, refers to the non-inclusion of people in social systems like the economy, art, religion, healthcare, and education. Modern society, however, functions on the basis of the inclusivity of social systems, albeit only by momentarily including people in their passive roles as consumers, audiences, believers, patients, and students (cf. Luhmann, 1995, p. 220). Note that this notion of inclusion explicitly does not refer to a structural and manifest inclusion of full persons into social systems. We are only “in” the economy if we pay or sell or process money and goods in any way, just as we are only included in the educational system during the period when we teach or are being taught in the broadest sense. One might say that we are “dividuals” in modern society since we are never fully included as individuals but only momentarily included in social systems in highly specific regards. As consumers in the supermarket we are not included as believers or voters (cf. Fuchs, 1992, p. 203).

When this sociologically conceived form of inclusion is not granted, either the legal system becomes involved (the passive roles as patients, consumers, voters etc. can in many cases be legally claimed) or the system of social work manages inclusion by providing integration measures. The operation of social work can be seen as a provisional inclusion within its own system, which then aims to include its clients into all other social systems (cf. Baecker, 1994). However, education always operates on the basis of de facto inclusion within the pedagogical system. In other words: pedagogy has either no contact with these radically excluded people (and thus does not operate in relation to them) or it

⁶ According D'Alessio et al. (2009) it was “around the end of the 80s that the term inclusion began to slowly supersede that of integration”.

⁷ That there are then and now still de-differentiated usages of the term inclusion as synonymous with integration and special needs education is, indeed, “perplexing” (cf. Slee, 2009).

⁸ This means: in sociology, inclusion defines itself in distinction to exclusion.

works with people who are already included in pedagogical institutions (as students in the broadest sense). This is not even an argument nor a thesis but rather an elaboration of the sociological—more specific: systems theoretical definition of the inclusion/exclusion distinction. Then, being addressed as a student by institutionalized pedagogical communication is synonymous to being included.⁹ Of course, pedagogy, especially social pedagogy, also focuses on exclusion problems but does so only with and for the people who are already included as students.¹⁰

Inclusive pedagogy is thus no answer to social exclusion in the sociological sense but to forms of “inclusion” it regards as pedagogically problematic (cf. Vislie, 2003). These forms can be subsumed under the concept of integration. Integration refers to all approaches that divide people in pedagogical settings into subgroups that face common challenges and shall therefore be addressed with specific pedagogical measures. When, for example, a group of children in an early childhood education and care institution is divided on the basis of special needs that are to be professionally addressed, certain children are being categorized and temporarily excluded from the group albeit in order to re-integrate them fully in the future.

Inclusive pedagogy both criticizes the categorization of children (even if deficit-orientated labels are avoided) and their temporary exclusion (cf. Slee, 2009). The idea is that all children benefit from the diversity of the groups they are part of and that it is possible to arrange pedagogical situations that allow and ask for the viewpoints and contributions of all people involved. One approach to inclusion is a so-called thing-centered pedagogy (cf. Vlieghe & Zamojski, 2019) that offers complex, multi-faceted real-world objects to children that can be meaningfully approached by all children on their own terms and in their own ways—in contrast to didactically reduced material that prescribes a small number of pre-defined learning approaches and outcomes. These reductive approaches are seen as exclusive as they facilitate, normalize, and reward some practices and problematize others. In turn, from an inclusion perspective, this renders some

⁹ We thank reviewers for drawing our attention to the need to expand more on this aspect.

¹⁰ To say the “disabled has been the subject of exclusion in the school environment” (Pagni, 2017, p. 167) is definitely true from a historical perspective. The non-inclusivity the disabled face in the school environment today, however, should (from a terminological perspective) not be called exclusion but: separation, integration, non-inclusion...

children challenged, “in need”, or incompetent in relation to the task or learning experience. At this point, this paper does not seek to judge one or the other approach but rather to differentiate inclusion and integration from the perspective of inclusive pedagogy. This self-description of inclusive pedagogy defines what early conceptions of inclusive pedagogy set out to contribute to a new understanding of pedagogy. In terms of a functional definition, inclusion is (sees itself as) the solution for the problem of integration. The critique that inclusive pedagogy faced in this early stage focused on its alleged utopianism and the risk of a de-professionalization of pedagogy by withholding specialized professional competencies from children with special needs. It is widely discussed whether the inclusive de-categorization leads to a de-professionalization by reducing special needs educators, which, considering their comparatively higher salaries, can be interpreted as a neoliberal austerity agenda (cf. Becker, 2015). We will not get into this long-held and documented discussion since we want to focus on a new line of critique of inclusive pedagogy.

inclusion and social justice

In recent years, critiques of inclusive pedagogy have shifted focus from its pragmatic viability—such as the effectiveness of de-categorizing differences among children and concerns about withholding necessary professional knowledge from those with special needs—to more politically charged questions. Analogous and arguably in reaction to the concept of colorblind racism (cf. Burke, 2018), the notion of disregarding categories and group differences among children is now criticized for potentially de-thematizing and thereby inadvertently perpetuating oppression (cf. Dovidio et al., 2015; Plaut et al., 2018). Whereas inclusive pedagogy previously critiqued integration from a normative standpoint, it has now become the subject of substantial normative critique itself. Critics question whether the emphasis on the individual and the deliberate avoidance of acknowledging social inequalities, differential vulnerabilities, and the victimhood statuses of various communities render inclusive pedagogy a conservative or even reactionary political institution. Ignoring categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, and disability is seen to equate to overlooking and consequently perpetuating these very inequalities (cf. Hernández-Saca et al., 2023). Furthermore, the inclusive

focus on the incomparable, unmeasurable, and uncategorizable individual is scrutinized as a potential (neo)liberal fetishization of the bourgeois Enlightenment concept of the individual (a-social) subject, which holds individuals solely responsible for their own success or failure (cf. Becker, 2015). To date, inclusive pedagogy has not offered a philosophical-educational response to these critiques. Instead, it has attempted to incorporate intersectional approaches without addressing the fundamental paradoxes this integration entails (cf. Bešić, 2020). Rather than adjudicating whether inclusive pedagogy embodies neo-liberal tendencies that inadvertently perpetuate inequalities, the following section aims to articulate the inclusive concept of the individual from a philosophical perspective, namely through aspects of Sartre's existentialism.

It is important to specify the scope of our engagement with Sartre's philosophy or, to put it more accurately, with some tenets of his philosophy that we see as valuable conceptual tools for our reflection in this paper. Our focus here is not to explore the relationships between existentialism—as a specific philosophical school—and educational theory. This has been elaborated elsewhere (cf. Bollnow, 2014; Kneller, 1958; Oliverio, 2022). Rather, the introduction of Sartre's ideas is a stepping-stone to showing how far an existential approach in inclusive education may contribute to avoiding the dangers of affirmative theorizing and of the de-educationalization of educational research and practice. In this regard, we will suggest re-describing the Sartrean view of the individual from the perspective of the *Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit*—the summoning to self-activity—as referred to in section 1. As a consequence, while briefly acknowledging (see below) some possible concerns—strictly from an educational perspective—regarding Sartre's philosophy as a whole, we do not intend to provide a fully developed discussion of it. Furthermore, we will situate our endeavour within the contemporary “existential turn” in educational theorizing (see below the reference to Gert Biesta and Piero Bertolini; see also Oliverio, 2022). We recognize that Sartre's insights do not fully align with this perspective, particularly with regard to the crucial issue of the educational relationship.

This misalignment stems from the fact that Sartre refines his conceptual categories within a predominantly philosophical discourse—moreover, one that is

creatively linked to the French tradition's focus on the ego. By contrast, the existential turn in educational theory emphasizes the inherently relational nature of educational phenomena as such (for a broader elaboration on this point, see Oliverio, 2022).

Despite these caveats, we consider Sartre's reflection on facticity to be particularly insightful and strategically valuable in the effort to develop an existential view of inclusive education, which avoids the pitfalls of what we are going to define, with Biesta, the discourse of the identity and, thus, an excessive concentration on what Sartre would call facticities. However, this does not mean that we are proposing a fully Sartrean concept of inclusive education. In other words, we do not intend to subscribe here to his existential philosophy in its entirety. Rather, we aim to activate what we see as potentially powerful interpretive tools, to be integrated within a broader—and distinctly educational-theoretical—framework of inquiry.

inclusive pedagogy's philosophy of the individual as a subject

Inclusive pedagogy posits that the individual child represents both the minimal and maximal unit for meaningful educational differentiation. This perspective rejects both intra-individual differentiation—breaking down the individual into various competencies—and inter-individual differentiation—grouping individuals based on categorical distinctions. Inclusive pedagogy's opposition to both intra-individual and inter-individual differentiation is primarily based on normative reasoning. While this normative stance may be effective against intra-individual differentiation, by emphasizing concepts such as the “whole child”, it appears less compelling against inter-individual differentiation. From a critical-pedagogical stance can be argued that by disregarding group differences, inclusive pedagogy may inadvertently perpetuate inequalities among underrepresented, marginalized, and oppressed communities.¹¹ Setting aside these normative and partially political

¹¹ Ahrbeck (2021) argues that the dogma of decategorization in the inclusion discourse obstructs the recognition of differences and trivializes special (needs) education. Bešić (2020) asserts the need to supplement the concept of inclusion with an intersectional approach to “emphasize that students who are marginalized or discriminated against often experience multiple forms of marginalization and discrimination, not only at the individual level but also within institutional structures” (p. 118). Boger (2015) develops a triadic theory of inclusion, demonstrating how only two of its three

considerations,¹² we now turn to the philosophical underpinnings of inclusive pedagogy's conception of the individual. What philosophical rationale does inclusive pedagogy offer to support its focus on the individual child, advocating against differentiation in both intra-individual and inter-individual contexts?

This philosophical basis is best articulated by existential philosophy in general, and the work of Jean-Paul Sartre in particular. Although other existentialist thinkers, such as Heidegger and Bollnow, offer arguments for the negativity and freedom of the individual—both essential for philosophically grounding the pedagogical concept of inclusion—Sartre's insights are particularly nuanced in examining the various forms of facticity that challenge this very stance.¹³ Without a refined phenomenological—not merely ontological—theory of facticity, inclusive pedagogy's emphasis on individual uniqueness and freedom could be readily critiqued from a social justice perspective, as outlined above.

In his seminal work, *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre (1966) follows Heidegger's insight that it is a fundamental philosophical mistake to discuss subjects in the same terms used for discussing objects. Heidegger famously invented a great number of philosophical terms that differentiate between existential and categorical meaning. When we refer to “the ready-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 145) in everyday language, we categorically treat these objects as things that are what they are, i.e., as identical with themselves. This is plausible in relation to the objects of our everyday world as well as with reference to the objects of the natural sciences. A stone, weighed in a hand in an everyday context or as an object of physical measurement is constructed as the sum of its perceived properties. This approach can also be applied to individuals, their actions, and their thoughts, but such reified subjects lose, according to Heidegger, exactly what

fundamental goals—normalization, empowerment, and deconstruction—can conceptually coexist. Consequently, from this perspective empowering marginalized or oppressed individuals and communities is impossible without acknowledging the social differences that inclusion seeks to de-thematize and overcome.

¹² The question of whether it is both possible and advisable to set aside political considerations when discussing pedagogical issues—as post-critical pedagogy suggests—remains an ongoing debate (see Issue 3(9) in *On Education: Journal for Research and Debate*). We cannot address this relevant theme within the framework of this paper. Similarly, as our aim is not to frame a fully developed Sartrean view of education, we cannot expatiate on how Sartre would choreograph the relationship between educational theory and political engagement.

¹³ We thank reviewers for suggesting the opportunity to explain better the reason for our deployments of Sartre's tenets. We will return to the reasons for this choice also later in the last two sections of this paper.

differentiates them from objects. Existential philosophy does not merely emphatically claim that there is something more to subjects than to things. Both Heidegger and Sartre argue extensively and thoroughly that there is, in fact, a fundamental ontological difference between subjects and objects, to the extent that they avoid the terms “subject” and “object,” both of which still reside within the common framework of objects (subjects as a subspecies of objects). The key for Heidegger and Sartre lies in the concept of negativity. For Heidegger, the foundational negativity of Dasein (roughly speaking his existential term for what is categorically called the subject) is its temporality: “Dasein must, as itself, become—that is to say, be—what it is not yet” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 287). Sartre, however, offers a more elaborated differentiation of this very negativity of what he calls the “for-itself” (Sartre, 1966, p. 119): “In order for a self to exist, it is necessary that the unity of this being include its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity” (Sartre, 1966, p. 125). This seemingly paradoxical formulation brings us to the issue regarding inclusive pedagogy’s notion of the individual: “Yet the for-itself is. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not” (p. 127). Seeing a child as what it is not means that we cannot identify this child with its facticity. This child was born at a certain time at a certain place into a certain family and a certain historical, cultural, and societal situation. None of these determinations are necessary nor are they chosen by the child. However, these contingent facticities are utterly concrete. All this is subsumed under the term of facticity. At first glance, it seems that this child carries these facticities as properties. For existential philosophy, the opposite is the case. The child will, and has to, attribute meaning to all of these facticities in a way that is not determined by the facticities themselves. To be male or white or disabled has no meaning in itself. We do not just have properties like these or others as long as we do not reify ourselves totally. Rather, according to Sartre, we are condemned to attribute meaning to these facticities on the basis of our freedom (cf. Sartre, 1966, pp. 618). Sartre adds that our freedom cannot determine, i.e. we cannot choose, the facticities themselves. Although we cannot describe facticities independently of the meaning we attribute to them, there is something like a “residuum” (Sartre, 1966, p. 619) that (on epistemological grounds) cannot be named or described but still determines the “coefficient of adversity of the things” (p. 619). If a child wants

to climb a tree, Sartre would say, this wish transforms the tree into something climbable. This is not an inherent feature of the tree but only comes to reality in relation to freedom in the form of the child's wish. Once the child chooses to climb the tree, however, they cannot choose how high the first branch is or how smooth the bark is. This illustrates that Sartre is not a naïve idealist who believes in unlimited freedom of action—but rather of will. The same goes for the child's bodily presuppositions to climb the tree. Naturally, there is a facticity of the self that contributes to the possibility of climbing the tree. The child must attribute meaning to their own facticity, however. Is the child frustrated? Do they plan to practice their jumping skills, ask people for help, quarrel with God, use technology, decide that it is a dull idea anyway? For Sartre, the child defines themselves as an individual subject, not in relation to their facticities (such as the length of their arms), but in relation to their process of meaning-making in response to these facticities. If the child does, in fact, define themselves based on facticities, Sartre refers to this as inauthenticity. This leads to the crucial point that categorization in the context of both special needs education and social justice discourses risks negating the foundational negativity and freedom of children and people in general. Inclusive pedagogy insists that a subject should not be identified with certain pseudo-properties, nor with its subjectivation as a victim of societal oppression. The child, as seen by inclusive pedagogy, has no properties like special needs or more or less developed competencies. These properties are not what the child is; it transcends these facticities by projecting itself into its own future. This is what Sartre means by the self being "what it is not" (Sartre, 1966, p. 127); namely, its own not yet actualized, thus negative (categorically non-existent), future.¹⁴ This does not mean, however, to deny the different

¹⁴ The radical nature of Sartre's negative concept of individual subjectivity becomes evident when we compare it to an approach that also seemingly emphasizes individuality. At the core of Vygotsky's theory is the assessment of both a child's current developmental stage (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 85) and their unique zone of proximal development (p. 90). With this, Vygotsky breaks away from the developmental psychological norm of standardizing and fostering children's development based on age appropriateness (p. 84). But does Vygotsky's focus on what a child *cannot yet do alone but can accomplish with assistance* not already account for the child's negativity in a way that aligns with existential-philosophical considerations in general, and Sartre's approach in particular? Against this, one must argue that the paradigm of development, even within Vygotsky's framework, is fundamentally incompatible with the existential-philosophical ontology of the child. For one, development operates within physical temporality—that is, within a unilinear conception of time where phenomena can be situated and causal relations hold. Sartre, as discussed, would object that an individual subject never fully coincides with itself, as if it were a thing. It possesses no fixed properties that could be determined at a specific moment in time. Thus,

adversities of facticities one child faces in comparison to other children. Rather, it means not identifying children with the facticities they face (as objects or even victims of these) but with their own fully individual way of dealing with them and attributing meaning to them and to themselves.

We can address this theme from another angle. Obviously, we do not want to deny that investigating and being aware of the facticities is not significant, including from an educational viewpoint, but it is moot whether dwelling upon them is the core of an educational-pedagogical outlook. We can adopt and re-adapt in this context some insights of an Italian educationalist, Piero Bertolini (1988), who, like Sartre, builds on Husserl's tenets in order to outline the features of what he calls "pedagogical existing." Bertolini honed his conceptual tools in reference to educational work with criminal and deviant youth and, thus, in a domain which is not strictly that of inclusive education as commonly understood. Some of his intuitions may be helpful in this context, however. In particular, what is most interesting for the present argument is his opening move: he contests as pedagogically insignificant, if not inane, the categorizations of children/youth as at-risk, maladjusted, deviant or criminal. These categorizations are imported into educational theory and practice from other discourses (sociology, psychology and legal system) but do not say anything *pedagogically relevant* when we come to the task of (re)education. Indeed, on the basis of his work in a juvenile prison, he came to the conclusion that – from a genuinely educational viewpoint – there are no conspicuous differences between these four categories as all individuals belonging to them are marked by what Bertolini defines as "a difficulty to become a subject" (Bertolini & Caronia, 2015, pos. 702), that is, a difficulty to recognize their own capacity to attribute meaning to the

from Sartre's perspective, defining a child's current developmental status amounts to reifying the child, failing to recognize its inherent non-identity with itself. Similarly, determining the child's "zone of proximal development" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90) would, in Sartre's view, represent a narrowing of its horizon, which he conceives as being marked by radical openness. According to Sartre, the child is not in a process of development toward a prefigured future; rather, every process is, so to speak, interrupted by negativity. The existential-philosophical pedagogue Otto Friedrich Bollnow (2014) elaborates on this idea by replacing the concept of development with that of crises, leaps, and instant moments (p. 38). None of this is intended as an argument *against* Vygotsky. There is no doubt that children are also organic and neural beings, subject to the processual temporality of developmental processes. Rather, this comparison clarifies what Sartre—at least in the reading we are here suggesting—means when speaking of the individual child: its subjectivity, which is not an entity that is determinable in the framework of development and its physical temporality.

world. This is the core of an educational-pedagogical understanding as distinct from that of other disciplines such as psychology (focusing on maladjustment to the environment) or sociology (addressing the issue of deviancy) or the legal system (sanctioning criminal behaviour).

There is a double level in this contention. First, at the epistemological level, it is a vindication of “pedagogy” (= *Pädagogik*) as an autonomous perspective distinct from other disciplines. Once again: we are not denying the value of interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation but if, as educationalists, we confine ourselves to accepting theoretical vocabularies of other disciplines and discourses we risk missing the specificity of the educational outlook. Moreover, this reverberates at the methodological-operational level, insofar as the other disciplines tend to assume an “objective” stance, which, while perfectly legitimate in their domains, may be misleading when it comes to the educational task that appeals to an encounter and a relationship with freedoms and subjectivities.

To adapt these ideas to our Sartrean take on inclusive education, we suggest that while the study of the facticities is the task of the sciences of education—which, following in Dewey’s (1984) footsteps, may become sources of a science of education qua *Pädagogik*—it is not properly a matter of “pedagogy.” In some respects, this view has points of tangency with Biesta’s (2021) concern about the one-sidedness of an educational discourse reduced to the simple paradigm of cultivation, which tends to focus on “the way in which human beings become who they are as a result of the interplay of ‘internal’ factors and ‘external’ influences” (p. 30). In this sense, it assumes a third-person perspective that studies the educand from the outside. The paradigm of cultivation is predicated on the question of “identity [which] concerns the question of who I am, both in terms of what I identify with and how I can be identified by others and by myself” (Biesta, 2020, p. 99). Most of the scholarship in inclusive education is arguably aligned with this perspective.

An existential approach, instead, pivots on subject-ness rather than on identity and, thus, entails a first-person perspective:

The question of subject-ness, however, is not the question of who I am but the question of *how* I am, that is to say, the question of how I exist, how I try to lead my life, how I try to respond to and engage with what I encounter in my life. It therefore includes the question regarding what I will “do” with my

identity — and with everything I have learned, my capacities and competences, but also my blind spots, my inabilities, and incompetence — in any given situation, particularly those situations in which I am called upon or, to put it differently, in which my “I” is called upon. (Biesta, 2020, p. 99)

In contemporary debate of educational theory and philosophy, Biesta’s position represents one of the most influential vindications of the need for an existential stance. His opposition of the latter to a paradigm pivoting on what he calls “identity” presents relevant affinities with the Sartrean view we are endeavoring to develop. What drawing upon Sartre enables us, is to better spotlight the question of facticities. In this respect, we can rephrase Biesta’s argument in these terms: the existential approach shifts the focus from the consideration of facticities to how the subject comes into existence by dealing with them.

Moreover, passing through Biesta allows us to reconnect our argument to our point of departure, namely the endeavor to develop a view of inclusive education that does not risk slipping into any “affirmative theorizing.” As aforementioned in § 1, Dietrich Benner highlights the pivotal role of the German notion of the *Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit*, the summoning to self-activity, for a non-affirmative theory of education. It is noteworthy that Biesta associates his understanding of the existential approach precisely with a recontextualization of this concept:

“Aufforderung” is not the cultivation of an object [...] but can better be understood as a summoning, as encouragement, one might say, that speaks to the child or young person as subject. “Selbsttätigkeit”, which literally means self-action, is not the injunction to be active but to be(come) *self*-active. (Biesta, 2020, p. 94)

We can re-describe this (educative) act of the encouragement to act as a *self*¹⁵ (and, thus, to the recognition of oneself as a subject, as Bertolini would put it)

¹⁵ Admittedly, inclusive pedagogy is not solely about the individual self but also about intersubjective recognition, community, and solidarity. However, we argue that inclusive pedagogy inherently follows the Sartrean path to intersubjectivity rather than, for instance, the Hegelian. While Sartre later revised his stance (Sartre, 1960), and this Cartesian, egological approach—deriving intersubjectivity from the position of a prior subject that precedes and enables it—has been convincingly criticized (e.g., Frank, 1991), we would like to suggest that this perspective can grant valuable insights for a more coherent understanding of inclusive pedagogy. Undoubtedly, “inclusive individualism” (Storm, 2015, p. 231), i.e. the focus on the individual self, has been widely challenged by scholars emphasizing inclusive communities (cf. Martino et al., 2022) and advocating for a social justice perspective on inclusion (cf. Pantić & Florian, 2015). Individualization itself has been repeatedly deconstructed by Foucauldian scholars (cf. Burman, 2012; Näsman, 1994; Smith, 2014), often as a mechanism of governmental power (cf. Madsen, 2014).

in terms of an appeal to freedom: as mentioned above, this does not entail any denial of facticities nor any reduction of the individual to a cluster of facticities that operate independently of the subject's capacity to attribute meaning to the world.

We have spoken of points of tangency between the Sartrean reading proposed here and Biesta's insights but not of a complete overlap. Indeed, we cannot pass over in silence a major difference (see also Oliverio, 2022): the kind of "subjectification" (in Biesta's [2017, 2020, 2021] words) to which Sartre (and Bertolini for that matter) points would appear to Biesta as too egological and too inf(l)ected by a hermeneutic stance (with its emphasis on the act of meaning-making) and, consequently, as ultimately still ensnared within the paradigm of cultivation and, possibly, missing the properly educational dimension.

What regime of relationships may obtain between these two kinds of educational subjectification (those of Biesta, on the one hand, and of Sartre and Bertolini, on the other) cannot be explored here. Rather, we have sought to pinpoint the specificities of an existential engagement with inclusive education as one that may enable us to better distil what is educational-pedagogical, without subordinating this latter dimension to other discourses, as important as they may be when designing actions of inclusive education.

the negativity of the child and a non-affirmative inclusive education

This notion of the negativity of the child may seem peculiar and specific to inclusive pedagogy. One could also argue, however, that it is the stance of "pedagogy" in general. Does "pedagogy" not fundamentally mean positioning the child as negative (cf. Krönig, 2022, p. 6)? If we view a child as determined by its facticities, we can treat it medically or engage in political efforts to change these facticities, but we cannot accompany it on its indeterminate journey to become

However, we interpret this not as a critique from within inclusive pedagogy but rather as a critique directed at it. From our perspective, inclusive pedagogy that replaces the notion of the subject with that of subjectification (cf. Krönig, 2022) — in the Foucauldian acceptance of the notion — to accommodate power-critical discourses and intersectional perspectives might ultimately undermine its own foundation. Admittedly, these approaches still identify as inclusive pedagogy. Perhaps they should indeed be seen as necessary revisions—or even an overcoming—of the original framework. Nevertheless, they respond to an approach that, we argue, is internally coherent and philosophically grounded in an existential approach.

what it is not. In the end, it is not about whether the child “really” is a negative entity that can project itself into its own future. It is about the mere possibility of seeing it as such that seems to be the entry ticket into the world of pedagogy. As argued above, a conception of what is pedagogical in “pedagogy” is the necessary condition for its autonomy both as a field of practice and as a scientific discipline. Inclusive pedagogy is arguably the most radical formulation of this autonomy insofar as it insists on viewing each child in the light of their own future and as a negative entity that cannot and must not be defined, standardized, and normalized.

This negativity, radical individuality, freedom, and responsibility of the child may be criticized for its proximity to liberal ideologies. Critics argue that these perspectives overemphasize individual autonomy and self-determination, leading to increased responsabilization (cf. Smith, 2012) and neoliberal economization (cf. Burman, 2012). Perhaps most importantly, they contend that such views overlook the specific barriers faced by marginalized children (cf. Artilles et al., 2006). Arguably, this has triggered the rise of intersectional thinking in inclusion discourses and research (cf. Wheeler et al., 2020). As Sartre's philosophy of the self suggests, however, the emphasis on individuality and freedom neither neglects the various facticities individuals face nor the inequalities between individuals. Within this philosophical framework, we can acknowledge that children differ significantly regarding the barriers and adversities they have to deal with. The (inclusive) pedagogical perspective does not identify children as bundles of facticities they share with other children, however, but rather as subjects who (have to) escape their facticities individually by projecting themselves into their future. Empowering children to do so – rather than identifying themselves as determined by their facticities (their past, their origin, their body etc.) – by focusing on their interests and their imaginations is, therefore, the specific modality this pedagogical approach exhibits. Only by refusing to see children as what they purportedly “are” can “pedagogy” see them, and help them to see themselves as “what they are not.” This negativity of the child and its future is not only a necessary condition for their freedom but also serves as the “entry ticket” to the pedagogical realm. At this point, the concern is not an epistemological one, i.e., whether we can plausibly argue for the negative

ontology of the child. Instead, we assert that “pedagogy” constitutes itself through the imagination of the child as negative, thereby “plastic” and free.

concluding remarks

Our aim has not been merely to draw superficially interesting connections or to arbitrarily associate inclusive pedagogy with a particular philosophical tradition—namely, existentialism. Certainly, aspects of inclusive pedagogy could also be linked to other schools of thought. For instance, its rejection of categorization and essentialism aligns with post-structuralist or postmodern perspectives, while the notion of the subject’s negativity was explored much earlier by thinkers such as Fichte.

However, we have aimed to show that existentialist philosophy—particularly Sartre’s—does more than simply resonate with inclusive pedagogy. It provides a rational foundation for its core claims, which are often asserted normatively. Moreover, we have argued that these claims are not exclusive to any specific strand of education but are fundamental to pedagogy as an autonomous practice. What distinguishes “pedagogy” from disciplines like psychology, social work, or everyday social behavior is precisely its commitment to principles that inclusive pedagogy articulates in its most radical form.

The existentialist conception of human existence provides a philosophical lens through which to understand key tenets of inclusive pedagogy. For example, the pedagogical axiom of the child’s plasticity (cf. Herbart, 1835/1984, p. 5) can be interpreted through the existentialist notion of existence as temporally structured—a “running ahead” toward the future. Likewise, the insistence that children, as individual subjects, cannot be fully diagnosed or explained finds grounding in Sartre’s concept of ontological negativity: in his terms, the individual is “what it is not and is not what it is.” Finally, the critique that inclusive pedagogy’s emphasis on individual freedom overlooks or downplays the facticity of the world—leading some to dismiss it as individualistic, or even neoliberal—parallels one of the central concerns of *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre’s exploration of the tension between freedom and facticity provides a framework for addressing this issue in philosophical terms—complementary to, rather than in place of, normative and political perspectives.

In sum, the foundational challenges of inclusive pedagogy are, at the same time, the central concerns of existentialist philosophy – particularly Sartre’s. His work is especially relevant here, as he directly engages with the facticity of being-in-the-world – precisely the aspect critics argue inclusive pedagogy overlooks. Thus, rather than merely serving as an intellectual backdrop, existentialist thought offers a robust conceptual foundation for the principles that define inclusive pedagogy.

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