Addiction as a Phenomenological Illness and Site of Epistemic Injustice

Resumo

In this paper, I re-examine addiction, moving beyond traditional moral or biomedical models to integrate philosophical insights from the phenomenology of illness and the theory of epistemic injustice. I argue that addiction constitutes a profound phenomenological illness, fundamentally altering an individual's relationship with their body, world, and self. Drawing on Havi Carel's framework, I detail how this condition disrupts embodied transparency, narrows the life-world, and fragments identity, generating a unique form of existential suffering. I then contend that individuals with addiction systematically face Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Prejudicial stereotypes lead to credibility deficits, while inadequate collective interpretive resources leave their experiences misunderstood and inarticulable. This creates a vicious cycle where phenomenological suffering exacerbates epistemic injustice, which in turn perpetuates the addiction itself. I further delve into philosophical debates surrounding agency, autonomy, and responsibility, analyzing how the lived experience of compulsion challenges conventional notions of free will. Finally, I explore the transformative role of narrative and self-knowledge in reclaiming epistemic agency during recovery, offering pathways toward more empathetic care and systemic justice for those living with addiction.