Sentimentos existenciais, pertencimento e confiança
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12957/ek.2023.78557Palavras-chave:
Fenomenologia, Ratcliffe, Sentimentos existenciais, Pertencimento, ConfiançaResumo
A recente fenomenologia da afetividade tem se dedicado à elucidação de um campo específico de fenômenos afetivos que, a partir da contribuição seminal de Mathew Ratcliffe, é conhecido com o âmbito dos sentimentos existenciais. Sentimentos existenciais são sentimentos corporais que condicionam em geral as experiências intencionais. Tais sentimentos atuam de modo pré-reflexivo e são vivenciados como um senso de pertencimento e realidade. Além disso, os sentimentos existenciais são constituídos como uma classe diversificada de experiência de possibilidades, sendo dotados de uma estrutura horizontal. Situando-se neste contexto teórico, o presente artigo tem dois objetivos: reconstruir resultados básicos da análise fenomenológica dos sentimentos existenciais e explicitar uma linha de desenvolvimento concernente à relação entre senso de pertencimento e experiência de possibilidades. A análise da relação entre senso de pertencimento e estrutura horizontal da experiência evidenciará uma ligação entre pertencimento e confiança, que é entendida como um estilo afetivo e não localizado de antecipação de possibilidades. Um resultado relevante desta análise é a identificação da complexa estruturação modal dos sentimentos existenciais, na medida em que são estruturados por uma confiança básica que é um modo afetivo de estar numa dimensão de possibilidades.
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